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Abstract 
Governing China with the News: 
Television and National Development in China since 1958 
Steven Gunnpeng Dong 
This thesis is an historical study of the interplay between television news and 
politics in China since 1958. It examines the evolution of television news and 
political development in China, as well as the continuing innovations to the 
CCP's ideological system. 
Television in China has become the major source of social and political 
information and knowledge to facilitate development, at a time when China is 
experiencing its fastest development in the national economy. The Chinese 
television institutions now are far f rom a monolithic and unified propaganda 
machine, and have begun to play the role of a multifaceted creature 
undergoing a process of rapid transformation, wi th different parts of the body 
straining in different directions. Meanwhile, however, CCTV (China Central 
Television), which serves as the central hub of official information and social 
and political knowledge provision in the process of Chinese national 
development, is still mainly running according to the aims and agenda of the 
Chinese Communist Party and central government. Among China's 
journalists, the debate on the democratisation of journalism arises once again 
at a time when the social market economic system has been well established 
throughout the country. 
This thesis has involved the examination of a diverse range of sources, 
dispersed in several archives and libraries in the UK, US and China. 
Bibhographical research has been combined wi th f ieldwork carried out 
among Chinese television journalists and senior managers in television 
stations. 
This work aims to contribute to a better understanding of the media and 
politics of modern China, adding a new perspective to the study of televised 
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Introduction 
Governing with the news: 
Television and national development in China 
since 1958 
The significant revolution of the modern times is not industrial or economic or 
political, but the revolution taking place in the art of creating consent among the 
governed... Within the life of the new generation now in control of affairs, persuasion 
has become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government. None of 
us begins to understand the consequences, but it is no daring prophecy to say that the 
knowledge of how to create consent will alter every political premise. 
Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion [1922:1] 
The importance of the media in politics lies in their potential to reach large 
audiences. Television is especially important in today's politics as it provides 
a greater sense of reality. Television in China has become a major source of 
social and political awareness and provides information in support of 
development at a time when China's national economy is developing at its 
fastest rate ever. Chinese television institutions are no longer a monolithic and 
unified propaganda machine, but a multifaceted creature undergoing a 
process of rapid transformation, wi th different parts of the body straining in 
different directions. However, China Central Television (CCTV), which serves 
as the central hub of official information and contributes social and political 
knowledge to the process of Chinese national development, is still mainly 
being run according to the aims and agenda of the Party and central 
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government. Within the journalistic community of China, the arguments on 
democratisation of journalism arise once again at a time when the social 
market economic system is well established throughout the country. People 
want answers to certain questions, such as: 
• What is the contribution of Chinese television to the current and 
future political and economic development of China? 
• How important is the fact that CCTV serves as the only central 
medium in the Chinese "four-level" television system, and how 
long w i l l i t dominate the audience market? 
• Does the public expect CCTV to change in some way? 
• What is CCTV's current political communications strategy as 
directed by the Chinese Communist Party's Central Department of 
Publicity? 
• To what extent has the market economy provided a democratising 
alternative future path for Chinese television wi th in the rapidly 
developing political environment under CCP control? 
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• What challenge does Chinese on-line journalism present to 
television journalism? W i l l the pattern of television propaganda 
policies be changed? 
This thesis aims to answer these questions. 
Television news and Communist China 
We have experienced an age of powerful news f rom all over the world . 
What major functions do the mass media perform in society? Political scientist 
Harold Lasswell [1969:103], a pioneer in media studies, mentions: 
• surveillance of the wor ld to report ongoing events 
• interpretation of the meaning of events 
• socialisation of individuals into their cultural settings 
Political communications scholar Doris Graber [2002: 6] argues that a fourth 
function should be added, which would be the deliberate manipulation of 
politics. 
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It is believed that the media have a major impact on the conduct of poHtics 
and on pubhc thinking. Pohticians throughout the world act and behave on 
the basis of this assumption. 
Larzarsfeld [1944: 2] led research over 60 years ago reporting on how people 
made their voting choices in Erie County, Pennsylvania, USA in the 1940 
presidential election. His research is among the early studies in the West 
indicating that a well-publicised campaign appeared to change votes. His 
research was criticised for many years, as social scientists started proving that 
media influence was limited in determining people's votes. The f u l l 
technology of mathematics, statistics and even physics was introduced into 
the studies unti l a more persuasive learning theory was applied in 
researching media influence on politics [Hansen, Cottle, Negrine, Newbold, 
1998: 82]. 
Mass media effects are always hard to measure, both at individual and 
societal levels because they are highly complicated and elusive. Social 
scientists often underestimate media impact because they falsely equate 
statistical significance wi th political significance. Media impact on a 
statistically insignificant number of individuals could still have enormous 
political consequences. During an electoral campaign, for example, only one 
or two per cent of the voters may change their votes because of media stories. 
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That is a statistically negligible effect. From a political standpoint, however, 
the impact may be major, because there have been so many elections in 
history and in recent years which have ultimately been decided by a very 
narrow margin of voters. A n "insignificant" one per cent of the total would 
still represent more than one mil l ion people [Graber, 2002:15-18]. 
Studying media effects in China can be tough, as its billions of citizens are 
mobilised in various ways through the mass media every day, and 
researching Chinese audiences is too ambitious a project to be viable. What is 
surprising, however, is that the viewers in their billions are always directed 
by the media according to the Party's ideology. It is impossible to believe that 
governing China wi th ideology can be based on a very scientific research of 
media effects and audiences, using statistics and mathematical calculations. 
This carmot be how the Chinese Communist Party governs [Bishop, 1989: 5]. 
There are political elites in China who are playing an important part in social 
and political development. The main problem wi th social science research on 
China's mass media is that it has concentrated so much on measuring the 
effects on ordinary individuals, rather than on political elites. Average 
individuals in Chinese politics are generally unimportant in the political 
process, because the political elites in China talk in a relatively different 
language on television, and this makes programmes boring for ordinary 
people to watch. 
CCTV is still maintaining old-fashioned programmes like Xin Wen Lian Bo 
{The United Nexus at 7:00). It was the television version of the front page of the 
People's Daily (PD), but became far more powerful than the PD. Presenters on 
the programme are older than the average and unnecessarily serious, wi th no 
smile and no appeal. News items are ranked in order of people's official 
position in the Party and government. Political elites have the power to make 
changes and, as decision makers, their immediate concern is likely to be the 
content, genre, narrative and format of news because of the profound impact 
these aspects have. Despite a sharp decline in the audiences of Xin Wen Lian 
Bo in China since the 1990s, the programme is still the most politically 
important media production in China. No newspapers, radio reports, Internet 
pages or text-messaging services could ever replace its unquestionable 
authority. Reuters journalists in China once commented that watching Xin 
Wen Lian Bo was extremely helpful in predicting climate change in Chinese 
society, economy and politics [Interviews, 2005]. 
Government attempts to control and manipulate the media are universal, 
because public officials everywhere believe that the media are an important 
political force. This belief is based on the assumption that the institutions 
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which control pubHc information can shape pubUc knowledge and behaviour 
and thereby determine the support or opposition of citizens and officials to 
the government and its policies [Berkowitz, 1997; 101]. It is obvious that the 
CCP highly valued the significance of the media and the formation of public 
knowledge as early as the Yan'an Period, when i t was fighting against the 
Japanese invader and then the KMT [Zhao, 1998:14]. The CCP comprises 
thousands of party branches, normally wi th three officers leading a standard 
branch, one of whom is always responsible for publicity and propaganda. 
This can be seen f r o m Table 0.1 below: 
Table 0.1 A typical party branch 
• • 
Upper level of party 
organisation 
^Part^ Branch 
1 Propaganda Secretary Organisation 1 
1 Officer Officer | 
Team 1 of Team 2 of Team 3 of Team 4 of Team 5 of 
Members Members Members Members Members 
Source: Compiled by author according to the CCP Constitution 
Development theory and television studies 
As this thesis concerns television in China and its role in the governance and 
development of China, it has been written wi th the help of the arguments and 
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conclusions advanced by development theorists. The thesis has not restricted 
itself to a particular set of development theories, but has cherry-picked f rom 
different sources those judged to be most relevant to the discussion here. 
Development has over the years been described and defined in all sorts of 
ways and based on various factors. Different organisations and theorists have 
come up w i t h a score of methods for measuring the development of people at 
individual and family level, at country and continental level and even 
breaking the measurement down to look at development w i t h regard to 
society's use of technology and communication. Theories of development 
[Peet/Hartwick, 1999:1] define development as the use of the productive 
resources of society to improve the l iving conditions of its poorest people. 
This, however, is not normally the case, as the advancement of development 
frequently results in the accumulation of more by a few, while the process 
masquerades as the accumulation of more for more. 
China's emergence as one of the countries that has seen the most rapid 
development over the past three decades is mostly described in terms 
economic growth, such as the rate of growth of China's Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP per capita) since its economic reforms started. In this thesis, 
however, China's development is considered and discussed in terms of how 
economic development has affected people's lifestyles, communication 
processes and the relationship between citizens, politics and government. 
This is based on the understanding that describing a country as developed, 
f rom economic growth alone, is inadequate while there are still problems wi th 
its environment, cultural and social wellbeing and the media's restricted 
freedom of expression. In addition, economic growth inevitably results in 
victims; these are the people, or that part of the population, who suffer 
because of the economic advances that are taking place and enjoyed by other 
parts of the population. There are people who lose their homes in the name of 
infrastructure development, others who are exploited as cheap labour and 
others, such as women, who are marginalized as being unsuitable for various 
activities. 
Most of the definitions of development by which countries are measured are 
those developed by the World Bank, which uses GNP per capita, and the 
United Nations Development Fund (UNDP), which uses the Human 
Development Index (HDl) , and takes into account factors other than economic 
growth. China is measured against the scales of these two organisations. 
However, there are discrepancies in the methods used by these two 
organisations to measure development, which is because they are based on 
Western ideas of development. National and international agencies report 
only what can be measured using conventional accounting procedures. 
Whose "convention" is "conventional"? [Peet / Hartwick, 1999: 7]. 
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In recent years, contributors to development studies and theories have been 
coming to a growing consensus that economic growth is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for development. To say that a country has truly 
developed, the development must be accompanied by enhanced human 
rights, free media to facilitate free f low of information, and other liberties that 
allow a nation's people to participate ful ly in further development and to 
enjoy the resulting benefits. Wilbur Schramm (1956) is a pioneering scholar in 
his research on mass media and national development. He supports the idea 
that the mass media w i l l provide the necessary knowledge for development 
to the people and government. Schramm's approach differs f rom traditional 
development studies, as this particular area has been dominated by economic 
theories f rom classical economists and neo-classical scholars through to the 
Keynesian growth theory supporters. Development has always involved 
growth. The sociology theory of modernization has provided alternative 
approaches through naturalism, rationalism and structural functionalism. 
Modernization and development are beginning to be examined not only 
economically, but psycho-culturally, historically and sociologically. Other 
scholars have contributed to the idea of considering the media in the context 
of national development research. Vandana Desai and Robert Potter who 
edited the 2002 book entitled. The Companion to Development, says most 
theories have missed the power of the mass media. Peter Burnell and Vicky 
Randall (2008) argue in Politics in the Developing World that democratization's 
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meaning, like democracy itself, is contested, because of social integration by 
people's mass perception of democracy, influenced by the media. 
Marxist and neo-Marxist theories applied the terminology of imperialism, 
idealism, materialism, production theory and dependency theory. New 
theories analyzing development are also are now included, being post-
structuralism, post-colonialism, post-developmentalism and feminist theories. 
The mass media, however, are usually omitted when discussing new political 
and social changes in the developing world. Schramm's early work seems to 
have no sequel. This thesis fil ls in that gap, consisting of interdisciplinary 
research between political science and communications. 
The Study of Media and Politics 
As if to justify its position as the fourth estate or the fourth branch of 
government, the media everywhere have been playing an influential part in 
political systems and governance. Prompted by this increasing rise in the 
media's importance, scholars have over the years written books that aimed to 
examine the media and their role in politics and governance. In coming up 
with Governing China with the Nexus: Television and National Development in 
China since 1958, the author took inspiration f rom his study of media and 
politics through the works of several leading Chinese, American and British 
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scholars, including Timothy Cook, W Lance Bennett, Brian McNair and 
Yuezhi Zhao, among others. 
In the book Governing with Nezus: The Neios Media as a Political Institution, 
Timothy Cook presents an in-depth analysis of how the media work wi th 
politics in the United States of America. Published in 1998, the book looks at 
the idea of neutrality and objectivity of the media in the US. Cook examines 
how the media strive to be objective and neutral in their role as an 
indispensable part of government. In his introduction to the book, he states, 
"This book seeks to show how the news media are recognisable as a political 
institution: because of their historical development, because of shared 
processes and predictable products across news organisations, and because of 
the way in which the work of newspersons is so intertwined w i t h the work of 
official Washington that the news itself performs goverriment tasks". 
Another insight into the relationship between the media and governance is 
provided by W Lance Bennett in the book, Neivs: The Politics of Illusion. Here, 
Bennett presents a thematic focus on the relationship between news and 
governance. He goes beyond the conventional debate about freedom of the 
press by introducing discussion of news reforms and the age of citizen 
journalism. 
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Michael Schudson wrote a chapter in a book edited by Timothy Cook, called 
Freeing the Press: P' Amendment in Action. The chapter entitled, 'Why 
Democracies Need an Unlovable Press' argues that it is important for media 
to be aggressive and attacking in order to make democracy work. Schudson 
applauds the media for their tendency to focus attention on things that 
sometimes make it unpopular, such as the media's love of conflict and how 
they like to expose politicians and other people of power and influence. In 
essence, Schudson delivers the message that the media should not be a lap-
dog. 
Schudson also explores the role of the media in democracy in his 1995 book 
entitled. The Power of News. Here he discusses the importance of news wi th a 
historical perspective by looking back over the 300 years of US newspapers. 
He concludes that the news media can contribute to a more democratic 
society. More informed citizenship w i l l create a better and fuller democracy. 
A number of authors have looked at how people in the US depend on the 
media to hear about political developments, most especially during elections. 
Darrel West (2005), in his book, Air Wars: Television Advertising in Election 
Campaign 1952-2004, discusses the way that people learn about presidential 
candidates through television commercials. Larry Sabato (1992) examines 
how the news media cover and influence presidential campaigns, when attack 
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and investigative journalism becomes commonplace. Joseph Hayden (2002) 
details how Bill Clinton won the 1993 US elections wi th the media's help. His 
book entitled, Covering Clinton: The President and tlte Press in the 1990s, looks at 
Clinton's two-term presidency and how he related wi th the media. 
Other writers considered in this thesis have examined the way in which the 
media have changed politics wi th regard to how politicians present their 
message to the people, and also how people access political messages. In their 
book entitled. Media and the Re-styling of Politics, John Corner and Dick Pels 
(2003) argue that politics has been re-styled by the media, an idea confirmed 
by other scholars such as Margaret Scammell (2003), who observes that a new 
marketing of politics is invented as citizens become political consumers. 
Scammell contributes a chapter to the book. Media and Re-styling of Politics. 
Pippa Norris (2000), in her book, A Virtuous Circle: Political Communication in 
Post -Industrial Societies, observes that many accounts have mentioned the 
decline of traditional forms of party campaigning and the rise of new 
developments, such as the growth of spin-doctors and political consultants. 
Paolo Mancini (1999) argues that political professionalism has been revisited 
by the media-driven political marketing. Writ ing in the 'Journal of Political 
Corrununication', Issue 16, 1999, Mancini said, "...The original meaning of 
political professionalism is confined entirely in the field of politics; however. 
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the media have changed everything, a politician wi th no media experience 
cannot survive at all". 
The rising power of the media and increasing influence on politics and 
governance gave rise to media conglomerates, whose existence has taken the 
relationship between media and politics to a new level. In his book. Rich 
Media and Poor Democracy, Robert McChesney (1999) examines the rise of 
private media in the West. He observes that our era rests upon a massive 
paradox, "On one hand it is an age of dazzling breakthrough in 
communication and information technology. Communication is so 
intertwined wi th the economy and culture that our times have been dubbed 
the information age. On the other hand our era is increasingly depoliticised, 
traditional notions of civic and political involvement have shrivelled. 
Elementary understanding of social and political affairs has declined. The 
clear trajectory of our wor ld turns towards ever greater concentration, media 
conglomeration and hyper commercialisation". John Street (2001) in Mass 
Media, Politics and Democracy notes the poisonous conglomerate control by 
media moguls. Wri t ing about packaging politics, after seriously criticising 
state control and state propaganda in previous times. Street points out that in 
the face of globalisation and new technologies both politics and the mass 
media are changing, w i th major implications for the distribution of power 
and the operation of democracy. 
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W. Russell Newman (2001) brings in a new perspective when he talks about 
the impact of new media and politics. Contributing a chapter to the book 
Mediated Politics by W Lance Bennett and Robert M . Entman, he says, "The 
political activities in the web community have just completed a successful 
promotion of civic awareness and web use under the rubric of web, white and 
blue. There may be significant social re-alignment and social movements that 
w i l l bring news issues to the fore and reorganise traditional allegiances". John 
Thompson (2000) adds another perspective as he explores why political 
scandals have become more prevalent today. In his book. Political Scandal: 
Power and Visibility in the Media Age, he states that the more political scandal 
occurs the more likely i t is that new scandals w i l l arise and w i l l be amplified 
by increasing media attention. The dynamic of scandal, media attention and 
the politics of trust, produce racheting effect, which constantly increases the 
political stakes. 
Although many of the American authors were studied in the wri t ing of this 
thesis, were wri t ing about different topics, they all seemed to agree that the 
media in the US have a watchdog role. This is the conclusion reached by W. 
Lance Bennett and Wil l iam Serrin (2005) in the book edited by Geneva 
Overholser, entitled The Institutions of American Democracy - The Press. 
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British scholars have also made an extensive contribution to the exploration of 
how the media and government relate wi th each other. Brian McNair (1995, 
2000) provides an in-depth analysis of media and politics in the United 
Kingdom. McNair studies British politics in an age of mediation. The media 
have not only become a political editor; they are also a provider of people's 
everyday understanding of politics. He appears to be concerned about 
performance politics in the UK, which would not benefit the process of 
democracy. 
The Study of Chinese Media and Politics 
C. C. Lee is one of the first scholars in the West to have examined the 
infrastructure of Chinese politics and media. Works by CC Lee that 
influenced this book include China's Media, Media's China, published in 1994, 
and Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism, published in 1990. 
Yuezhi Zhao is another scholar among the first to study the history of radio, 
television and newspapers in China and analysed the relationship between 
media development and important historical moments. In her book. Media, 
Market and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line, Zhao 
studies the corruption of journalism in China, wi th a focus on newspaper 
reforms. In 2008 she published another book entitled. Communications in China: 
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Political Economy, Power and Conflict, where she describes how market reforms 
and digital communication technology have reconfigured the party/state 
power and media control. Perhaps most importantly, she argues that Chinese 
politics have entered an international age; China is invited to compete wi th its 
media system and the effective governance of a billion people. 
On the other hand, Daniel Lynch (1999) contends that a combination of 
property rights reform, administrative fragmentation and technological 
advance has caused the post-Mao Chinese state to lose a significant degree of 
control over "Thought Work", the management of propagandistic 
communication flow into and through Chinese society. Lynch's book. After the 
Propaganda State - Media, Politics and Thought Work in Reformed China, is the 
first Western scholar's book about contemporary media and politics in China. 
Another unique writer about China is Susan Shirk, former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State in the US. She is unlike other academic authors, because she 
observes China through diplomatic and political eyes, having been a senior 
diplomat in the US government, responsible for American policy on China. 
She has an unbeatable and unique understanding of China and its mass 
communications system. Her book is entitled, China: Fragile Super Power: Hoxv 
China's internal politics could derail its peaceful rise, and includes many of the 
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case studies she on how the media area managed over natural disasters and 
social crises in China. 
A l l the authors who have written about China and its media, such as Lynch, 
Zhao and Shirk, have done well in identifying issues at the core of the media 
and politics in China. M y thesis has greatly benefited f rom their scholarly 
observations on China. These authors, however, have not provided a 
thorough history of the interplay between television and politics in China. 
None of these scholars were real players in Chinese media and politics. Social 
science research methods, such as surveys, questionnaires, interviews and 
personal observations do not always guarantee unchallengeable results in 
analysing media and politics in China. I hope that this thesis w i l l go some 
way towards fu l f i l l ing this task. 
Television studies: from sociology to anthropology 
Writing about television has been popular in sociology. Issues covered are 
normally about television institutions, social representation on television, 
audience research and social effects. Richard Collins (2004) wrote a chapter in 
a book entitled. Television Studies Reader, edited by Robert Allen and Ennette 
H i l l . Collins discusses public service broadcasting in Europe and argues that 
this has been the dominating theme for people studying television. Early 
32 
works that may have influenced Collins' book include a Lucy Kung-
Shankleman's book, entitled. Inside the BBC and CNN-Managing Media 
Organization", published in 2000. She was the first scholar to have personally 
spent time in the BBC and C N N as a dedicated observer. Her book 
successfully compares the two broadcasters' methods in achieving their 
commercial and public service goals. 
Looking at China, Junhao Hong (1998) wrote a book entitled. The 
Internationalisation of Television in China: The Evolution of Ideology, Society and 
Media Since the Reform. Junhao successfully reviewed the history of Chinese 
television f rom Deng Xiaoping's reform until 1998. The focus of the book is on 
China's television preparation for its global challenges, and how conventional 
politics gave way to the enforced reform of the media. The book 
unfortunately did not give cover history before 1978. 
It has always been argued that television represents society, but Julie D'Acci 
(2004) states that any discussion of the ways in which television represents 
society might start by asking what is meant by the term "representation". 
Soft power theory had been invented and was extensively applied by the CCP 
from Chairman Mao's period of leadership onwards. Mao and his peers in the 
early foundation of the Party established an authoritarian control system 
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based on a totalitarian ideology. The system was designed to have tight 
control of the media in order to support the Party's ideological goals and 
prevent it f r om interfering wi th the Party's conduct of government. 
Traditionally, the CCP has four methods of controlling the press: laws and 
regulations, standards and values, structural management and economic tools. 
This thesis w i l l examine how this control is carefully managed and how it is 
contributing to the social, political and economic development of the nation. 
Theoretical foundations and structure of this thesis 
Studying television news in China is complex and requires diverse, eclectic 
methods. Chapters 1 to 4 begin by interpreting the historical record of 
Chinese television and its news production. The thesis follows the gradual 
development of Chinese politics, whereby political scientists use historical 
data to trace the origin of contemporary institutional organisations and to 
specify the political, social and economic conditions under which they 
emerged. It was thought important that the thesis should first provide a 
history of the relationship between politics and the media in China and 
clearly show how the two sides have been influencing each other to produce a 
kind of state-controlled yet semi-independent media. The first four chapters 
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explore how television emerged in the Chinese media and the position i t took 
in society, particularly in politics. 
It is through understanding the social and political background of how the 
Chinese media, especially television, were established and operated that 
readers w i l l appreciate the current conditions in the Chinese media as 
discussed in later chapters. The history chapters have attempted to identify 
the major events that forced changes in the Chinese media, and the people 
and authorities behind them. These include people and events that were 
hardly noticed at the time, but proved to be significant. 
In Chapter 1 the thesis describes how the CCP established its control of the 
Chinese media by setting up guidelines by which the media were to operate. 
It further shows how the Party established a position in its ranks to control 
the media. The chapter also talks about the beginning of television in China, 
marked by the opening of Beijing Television (BTV), and later Shanghai 
Television, and the assistance given for this project by the USSR. The Cultural 
Revolution played an important role in the history of the Chinese media and 
Chapter 2 outlines the motives that necessitated it. This chapter discusses 
why Chairman Mao went ahead wi th the Cultural Revolution despite the 
obvious scars it would leave on Chinese history. Media involvement is 
articulated, especially the role that television was expected to play, and how 
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the Cultural Revolution eventually led to the closure of BTV in 1967. The 
chapter further looks at the cruelties perpetrated by the Gang of Four and 
how they used television to advance their interests in the Cultural Revolution. 
Former American president Richard Nixon visited China in the 1970s and the 
chapter describes the lasting impression that the American television 
journalists accompanying Nixon left on the Chinese media. 
There is no media institution in China that can ever challenge CCTV in all 
aspects at the same time, because CCTV remains the protected monopoly of 
the Party and Central Government; it is secured and supported politically, 
economically and even socially by the state. Empirical research studies were 
conducted f rom the perspectives of news production, gate-keeping practices 
and the political economy of running a giant media organisation. When 
conducting research on television institutions in China, it is always 
recommended to start f rom CCTV. As discussed in varied chapters of this 
thesis, the CCP's management of television news is through a "pyramid" of 
"four level television" and CCTV is on the top as the central hub of CCP 
official information and CCP guaranteed monopoly of news. The CCPCC's 
Central Department of Propaganda (CDP) has always carefully managed 
political policies and discussions, important and sensitive information, to be 
gathered and conveyed to the public through CCTV. Directly under the CDP 
are the People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency and CCTV. A narrative history of 
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CCTV is certainly the history of the CCP's manipulation of power and the 
people's mind in China. 
Chapter 3 outlines the birth of CCTV, which marked the end of BTV, and 
talks about television news since the Cultural Revolution. The influence and 
power that the Gang of Four had in the Party were diminishing after the 
change of leadership in the CCP, and this development gave rise to a certain 
amount of freedom in Chinese television journalism. Banned programmes 
resumed, personnel could make decisions about news, presenters returned to 
the screen and Western programmes were once again allowed. Through 
television coverage of visits by Deng Xiaoping to other countries, Chinese 
people noticed the development gap that existed between China and the 
outside wor ld in terms of infrastructure and standards of l iving, and they 
demanded modernity. The chapter also introduces a discussion on how 
advertising found its way into Chinese television, and the enthusiasm wi th 
which it was received. 
The rise of television and the decline of radio is the discussion that marks 
Chapter 4, which aims to demonstrate how television was undermined in its 
early days, when radio was still regarded as the best thing that ever happened 
in the media. The narrow freedom allowed to television fol lowing the 
leadership changes in the Party gave an opportunity for the medium to show 
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the public how powerful it could be when its news coverage started to 
influence the Party's decisions. CCTV no longer looked only for positive news 
stories, but also reported on negatives, and it started producing programmes 
wi th the same approach. The chapter relates how, f rom 1980, the Party started 
paying more attention to television than to radio and newspapers. The 
existence of television became a factor in party decisions, and journalists 
started running the television stations. 
Chapters 5 and 6 consist of a narrative history and a lively discussion, 
complemented by recent developments and important case studies. These 
chapters are the bridge to a further in-depth discussion on important aspects 
of the interplay of poUtics and television news in the developing China. 
Chapter 5, The golden age of television, describes the continued development of 
Chinese television wi th the 1993 establishment of Shanghai Oriental 
Television (SOT), a purely commercial station without party or government 
funding. SOT was a news-oriented station and this presented competition to 
CCTV, jerking it into action to change its news policy. The chapter observes 
how in its efforts to improve its news coverage CCTV was supported by 
President Zemini, who watched the news every day and participated in 
interactive programmes. As efforts to change continued, CCTV news became 
increasingly less to do wi th Party and government and more audience 
oriented. To withstand competition CCTV needed to keep up wi th 
38 
commercial pressure, and this forced it to scrap unpopular programmes. The 
chapter concludes by discussing the erosion of professionalism through the 
influence of money and resulted in the commercialisation of news. Chapter 6, 
CCTV and the international playground, is set out as a research proposal, wi th a 
presentation of its findings. It looks at the notion of globalisation in relation to 
the global media, and then the focus is narrowed to China. 
Social science research methods are employed in later chapters. Chapter 7 is 
based on personal studio observation, when the author was presenting news 
on the busiest CCTV 24 hour news channel. This chapter aims to provide a 
detailed description of the news production process, while examining the 
relationship between the Party/ government and the media after several years 
of reform. Throughout the chapter i t is clear that the Party/government have 
increasingly been forced to take the media, particularly television, into 
account when making decisions. Chapter 8 is a comprehensive report on a 
series of surveys and interviews wi th CCTV producers, reporters and editors, 
as well as the CDP and SClO's senior officials. In this chapter, entitled 
Television journalists - seeking strategies for survival and success, the thesis sets 
out the trade-off that occurred between media independence and freedom 
and the benefits that accompanied state control. A picture is drawn of the 
changes that took place in the lives of journalists as less government control 
meant that they had to forego benefits such as free housing, retirement 
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pensions and other attractive benefits. Figures are provided which highlight 
the everyday lives and professional careers of Chinese television journalists. 
Chapter 9 is a combination of empirical research and a cultural approach. 
This chapter describes the introduction of a 24-hour news channel and 
discusses what led up to the decision to establish it. Although i t appeared to 
be a good move, the channel's news still lacked quality and i t appeared to be 
little more than a response to Phoenix Television in Hong Kong. Its 
weaknesses included a lack of original international coverage, and its news 
was not comparable wi th Western standards. The chapter also explores the 
problems associated w i t h state-owned television channels. In Chapter 10, 
Televised democracy and mediated realities, the thesis introduces the term 
"televised democracy", which the author coined to describe how the Chinese 
Party and government officials used television to give an impression of 
democracy and being democratic, by taking advantage of the medium's wide 
reach. The chapter looks at all the major party journalistic organisations in 
China and compares them wi th CCTV's early efforts for a televised 
democracy. It presents an argument about whether televised democracy was 
intended to bring real democracy to China or whether it was simply a party 
tool to bring mediated reality to the public, in order to brainwash and mislead. 
Chapter 11 is a discussion of the Internet in China and the challenges it has 
presented to the CCP's control of information f low. The chapter also explores 
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the opportunities that the Internet has offered to Chinese citizens at almost 
every level and how the Internet has compete wi th the traditional media 
including television. As a final chapter it offers a forecast of where China is 
going wi th regard to the exchange and availability of information among its 
citizens. 
This thesis concludes at the time when H u Jintao and Wen Jiabao were 
completing their first term in administration and held the 17th National CCP 
Congress. According to the most cited Hu-Wen notion "Improving the Party's 
Governing Capability", the conclusion chapter does not intend to simply 
repeat the conclusions of each previous chapter. However, the conclusion 
highlights advantages and disadvantages of the Party's 87 years of strategy 
having the media as "mouthpiece". The Internet has never been the same as 
television, which can be f i rmly regulated by the Party and Central 
Government in China. 
Research methodology 
This thesis has been compiled through a combination of empirical research 
and conventional social science research methods. 
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Peter Burnham (2004), in his book. Research Methods in Politics, observes that, 
"...Politics is about power. Studying the distribution and exercise of power is, 
however, far f rom straightforward". Don Stacks (1999) book. Communications 
Research, is formulated f rom both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, including questionnaires, surveys, focus group interviews, content 
analysis and anthropological observations. 
A narrative history forms the first part of the thesis. It is the first 
comprehensive history of Chinese television since 1958 and much of the 
information was found in the Chinese government's archive, which has 
recently been made available. When wri t ing the history in these early 
chapters, the author compares the mainstream elements in the history of 
modern China and provides primary discussions on its media, politics and 
development. 
This part of the study involved extensive examination of party and 
government documents, public reports, and trade and professional journals in 
China's national and Beijing municipal libraries, and in the State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television Archive. Yearbooks of CCTV 
and SARFT (formerly the MRFT) were consulted for facts, figures and the 
official version of trends. Academic journals published by journalism and 
communications schools at CUC, Renmin University, Fudan University, 
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CASS and Wuhan University, and the research archives wi th all published 
newspapers and telegraphs at the People's Daily, Xirihua News Agency and 
the Beijing Daily. These are all rich resources for analysing the Party's gate-
keeping practices and ideological control. 
The subsequent chapters of the thesis are supported by social science research. 
Qualitative and descriptive methods were employed and these included 
participant observation, focus groups and in-depth interviews. Information 
was also obtained through a survey in which 2,000 questionnaires were 
distributed to CCP members and television journalists at all levels to collect 
basic data. 1,717 were returned for analysis in this thesis. 
As a vital supplementary method, the in-company research that underpins 
the analysis of CCTV was conducted between January and July 1999, March 
and December 2000, May and October 2001 and March and June 2003. During 
this period, 49 senior members of staff and 151 journalists and producers were 
interviewed at the CCTV Beijing Head Office and in London during their 
coverage of the Chinese President's official visit to Britain in 1999. Further 
interviews were conducted wi th members of staff in the CDP and some 
academic institutions, including the BBI, CASS-IOJCS and RMU. Most of ihe 
interviewees were met twice, first for the initial data collecting and then for 
the feedback. 
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Full details of the research methodology and the early findings are available 
to the examiners on request. Because of the politically sensitive nature of the 
topic of this thesis, the interview data have been used either as background 








The Chinese Communist Party had first established complete control of the media at 
its founding congress in 1921, using the "party principle" policy to enforce its 
ideological guidelines. The CCP's five-year development agenda for ideology and 
education of 1955 included a proposal to establish Beifing Television (BTV), which 
xvas finally born in 1958 with assistance from the USSR. The initial scramble for 
television dominance during the Great Leap Fonvard (1958-66), xoith numerous 
netxvorks set up throughout China, led to problems luhen a series of natural disasters 
depleted the nation's finances and government cuts forced all but 25% of the stations 
to close. 
BTV's early development is outlined, noting the launch of television news and the 
"News Documentary Era". The Chinese leadership's growing awareness of 
television's potential is noted, particularly shown in Zhou Enlai's support of BTV. 
Premier Zhou also sazo BTV as a means of improving China's image in the West, and 
used his televised interview with the BBC for maximum impact abroad. BTV also set 
up a network of foreign correspondents, in line with the CCP's long-standing global 
television strategy. BTV's experiments in programming are examined, live sports 
coverage being particularly well received, along with televised lectures, knoxvn as 
"moving the blackboard" which were also used by the Party to identify and promote 
future leaders. 
"Party principle" has been a widely understood term in the Chinese media 
ever since the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party. Explaining it in 
Chinese is easy, although it would involve a lengthy explanation in English, 
but Tong Bing and Cheng Mei [1993:148] have provided one of the clearest 
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interpretations of the term. They concluded in Theorizing Journalism Studies 
1993] that "party principle" consists of the following components: 
• News media must adopt the Party's guiding ideology as 
their own 
• News media must propagate the Party's programmes, 
policies, and directives 
• News media must accept the Party's leadership and adhere 
to the Party's organisational principles and media policies 
This is exactly describes the true nature of the Communist Party's control of 
the media in the former Soviet Union and in today's China. The Party has 
exercised unconditional control over all publications since the Yan'an era of 
history. The Party established its media policy during its founding congress in 
1921,and stated that "Party journals, daily publications, books and booklets 
must be administered by the Party's central executive committee, and no 
central or local publication should carry any article that opposes the Party's 
principles, policies and decisions" [Tong and Cheng, 1993:147]. 
Table 1.1 
Top leadership of the C C P since 1949 
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Chairman of the CCP 
Mao Zedong 1949-1976 
Hua Guofeng 1976-1981 
Hu Yaobang 1981-1982 
General Secretary of the CCP 
Deng Xiaoping 1954-1966 
Hu Yaobang 1978-1987 
Zhao Ziyang 1987-1989 
Jiang Zemin 1989-2002 
H u Jintao 2002-
Source: Compiled by author f rom the Chinese Communist Party Archive 
Mao Zedong and the first generation of CCP leaders issued many directives 
to their senior members on the importance of maintaining complete control of 
the press [Zheng, 2004:191]. Public opinion was a great support during the 
anti-Japanese war, directed by carefully conducted communications wi th 
people at grassroots level. Even today, the majority of Chinese people would 
say that the CCP had defeated the Japanese invaders, while the KMT had 
retreated f rom the war. This was the main reason why the people supported 
the CCP in winning the later Civi l War and the KMT was finally forced to 
Taiwan Island [Lieberthal, 1995:199]. 
In every tiny branch of the CCP, there are normally three senior officers who 
direct activities and one of them is always the Propaganda and 
Communications Officer. The CCP's practice and theoretic understanding of 
"soft power" is as good as that of any party in the West. Before television 
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became powerful in China, the newspapers and radio were already under the 
Party's tight control, and television fell into line as soon as i t began to play an 
important role in Chinese society [Hong, 1998:102]. 
The birth of national television in China 
Chinese television was born during the "Da Yue Jin" (Great Leap Forward) 
period. Da Yue Jin is the continuation of the Chinese Communist Revolution 
under Mao. Economically, China was still a very weak country. With only 
very limited financial and technological support, the first television service 
started on 1 May 1958. Since i t was regarded as a "laboratory experiment" 
and restricted to the Beijing region, the service was named "Beijing 
Television" (BTV). As wi th television services elsewhere in the wor ld at the 
time, all programmes were broadcast live and in black and white [Crisell, 
1997:165]. 
Five months later, on 1 October 1958, a second television service became 
available in Shanghai and was accordingly named Shanghai Television [SAB 
1978: 22]. A third service was introduced in Harbin, the northern provincial 
capital city on 20 December of the same year [Guo 1991: 32]. 
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Beijing and Shanghai are major centres of political and economic 
development, while Harbin is the capital of the China-USSR border province 
of Heilongjiang, and for this reason early Chinese television was under 
tremendous and direct influence by the Soviet Union. 
Television at the time was principally regarded as a technological affair by the 
Party and government. Most staff in the new services were engineers who 
had studied overseas, mostly in the USSR or the former Eastern European 
socialist countries [Lee, 1990:177]. The first TV sets, branded as "Beijing", 
were produced under the supervision of Moscow experts [SAB 1978: 62]. 
These experts had also helped Shanghai to establish its own "Shanghai" 
brand of TV sets, made in a newly established factory in the city. The socialist 
family of the USSR and Eastern Europe helpfully supplied the programmes. 
According to Guo [1991: 42] and the State Administration of Radio, Film and 
Television (SARFT) Archive, the newly born television service opened its 
broadcast at 7.00 pm on 1 May 1958 wi th the words "Beijing Television" in 
Chinese traditional calligraphy set against a background picture of the USSR-
supported Central Broadcasting Plaza Building, and accompanied by 
revolutionary music. 
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The first programme was a live broadcast of an International Labour Day 
round-table discussion, led by National People's Radio reporter L i Yi . Invited 
guests included Tong Chunrong, a labour worker f rom the Beijing Mechanical 
Factory, Liu Wanyuan, Head of Shift, Beijing Shijingshan Steel Factory and 
Hao Decai, Director of the Beijing Sijiqing Agricultural Production and Co-
operative Bank. Topics under discussion ranged over production figures. Da 
Yue Jin proposals and Maoist thoughts. The programme was smoothly 
presented, and illustrated wi th charts and photos. Historical documents 
indicate that several rehearsals took place before the live show. 
The second programme was a documentary. Go to the countryside, which 
portrayed the way that cadres were sent by the Party to the socialist 
countryside to correct "mistaken thoughts". This documentary was made by 
the Central News and Documentary Studios (CNDS). Before television was 
introduced, the only news in audio-visual format was produced by this 
organisation and in later years it merged wi th the BTV (now CCTV). 
According to the SARFT Archive and interviews wi th journalists, 
entertainment programmes were also provided, which included the 
following: 
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• A recitation by the National Broadcasting Opera of poems: 
Three girls from the factory and Call for the Great Leap Forxoard 
• A ballet performance by the Beijing School of Dancing Arts 
of the The four little swans, The romance of shepherd boy and 
country girl and a Chinese traditional dance of A beautiful 
night on the Spring River 
The first day of broadcasting finally closed wi th a USSR-made documentary 
entitled The television. 
On the same day, Xinhua, the official news agency of the CCP and the 
Republic, released news of the birth of Beijing's first television station. 
Guo [1991: 42] argues that BTV had very limited resources for producing 
programmes. It relied on the support of other organisations in the Chinese 
performing arts and f i l m industry. A t this early stage, BTV was purely a 
broadcaster showcasing other people's work and it is surprising that the first 
days of broadcasting were all live rather than recorded. 
Although there was no obvious connection between politics and television in 
China during the inception period and audience numbers were limited, USSR 
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experiences in television f rom as early as 1939 attracted the attention of 
Chairman Mao and other leaders of the CCP. Very generous financial and 
technical support was guaranteed by Premier Zhou Enlai. The proposal to 
establish BTV was already included in the State Council's five-year 
development agenda for ideology and education in 1955. By 1958, 57 
countries around the world were introducing television networks in their 
territories and the US and USSR had started to compete over television 
development. As a loyal brother of the USSR and the Eastern European 
countries, China could not be left out of the campaign. Hong Kong had 
established black and white television broadcasting in 1957 and Taiwan had 
conducted some early experiments in the same year [Xu, 2003:113]. The 
People's Republic just had to succeed ahead of Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
BTV was included in the Party's propaganda system as soon as it was 
launched. Though technically i t could only reach audiences wi th in a 25 
kilometre radius, its national television status was confirmed and Chairman 
Mao was one of BTV's most enthusiastic supporters. Occasionally he would 
ask BTV to re-broadcast some programmes that he had missed. Mao sent his 
calligraphy of the BTV title in Chinese as a gif t in December 1964. The 
privilege of asking for a re-broadcast of a programme was also available to 
the other top leadership in Zhongnanhai. Vice Premier Deng Zihui had asked 
for a documentary on the electric plough to be shown twice. The Chairman of 
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the State Liu Shaoqi, Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) and Chair of the National People's Congress Zhu De both visited BTV 
more than once [Roderick, 1993: 46]. 
On behalf of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC), 
Premier Zhou Enlai paid an official visit to the station on 12 September 1959. 
During his visit, additional financial support was provided and he even paid 
attention to the fake flowers on the piano. He told staff at BTV that i f they 
could not afford to buy fresh flowers every day, they could always go to 
Zhongnanhai and collect all they needed f rom the leaderships' family 
gardens. In 1961, Premier Zhou and his wife Deng Yingchao went to see the 
opera Lady Du's legacy, and the premier was said to have instructed the 
cameraman to f i l m the orchestra while the actors were changing scenes. In 
1963, Premier Zhou is said to have intervened again, when he asked BTV 
supporting staff to put soft pads under the teacups in order minimise noise. In 
1972, Premier Zhou held a meeting for national media reporters at 
Zhongnanhai, where he introduced the rule of "pool reporting", under which 
all national media reporters were to collaborate wi th each other [Guo, 1991: 
74]. Previously they had competed for stories about the top leadership, but 
this collaboration meant that Premier Zhou actually promoted BTV to a 
leading position and began to give priority to audio-visual facilities. 
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Two weeks after its establishment, BTV started producing its own news 
programmes. On 15 May 1958, a four-minute news clip about the Dongfeng 
brand of car was produced and broadcast. On 1 June 1958, BTV covered the 
launch by the CCPCC of the Party's theoretical journal Hong Qi {Red flag). 
During the same period BTV produced a documentary on fighting floods in 
Henan Province. This period in Chinese television history is referred to as the 
"News Documentary Era". 
Poor technological support and facilities did not prevent the newly-born BTV 
from playing a crucial role in major national events. On 1 October 1958, BTV 
covered live the parade on Tiananmen Square to commemorate the 9^*^  
Anniversary of the People's Republic of China. The Party and the 
Government were so pleased wi th it that a ful ly functioning Broadcasting 
Centre was established on the Square to enable BTV to cover the 10* 
Anniversary. After that, live coverage became the compulsory usual practice 
for such celebrations, and demonstrated that the Chinese political leaders had 
equipped themselves wi th the fundamental skills and tactics of television 
politics [Interviews, 2004J. 
The first presenter of television news was introduced rather informally, 
because both the head of BTV and the CDP leaderships did not attach any 
importance to this aspect of television. Shen L i , a beautiful lady w i t h an 
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authentic Beijing government-approved accent, was chosen to be the first 
announcer and presenter. Her role was basically just to f i l l i n the gaps 
between documentaries [Interviews 2004]. In a BTV television crew, the 
cameraman was the commander and centre of decision-making. Most people 
regarded television technology as complicated and therefore regarded the 
cameraman as a great engineer equipped wi th hi-tech knowledge - and the 
cameramen thought the same! Despite being held in such high regard, they 
paid little attention to news values such as reality, objectivity and impartiality 
in their shooting. The two main priorities were to get good quality pictures 
and ensure political correctness. This tradition is still evident in CCTV, as the 
technical department does not provide the necessary support for other 
departments to f u l f i l their functions well. It does not surprise viewers when a 
news item is cancelled by the technical support department before going on 
air because of poor quality pictures and sound. Many leading presenters and 
journalists in CCTV have frequently complained about this, but the only time 
that the complaints were given attention and some minor improvements 
made after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Hong Kong based Phoenix 
Television covered the event, despite poor quality pictures and sound 
provided by amateurs, and i t won an audience of nearly half a bil l ion in 
China. CCTV, however, was waiting for the best quality pictures and sound, 
as well as approval f r o m the top for political correctness. I t offered less than 
two minutes' coverage during the first 48 hours after the attack, and 
meanwhile vast numbers of loyal audiences, as well as advertising investors, 
were lost [Interviews, 2004]. 
It is diff icul t to criticise the pioneers, as the leaders at the time were largely to 
blame; they just d id not understand the need to adapt to change. 
News production soon turned to the "Great Leap Forward" mood of the 
1960s. Many provincial television stations were established and were all 
required to submit their news programmes to BTV. This exercise was not only 
for central approval purposes, but also to collect the best pieces for BTV as the 
national television to re-broadcast. A t the same time, BTV sent pictures and 
voices f rom Zhongnanhai and the capital to provincial television stations 
around China. 
A problem arose at the time as television stations were "photocopying" f rom 
each other. Viewers could easily predict the conclusion of each programme 
and presenters would even be wearing the same clothes in different 
programmes. Creativity was seriously neglected, while consensus was greatly 
encouraged. 
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Politicians on television 
Felix Green, an English television journalist and producer, was visiting China 
for the second time in 1960 when he was suddenly informed of an invitation 
f rom Premier Zhou Enlai in Beijing [MRT, 1984:144]. The invitation was for 
Green to interview Premier Zhou for television audiences beyond the Chinese 
borders for the first time. 
Professional support for the interview was provided by a team f rom Beijing 
Television, who set up the best possible facilities in the Jiangsu Hal l of the 
Great People's Hal l on Tiananmen Square. The interview took place on 5 
September 1960. Green later commented that Premier Zhou was slightly 
different during the interview compared wi th when there was no camera. He 
was very serious and concise and the context of his answers was never 
beyond the pre-prepared scripts. The scripts were well writ ten by diplomats 
and carefully aimed at the international audiences. 
The BBC aired the interview on 3 November 1960 and it was also reported by 
most of the leading international news agencies and newspapers around the 
world. This was the first time that China and a Chinese politician had been 
seen and directly heard by Western audiences on a formal television 
broadcast Before this, the image of China was always demonised and 
misleading [Li and Liu , 1998:15]. 
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The People's Daily published the f u l l dialogue between the premier and Green 
two days later. According to this newspaper, the interview covered issues of 
Sino-American relations, Taiwan, Sino-Indian relations and the ongoing 
ambassador-level negotiation in Warsaw between China and the US. When 
Green questioned why talks wi th China always took so long. Premier Zhou 
said: 
Why should we be in a hurry? It is important that we are 
continuing the talks. It took us two years to complete the peace 
talks in Korea. You are younger than me and I am older, so I 
should be the person to worry. I am sure I can see the result of the 
talks before I get too old. It won't take so long to complete as you 
think. Britain is a country wi th a long and glorious history, so 
f rom the historical point of view, we always take our time for the 
good of the people. 
[Guo, 1991: 69J 
Green was the pioneer in televising China to the West to improve 
communication between those on both sides. On the basis of this, when an 
American journalist, Edgar Snow, visited China ten years later he was invited 
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to the Tiananmen (Peaceful Heaven Gate) wi th Chairman Mao for 
celebrations for the 21^' Anniversary of the People's Republic in 1970. 
The Green interview, made the top leadership in China realise the importance 
of television and it impressed upon them the principle," Be prepared 
collectively, and then get interviewed." 
The failure of the "Great Leap Forward" in the development of television 
At the same time that China started the Great Leap Forward, the countiy had 
to face three years of unremitting natural disasters nationwide. The slogan for 
the Great Leap Forward was, "How brave you are w i l l determine how 
productive your land w i l l be" and "Never dare to achieve; when you think 
about it, you can make i t " [Dreyer, 1993: 66]. Many of the gradualist 
development proposals, including the development of television in China, 
were immediately abolished and replaced by extremely ambitious ones. 
When the 7* National Conference on Broadcasting was held in Beijing on 1 
March 1960, it was announced that 40 new television stations would be built 
and the total number of television stations in China would reach 50 within 
three years. However, as a result of the natural disasters, China's economy 
was in crisis and some of the newly established television stations started to 
collapse as soon as they were established. 
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BTV was in a dilemma. A t least 20% of its staff were sent home fol lowing 
funding cuts by the central government. Broadcasting time was cut to around 
2 to 2.5 hours a day, an hour less than previously. After the cut, BTV was 
asked to concentrate on producing weekend programmes for Saturday and 
Sunday. At the same time, China stopped importing TV sets, and this was 
another disaster for the development of Chinese television. By February 1963, 
only 25 per cent of the television stations were still alive and broadcasting, 
and these only on limited time schedules, in eight cities including Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Shenyang, Harbin, Changchun and Xian. 
Radio services were not spared either, and nearly 50% of the 146 radio 
stations were closed in 1962. 
China was so poor in the 1960s that seemed inappropriate for a bill ion people 
to watch television when others were hungry for food. There was no money 
for making TV sets and none for producing more programmes. These were 
some of the barriers to the further development of Chinese television. 
Certainly, the 'Great Leap Forward' was not the right solution; i t created great 
waste, as it encouraged the setting up of too many television stations, only to 
close them after a short time. 
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The limited success of BTV 
Ping-Pong, otherwise known as table tennis, is the Chinese national sport. It 
was famous because i t served as a bridge in Sino-American relations in the 
1970s. BTV was, in fact, the only lively television station supported by the 
Party and central government, and was rescued through televising the table 
tennis competition in 1962 when the 26* World Championships were held in 
Beijing. 
Working together w i t h newspapers and radio, television started showing 
people the power of moving pictures. Through television, the audiences in 
Beijing did not miss a single match during the 11 days of the games. BTV 
broadcast the 14 matches for 35 hours. There were only 10,000 television sets 
in Beijing at the time, but each set was watched by several hundred people. 
They cheered in front of their TV sets just like the spectators in the stadium. 
The power of television had now been realised, not only by the people but the 
top leadership as well . For a while news reports were f i l led w i th ping-pong 
stories, and BTV received over 3,000 letters, telegraphs and telephone calls 
f rom people around Beijing. 
BTV senior management held an internal meeting immediately after the 
competition and agreed that programmes should include sports and 
entertainment in order to attract a large audience. 
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Following its successful experience in broadcasting the table tennis 
competition, BTV started considering more entertainment on television, 
despite the hard time it was going through in China. On 30 August 1961, a 
Variety Show, Laugh, debuted. It brought plenty of laughs to the sad 
audiences in the midst of disasters and received a warm welcome f rom the 
people and senior leaders. However, when the second and third episodes of 
Laugh were broadcast, the programme received serious criticism f rom the top 
leadership. Even Chairman Mao commented angrily and wrote the following 
lines to the authorities on 27 June 1964: 
In the last 15 years, almost all of the arts organisations have badly 
led the audiences except for a small number of loyal Communist 
ones. These arts organisations are f u l l of feudalist and capitalist 
people and they have never researched the people at grassroots, 
including the workers, farmers and soldiers. They have never 
presented the great achievements of the socialist revolution and 
construction. We must urge them to change! 
[Mao, Vol. 3,1982:196J 
The early BTV attempt to entertain failed, and so management started to look 
for alternative ways of serving the Party and people. From A p r i l 1961, BTV 
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began to send staff reporters to cover Communist brothers in Laos, Vietnam 
and North Korea. Through these efforts, BTV journalists produced 
documentaries on Laos and accompanied Chinese delegations headed by 
Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi to 14 Asian and African countries. 
In 1963, Mei Yi , Minister of State, Administration of Broadcasting, announced 
that national television should be, "Rooted in Beijing, facing the wor ld" , and 
this became one of the earliest government statements on Chinese television 
global strategy. A series of conferences about producing programmes for the 
international market was held to realise Minister Mei's goals [SAB, 1979:203]. 
The wars in the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam provided a great 
opportunity for BTV to boom. Both Korean and Vietnamese leaders selected 
BTV journalists as their only chosen medium to express their (the leaders') 
opinions to world audiences. Young as it was, BTV established its first 
overseas bureau in Hanoi and this was long before the already long-
established Xinhua News Agency and the People's Daily. 
Television as an ideological classroom 
Producing news was still a luxury for BTV in the very hard 1960s. Directly 
learning f rom the Open University in the UK and Houston K H H T in the USA, 
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BTV introduced educational programmes in 1960. On 8 March of that year, 
the Beijing Television University was formally established and 8,600 students 
registered in the three departments of Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry. A 
Department of Chinese and Literature and a Department of English were 
established later on. Vice Premier Lu Dingyi highly valued this effort, saying: 
This is the best way to take f u l l advantage of television. Television 
should not televise the capitalist life style, but teach people 
knowledge of socialist constructions. 
[Zheng, 2004: 329] 
Television universities were set up in other cities after the Beijing success. 
Producing teaching programmes on television was relatively cheap. It was 
called "moving the blackboard", illustrating the fact that television staff were 
just broadcasting real classes to a bigger audiences. 
The classroom format brought inspiration to producers at BTV and soon a 
new format of television forum being introduced on television. The 
programme created many celebrities, the first being "Steel Man" Wang Jinxi, 
an oil tield worker f rom Daqing. Wang was a great speaker on television. On 
17 February 1966, he lectured on BTV and it was broadcast live [SAB, 1980: 
101]. His lecture was published in the People's Daily the next day, but people 
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preferred to watch "the real" Wang on television. The lecture was 80 minutes 
long and acclaimed as a great success according to the audiences' positive 
feedback. During the live broadcast, many viewers called in and some even 
asked for the Steel Man to be given a cup of water and to take a break. More 
television stations invited Wang for lectures and he was undoubtedly 
regarded as a celebrity f rom then on. 
Directly promoted by the CCP, Daqing Oi l Field Base, Dazhai Country Farms 
and the People's Liberation Army were this period's three flagship models for 
China. Guests for television lecture programmes came f rom these model 
places. Lecturers included Zhang Baifa and L i Ruihuan. [SAB, 1980: 44]. 
Zhang was then a construction worker for the National People's Great Hall 
and f rom the 1980s the Deputy Mayor of Beijing. L i was a carpenter and then 
the Mayor and Party Secretary of Tianjin, as well as Chairman of the NPPCC 
and a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee in the 1990s. The 
television screen provided a platform for ideological propaganda and the 
promotion of future leaders. L i Ruihuan is still one of the best speakers 
among the Chinese top leadership. It would be hard to deny that his lecture 




Party journalism and the governing system under 
Mao during the Cultural Revolution [1966-1976] 
Chapter Summary 
The inseparable connection between the Cultural Revolution and the history of the 
Chinese media is discussed. As Mao saw the media as integral to the success of the 
Cultural Revolution, BTV was obliged to play a key role as his mouthpiece, and the 
effect of this policy on BTV programming is shown. BTV's failure to re-broadcast a 
national ceremony in 1966 forced it to close, but the CCP used this opportunity to 
strengthen its control of television, taking over the State Administration of 
Broadcasting, and vetting all programmes when BTV reopened. The Gang of Four's 
attempt to use Shanghai Television to forward its ideological aims is examined, with 
particular emphasis on the brutal televised Class Struggle conferences. 
Television ivas directly affected by the CCP's foreign policy from 1970, when the CCP 
revised its global strategies and Mao renewed his diplomatic talks. The most dramatic 
example of this came through US President Nixon's state visit to China in 1972, 
when Chinese television journalists covering the event were shocked to see hoiu badly 
their technology compared with that of their American counterparts who had the most 
advanced technology in the world. 
The Gang of Four brought an additional influence: paying renewed attention to 
China's image in international relations, they decided to convert television 
broadcasting throughout China to colour, and thus played a major role in the next 
advance of Chinese television. 
Mao is still regarded as one of the greatest of China's leaders and one wi th 
extraordinary daring, although most people in China would regard the 
Cultural Revolution as a huge mistake. According to Lieberthal [1995:167], 
Mao had four broad goals for the Cultural Revolution. First, he sought to 
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change his nominated successor f rom President of China Liu Shaoqi to 
Defence Minister Lin Biao and demanded major efforts to blacken Liu's name. 
Second, Mao wanted to discipline the huge bureaucracy governing the 
country and urge party officials to stop corruption. Third, Mao wanted to 
have Chinese youth armed wi th the necessary amount of what he called 
"revolutionary experiences". Finally, Mao wanted to make substantial 
changes in various policy areas, including reducing income inequalities and 
introducing material incentives. 
The national response to Mao's call to launch the Cultural Revolution 
amounted to the w i l d adulation of a leader who had caused enormous 
suffering. As the mouthpiece of the Party, BTV was necessarily included in 
the Cultural Revolution regime. In May 1966, BTV was forced to make the 
following adjustments to its programmes: 
First, to add information about the Cultural Revolution in news 
bulletins; second, f rom 15 May 1966 to establish feature 
programmes criticising "black lines" wi thin the Party against 
Chairman Mao; third, to televise the Cultural Revolution in all 
news programmes as much as possible; fourth, in children's 
programmes, to organise young people to criticise and fight 
against Deng Tuo and W u Han's anti-revolutionary activities and 
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behaviours; f i f t h , to promote people and activities supporting 
Mao and the Cultural Revolution. 
[Xu, 2003: 410] 
Television and the Cultural Revolution 
BTV was small in size and influence, but very close to the centre of power. 
There were only a few TV sets in Beijing, and a great many of these were 
owned by the political elites. The CDP of CCPCC had included BTV in the 
priority list of propaganda along wi th the People's Daily and the Xinhua News 
Agency. 
BTV soon released a memorandum to "ban bad programmes". The "bad" 
programmes were unconditionally banned and programmes could be "bad" 
in the fol lowing eight ways: 
1: Misleading wri t ing of history and promoting the already 
mistaken routes; 
2: Discovering a Communist hero's mistakes and blackening the 
hero's image; 
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3: Encouraging the fear of war and supporting peaceful settlements 
wi th the capitalist West; 
4: Demonising images of workers, farmers and PLA soldiers; 
5: Denying class struggle and class enemies; 
6: Promoting people-centred capitalist values; 
7: Promoting feudalist and capitalist romances; 
8: Broadcasting classical opera about emperors, beauties and ghosts, 
regardless of domestic or interna Productionstional. 
[SAB, 1980: 272] 
In response to this, BTV eliminated names of reporters in news bulletins, and 
the names of producers, authors, editors and reporters of programmes were 
no longer shown on the screens. This "innovation" was highly praised by the 
CDP on 22 July 1966. 
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During the Cultural Revolution, important organisations such as the People's 
Daily and Xinhua were asked to come up wi th innovative ways of showing 
loyalty to the Chairman and the Party. BTV broadcast Chairman Mao's 
portrait continuously during the day and the portrait was always surrounded 
by sunshine and sunflower wi th the background music "The East is Red". 
On 18 August 1966, Chairman Mao received the Red Guards at Tiananmen 
Square and BTV was required by the Central Department of Propaganda 
(CDP) to broadcast this massive event. Following previous practice, this kind 
of programme would be edited for re-broadcasting as a documentary on 
national and local television. For unspecified reasons, however, the repeat 
was not shown for a few days and serious complaints arrived at BTV and its 
bosses, including the State Administration of Broadcasting and the CDP. 
Among these complaints was a letter f rom the Red Guards at Beijing 
University of Science and Technology, who asked, " I f BTV doesn't want to 
broadcast this glorious event, then what does i t want to broadcast?" 
An anonymous member of the audience wrote: 
1 so much want to see the Chairman again and again, many times, 
but why can't BTV understand this? I think BTV does not love 
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Chairman Mao; BTV does not trust and adore Chairman Mao! 
BTV does not understand the heart of people. 
[SAB, 1980: 279] 
Girls f rom Beijing No 13 High School wrote a joint letter in combative mood: 
"Down wi th your black-hearted president of BTV! We want a new BTV 
president f rom the farmers, workers or the PLA soldiers." [Guo, 1991:108]. 
Letters and telephone complaints kept pouring in and some even started to 
challenge presenters and reporters on other aspects, such as their dress, make-
up and speed of presenting. 
Internal meetings were held to f ind a strategy for surviving the situation and 
a decision was made to close down BTV for its own protection. On 31 
December 1966, the State Administration of Broadcasting approved the BTV's 
application to close down for three reasons: 
1: The audiences are all busy wi th the Cultural Revolution and 
have no time to watch television 
2: Professional arhsts and performing organisations are all 
devoted to the Cultural Revolution and have no time for 
television programmes 
3: Staff at BTV are eager to take part in the Cultural Revolution 
[Zheng, 2004: 272] 
From 1 January 1967, BTV programmes always started wi th a shining portrait 
of Chairman Mao and his selected xuords (Mao Zhuxi Yu Lu) of the period. 
Ordinary programmes were stopped and replaced w i t h Cultural Revolution 
propaganda. On 6 January 1967, BTV was formally closed down by the 
CCPCC [SAB, 1980 Appendix 2]. 
One after another, television stations around the country were closed, except 
for Shanghai Television. 
Shanghai Television: The televised Class Struggle conferences 
Shanghai was the centre of the Cultural Revolution because Jiang Qing, Mao's 
wife, and her three followers were all based there [Dreyer, 1993: 45]. Zhang 
Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan of the Gang of Four urged Shanghai Television 
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to play an active role in the fight against class enemies of the Cultural 
Revolution through its powerful audio-visual effects. The Gang of Four even 
invented the "televised class struggle conference" in Shanghai [SAB, 1980: 
412-415]. 
In the televised conference, the former party chiefs of Shanghai, Chen Pixian 
and Cao Diqiu were forced to get down on their knees on a platform and 
were rudely beaten by the Red Guards. The format of the conferences, 
including which of Chairman Mao's words should be announced, the slogans 
to be promoted, and even the allocation of desks and chairs and how to beat 
the class enemies, were all quickly learned by neighbouring cities and 
provinces. This is how the Gang of Four relied on the power of audio-visual 
communications to achieve their political goals. 
The Gang of Four never got tired of the televised conferences. More than 100 
conferences were held over a few months. However, some conferences got 
out of control. On 13 March 1968 the Dean of the Shanghai Academy of 
Music, Professor He Luting, was brought to the conference. In front of the 
camera, he loudly denied all the charges levelled against h im by the Red 
Guards. He even compared the Red Guards to the Japanese invaders and 
KMT dictators, saying he could not condone torture by the Guards. The Gang 
of Four were so annoyed and anxious that they ordered the police to arrest 
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Professor He for betraying his country and the adored leader [SAB, 1980: 412-
415]. A l l this was broadcast live to a great number of people around Shanghai. 
A second televised conference against Professor He was held on 25 Apr i l . A l l 
his family were arrested and brought to the conference. Professor He still 
maintained his stance, angering the Red Guards, who brutally beat h im and 
his family in f ront of the camera. This shocked the audience, and Zhang 
Chunqiao of the Gang of Four ordered the television station to stop 
broadcasting the programme immediately [SAB, 1980: 412-415]. 
Failure of the televised class struggle conference against Professor He Luting 
brought a serious threat to the Gang of Four and they decided to abandon this 
newly invented, powerful method. Television is a platform for manipulating 
people's minds, but i t is also dif f icul t to bury the truth on television. The State 
Administration of Broadcasting ordered the existing television stations to stop 
live broadcasts of class struggle conferences, and all conferences had to be 
carefully edited for the Cultural Revolution. The CDP also asked the local 
party officials to approve programmes before they went on air. 
74 
A time of madness for television 
On 4 February 1967 the government re-opened BTV, but all previous 
programmes were cancelled and the new ones were about the Cultural 
Revolution. News programmes were fu l l of Chairman Mao's selected words 
and the Red Guards' achievements in destroying the historical heritage of 
Beijing. The programmes always started wi th the Dance of Royalty, Singing 
the Songs of Chairman Mao's selected words, and presenting the compulsory 
morning commands and evening conclusions [Guo, 1991:110]. 
On 12 December 1967, the CCPCC sent PLA representatives to take control of 
the State Administration of Broadcasting, including the national radio and 
television services. The Gang took tight control of BTV, w i t h Jiang Qing 
among the senior leaders approving the programmes each day before they 
went on air. Apart f rom news programmes, the majority of BTV's airtime was 
given to the newly invented "Yang Ban X i " (model opera). The Gang were 
very pleased to gain f u l l control of television. They even began to consider 
technology upgrades. Colour television facilities were purchased f rom 
overseas, which started off a second round of television development. This 
time, however, it was carefully managed by the Gang wi th clear political 
goals to avoid huge waste like the Great Leap Forward. 
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Solid exchanges with the West (1970s) 
From 1970 onwards, Mao's shining portrait was removed f r o m BTV's opening 
scenes and in 1971, at Mao's instigation; his selected words were removed 
from television, too. Nobody really knows the reason even now. 
This was also the time when the US Secretary of State, Dr Henry Kissinger, 
and the 37* American President, Richard Nixon, visited China. 
The CCP revised China's global strategies, fol lowing its misplaced trust in the 
USSR, who had offered sanctuary to the traitor Marshall L in Biao, originally 
Mao's nominated heir, after his failed coup d'etat. Chairman Mao had further 
talks on international relations and diplomatic activities. BTV revised its 
programming strategy accordingly and started learning f rom the most 
advanced television industry, that of the United States [Interviews, 1999]. 
On 21 February 1972, a week after BTV televised the funeral of American 
journalist Edgar Snow, President Nixon arrived in Beijing, accompanied by a 
delegation of American television journalists armed wi th the most advanced 
television technology. This embarrassed the Chinese television journalists 
who were covering the visit alongside the Americans. 
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Carefully edited as always, BTV programmes during the visit showed 
President Nixon offering his hand first, to which Premier Zhou would 
respond and the two would shake hands. This pleased the Chinese audience, 
because to some extent it created the impression that the US wished to 
apologise for its previous mistakes. Though the BTV journalists were praised 
by the top leadership for work well done, the journalists could not forget the 
yawning gap between their technology and that of the US journalists. 
Nixon's visit also gave the Chinese leadership a chance to experience the 
power of television in telling the American audiences about the real China. 
Three networks were covering Nixon in China: ABC, NBC and CBS. The total 
coverage of China for the period was 52 hours, w i th over 30 themes. The 
networks had nine live sessions covering Nixon's visit, reaching an audience 
of 60 mill ion to 1 billion. It was the first time that the US population had seen 
the real China. On television Chinese people appeared gentle, polite, diligent 
and peaceful [SAB, 1973:155]. Something similar happened when the 
Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited China in 1972. 
The top leadership in China had made a decision to convert Chinese 
television f rom black and white to colour. Money was no longer a problem. 
On 14 Apr i l 1973, colour television signals were sent out as a test and on 1 
October 1974, BTV formally started broadcasting in colour [SAB, 1973:12]. 
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Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou and the Gang of Four all contributed to this 
development. The main reason for their support was based on international 
considerations, because at this time none of them could have predicted the 
radical influence of television news during the coming decades. 
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Under nexv leadership and after the Gang of Four's arrest, Chinese television had 
greater freedom and began to flourish. BTV's broadcasts reached a wider audience and 
were entirely in colour. Banned programmes were reinstated and neiv ones 
introduced. It began local and regional programme exchanges, which led to its 
renaming as China Central Television (CCTV), and in 1976 to the launch ofXin 
Wen Lion Bo (XWLB), a composite programme of breaking news from networks 
around China. 
Deng Xiaoping's international travels brought Chinese journalists into contact with 
advanced Western technology, and a realisation to the Chinese public of the vast 
development gap between Western lifestyles and their own. Through popular demand 
Chinese television was updated, owners of television sets rapidly increased, and 
CCTV was soon the most watched channel xoorldwide, and a massive influence on the 
China's development. 
Advertising xvas first pioneered in China by Shanghai and Guangdong Television, 
folloived by CCTV. This commercial revenue eased television's financial burdens and 
CCTV gave programme innovation its top priority. All Chinese television stations 
regarded news as central and increased their news production staff. GTV began to 
import and export programmes, establishing the first commercial production 
company. It also launched the first Cantonese channel, and dramatically revamped its 
nexus format. 
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Televising the end of the Gang of Four 
The Cultural Revolution was a huge disaster in modern Chinese history. The 
Cultural Revolution was Mao's idea of getting r id of people in the Chinese 
Communist Party and in Chinese society who were deemed to be emerging as 
a privileged class in China. Mao's strategy in bringing about the Cultural 
Revolution was to mobilise students and young workers as his Red Guards to 
attack members of the Communist Party who were alleged to be liberal 
bourgeoisie elements. The Cultural Revolution plunged China into social and 
political chaos, leading to economic problems that lingered until 1976, when 
the Cultural Revolution finally ended. The Gang of Four were the most 
important actors of the Cultural Revolution and they were working so hard 
to use the power against any political competitors. 
The term Gang of Four refers to a faction that was formed during the Cultural 
Revolution led by Jiang Qing, Mao's third and last wife. Other members of 
the Gang of Four included Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang 
Hongwen. The four had their own political ambitions and they used Mao's 
name to implement their plans by victimising other party members who 
disagreed wi th them or were viewed as a threat during the Cultural 
Revolution. The Gang of Four committed many atrocities in the 10 years that 
the Cultural Revolution was in effect. After Mao's death in October 1976, the 
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group was arrested and put on trial, leading to life and death sentences for 
them. 
When Premier Zhou died in January 1976, television again became the Gang 
of Four's platform for minimising the Premier's influence. After a two-minute 
story about the Premier's death on 8 January, BTV never carried follow-up 
reports and yet model operas continued every day at prime time. These 
actions greatly angered the Beijing audience. 
Model Opera was promoted by Chairman Mao and his wife Jiang Qing 
through the Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong had on several occasions, after 
the founding of the People's Republic of China, expressed disapproval of the 
operas that were being staged. He complained that though there had been 
reforms most operas were still dominated by Western ideologies and 
lifestyles. Mao wanted opera that would depict proletariat heroes from 
workers, peasants or soldiers. Jiang Qing found an opportunity to revise the 
content of several Beijing Operas into Model Operas, whose format and style 
would be followed as standard. She made sure that the model operas were 
broadcast all the time on television and radio, made into movies and 
advertised with everywhere with posters. Performances were given all over 
China and each performance had to be identical and adhere to the model. 
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Even during the memorial week after Premier Zhou's death, BTV had to 
broadcast Model Opera during most of the time and cut nearly all the pictures 
of people crying at the sight of Premier Zhou's body. On the day of Premier's 
funeral, there were people parading on the streets for a distance of at least 10 
kilometres, but it was absent from BTV. 
The Gang of Four had actually gone too far. Yao Wenyuan was seen with a 
serious face on the television, but no tears. He shook hands at length with the 
widow, Deng Yingchao, on television, implying that he was the chosen 
successor to Premier Zhou. People were extremely angry when Jiang Qing 
appeared on television wearing a cap on her head. Many workers and farmers 
watching television in factories and farms angrily shouted, "Take off your 
cap!" [Interviews, 2000]. 
When Chairman Mao died in September 1976, the Gang had no way of 
preventing BTV from reporting thoroughly on this sad news and the 
associated events. 
Soon it was time to celebrate, when the Gang of Four were arrested by the 
new C C P C C led by Chairman Hua Guofeng. The trial was publicly broadcast 
by BTV, and at the same time many of the previously cut and edited 
programmes in memory of Premier Zhou were shown on television. 
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The new C C P C C ordered BTV to broadcast the national celebration of 
Chairman Hua's accession to power and the sentencing of the Gang of Four 
on charges of serious crimes. A time of madness was over and the BTV was 
entering a new era of development [Interviews, 2000]. 
Tribute to Premier Zhou on television 
Programmes in tribute to Premier Zhou dominated the airtime for weeks. 
People who had been imprisoned by the Gang of Four were released by Deng 
Xiaoping. Most of them were powerful people, as they had held important 
positions in the Party and the government at the time they were imprisoned. 
They had every reason to celebrate and promote the new political values and 
ideas pursued by Deng Xiaoping. Poems that were deemed illegal were read 
out loudly on television and even converted into new songs that were sung 
on BTV's variety shows. Television journalists were part of the celebrations 
and they planned a special evening memorial show for Premier Zhou on 21 
December 1976. 
Lady Guo Lanying sang with tears a new song in tribute to Premier Zhou. 
Everyone cried with her, and the song was being sung by billions from the 
second day. Lady Guo Lanying became the most famous singer after that. For 
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BTV, the political implication of the evening was not only the tribute to the 
Premier, but also being free from the dictatorship of the Gang of Four. 
The Beijing News Documentary Studios were still the only official production 
base for BTV. Being different from the Cultural Revolution days, red was no 
longer the only colour on television to describe the Party and governance. 
BTV documentary films started to be based on true stories and drew on real 
people's experiences. Through these interactions with the public, television 
became more important in Chinese politics [Interviews, 1999 and 2000]. 
BTV tests the political climate in China 
"Class Struggle" in China had formed a key element of C C P policy ever since 
1960, and it was still deeply engraved in the people's consciousness even 
when the Gang of Four's power had officially ended. 
While carefully meeting the requirements of the Gang of Four to promote the 
Cultural Revolution, BTV was also presenting some carefully selected 
politically correct foreign programmes. In 1971, with approval by Mao's wife 
Jiang Qing, BTV showed a ballet by Japanese dancers, which she loved, called 
White-haired daughter {Bai Mao Nu). The content was regarded one hundred 
per cent politically correct and approved, as it supported the Class Struggle, 
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but a blunder was made at the end of the show, when the ruthless landlord, 
who had tortured the "white-haired daughter", held hands with her in 
apparent harmony. As the landlord represented the Class Struggle leaders 
and the daughter the oppressed, this holding of hands clearly sent out the 
message that such oppressors should not be tolerated by the oppressed. It was 
badly received by the Gang of Four, being in direct contradiction of their 
policies, and BTV senior management were obliged to issue them with an 
apology. 
A similar blunder was committed in 1974. BTV aired a Beijing Opera 
Academy show called Sunflower store {Xiang Yang Shang Dian), which viewers 
loved. But during the show, while a lady was singing the words, "Never 
show your mercy to the class enemies", a shining portrait of Chairman Mao 
suddenly appeared on the screen. The implication was that Chairman Mao 
was the enemy referred to in the song and it once again perturbed the Gang of 
Four. 
People at BTV became extremely cautious and careful after that, and all 
attempts at improving the news services were cancelled by the management. 
The safest way for them was to show a succession of "model operas" (Yang 
Ban Xi) [Interviews, 1999, 2000, 2002]. 
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After the arrest of the Gang of Four, BTV management started thinking about 
the news. Before making any improvements, however, the management 
resumed programmes from foreign countries, as well as previously banned 
programmes such as traditional opera and those about love and romance. 
Two Yugoslav movies were shown and a series of Yugoslav television dramas 
also became popular among Beijing audiences. 
On 6 February 1978, BTV broadcast a newly organised Spring Festival Variety 
Show, comprising Chinese traditional cross-talks (Xiang Sheng), songs, dances, 
operas and acrobatics. This soon became a traditional part of the Chinese 
Lunar New Year's Eve celebrations. After carefully testing the political 
climate with the Yugoslav television drama series, BTV broadcast eight drama 
series made by its own production teams. When Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping 
visited Japan, BTV produced and broadcast a number of educational 
programmes, including Science and technology today and the translated 
Japanese movies Hometown and Chasing the criminal. Hometown was the first 
movie in China to depict women in prostitution since the foundation of the 
People's Republic. Although it was a story entirely based in Japan, the BTV 
still took extra precautions by holding audience round-table discussions and 
organising newspaper and radio commentaries to minimise the political risk 
[Interviews, 2000]. 
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Every action taken by BTV indicates that the institution was testing the 
climate for changes to keep up with the social, economic and political 
developments in China. 
Completed hardware for the news to change: The birth of Xin Wen Lian Bo 
and CCTV 
Initially, in order to broadcast the shining images of Chairman Mao during 
the 1971 May 1 Labour Day Celebrations on Tiananmen Square, the State 
Administiation of Broadcasting (SAB) held a meeting with established 
national television networks to cover this event. In the name of the Cultural 
Revolution and Chairman Mao, both the SAB and BTV received much 
assistance from the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. By the end of 
1975, except for Xinjiang, Xizang (Tibet), Inner Mongolia and Taiwan, all 
provinces and cities in China could receive BTV signals while the local 
television stations could also transfer their programmes to BTV electionically. 
When the hardware was available and ready, the SAB's 1976 National 
Working Conference for Television Development decided to intioduce a news 
programme on BTV, which would gather together all the breaking news for 
audiences around China. A change of contents started immediately and on 1 
July 1976 an early 10-15 minute draft of the news went out on air. According 
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to the SAB armual statistics, the programme signal could by 1976 theoretically 
reach an audience of over 300 million. However, there were only around 
463,000 TV sets in China, so the real figures were hard to establish. 
With the Gang of Four in prison, Chinese television began to flourish and 
progress [Guo, 1991:144]. From July 1977, all programmes on BTV were in 
colour, and at the same time it was servicing more people outside the borders 
of the Beijing municipality. Special task teams were sent to regional centres to 
negotiate programme exchanges, with particular emphasis on the prompt 
provision of news programmes. 
On 1 January 1978, daily news programmes resumed after the break of over 
10 years and people saw an attractive young lady presenting the news, 
replacing the red flags that viewers had become accustomed to over the 
previous ten years. From that day, the daily news programme at 7.00 pm was 
called Gathered bulletin of news around China (XWLB or Xin Wen Lian Bo, also 
translated as The united prime time news). This programme would later take 
over the political importance of the front page of the People's Daily and the 
Evening Prime 'News at 7.30 pm on the National People's Radio [Sun, 2003: 67]. 
Once the XWLB was formally on air, news production at regional and local 
television stations were organised by BTV. The Party and central 
government, seeing the growing importance of television, considered that 
BTV was ready to be "national" and "central". On 1 May 1978, the central 
government re-named BTV as China Central Television (CCTV), and the 
Chairman of the C C P C C , Hua Guofeng, provided his calligraphy of the 
Chinese name of CCTV. The was a great honor for C C T V to have its name 
written by the state leader. From then on, C C T V was not only 
administratively under the supervision of SAB, but also directly under the 
C C P C C s CDP [SAB, 1978:112]. 
Only a limited number of media organisations came under the direct 
supervision of the CDP, and these included national newspapers and national 
radio. This was a paradox for CCTV, because while direct supervision meant 
being given first place and having greater access to top-level political 
activities, it also meant more regulation by the Party and less freedom. 
Open to the West and learning from the internationals 
From the late 1970s Chinese people started seeing real news on national 
television. When Deng Xiaoping visited the United States in 1979, people 
watched the latest news of the visit every evening. At the same time. 
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supported by American colleagues, CCTV showed a series of new science and 
technology programmes, including the American-made documentaries. 
Wildlife, Dynamics of the river and Apollo's moon landing. The news of Apollo's 
moon landing in 1969 was ignored by the Gang of Four, because they were 
afraid to inform the public that "Public Enemy No.l", the United States of 
America, could be so successful. When Chinese audiences saw the moon 
landing by US astronauts ten years later, Chinese people for the first time 
realised the huge development gap between China and the West. It was 
arguably at this time that C C T V as the national television played the most 
crucial role in national development since the establishment of the first 
television stations 21 years earlier [Guo, 1991:145]. 
When Deng Xiaoping returned, he also brought back gifts for television 
development. The US started providing China with the latest technology for 
satellite television and related facilities. As a reformer, Deng enjoyed being 
accompanied by journalists from CCTV. The young and energetic television 
journalists showed exactly what they had witnessed during the Vice 
Premier's visit to Thailand, Japan and the US. Chinese people were deeply 
impressed by what they saw on the news - the skyscrapers, highways jammed 
with modern cars, modern facilities at every private home-and that every 
family in the West had a TV set - and as a direct result they demanded more 
TV sets for themselves. In their everyday hfe after the Cultural Revolution, 
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Chinese people wanted a variety of choice in clothing, lifestyle and 
knowledge of contemporary tiends. Knowing more about the modernised 
Western countries was another reason why people chose television as their 
window on the world [Xu, 2003: 301]. 
Nine years later, China had become the largest producer of black and white 
TV sets and the third largest producer of colour TV sets. By 1987, there were 
600 million people in China watching television every day, and, theoretically, 
C C T V became the most watched television channel around the world. It was 
impossible for the C C P to ignore the importance of television, as the audio-
visual effects had become an extiemely powerful influence on social, 
economic and political development in China [Zheng, 2004:178]. 
Early days of advertising: Could money speak louder? 
China was famous for having no advertising because it was seen as a symbol 
of capitalism, and in a centrally contiolled and planned economy, there was 
no need to advertise anything to attract more buyers. 
Shanghai and Guangdong television stations were the pioneers in advertising. 
On 28 January 1979, Shanghai Television showed the first advert for a herbal 
drink, followed by one for the Swiss-made Rado watch. Hong Kong 
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businessmen soon realised that this was a great profit-making opportunity 
and they seized it, becoming agents for Shanghai and Guangdong Television 
Stations. Both of them took plenty of advertising revenue in the first year. 
Although television stations were at first shocked to at earning money in this 
way, they soon accepted it [SAB, 1980:136]. 
Advertising was officially approved by CDP, and C C T V started to have a 
five-minute commercial slot each day. 
Japanese companies paid for most of the commercials and as a result they 
sponsored many Japanese cartoons and TV dramas to be shown on CCTV, 
earning C C T V the criticism of being "Japanese Television". Japan is China's 
closest neighbour, but criticism over C C T V was soon overtaken by more 
important issues raised in the media, as China was so eager to develop and 
modernise the four sectors proposed by Deng Xiaoping: industry, agriculture, 
science and technology, and defence. 
Nevertheless, advertising on Chinese television in the 1980s was always 
carefully managed and kept to a minimum to avoid unnecessary criticism 
from the government and the public. The television sector was as greedy for 
profits as it is in the 21^ ^ century. Money played only a negligible role in 
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influencing the television agenda. Advertising was strictly for promoting 
products to the public. 
Stronger voices in process 
When the financial burdens disappeared and undue political pressure eased 
off, C C T V made innovation of content their top priority. 
To secure a regular audience, C C T V introduced new programmes for various 
needs. Among the many new initiatives was Servicing you {Wei Nin Fu Wu), 
which became one of the most popular programmes, and was particularly 
enjoyed by housewives for the daily running of a family. Following its success 
and popularity. Servicing you was "photocopied" by other television channels 
in China. The programme reached another milestone when Mrs Shen Li , who 
in 1958 had been the first news presenter on Chinese television, was chosen to 
host it. Shen became the first television celebrity with loyalty right across the 
country, and it was then that people realised the power of personality-led 
programmes on television. 
Shanghai Television introduced Market report {Shi Chang hue Ying), which 
became the first business and financial news bulletin. Guangdong Television 
had a similar programme called Market this week {Shi Chang Man Bu). All 
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television stations in China started to recruit more news production staff and 
news 
was evaluated as the core strategy by most television directors [MRT, 1984: 
144]. 
Guangdong was among the television stations with the most "imported" 
programmes. It became the first provincial television station to establish a 
commercial company for audio-visual productions when it opened the Pacific 
Audio-Visual Company. This company became the official platform for 
making programmes for external markets, as well as importing programmes 
into China from elsewhere. 
No sooner had this development taken place than a challenge arose. 
Guangdong residents in the Pearl River Delta could easily receive Hong Kong 
television programmes, and by comparison the Hong Kong television was 
more entertaining and had many different programmes. Because viewers 
opted to watch it rather than the Guangdong Television (GTV), the GTV 
network was motivated to make improvements. 
Three major improvements were made during 1981 to 1983. In 1981, GTV 
introduced a new channel with more localised and entertainment 
programmes. In 1982, it began lunch-time news as well as a more interactive 
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programme, which offered a popular request service with a hotline available 
to the audiences. In 1983, a Cantonese channel was opened and facilities were 
improved to reach over 80% of residents in the province. This was a record 
that even radio never matched [MRT, 1983: 204]. 
GTV was directly under the supervision of the Guangdong Provincial Party 
Committee's Department of Propaganda, and so it was regarded as a political 
duty to attract audiences to watch the network rather than Hong Kong 
television. Audience surveys were frequently conducted and immediately 
analysed and adjustments were made to programmes accordingly. 
A comprehensive proposal to improve news programmes on GTV was 
approved by the Party's provincial authority. News programmes were 
produced in various formats, which included news briefs, commentary, 
reporters on the scene, live coverage, television debate and newspaper 
comment. 
The SAB was replaced by a new cabinet ministry, the Ministry of Radio and 
Television. The name itself shows that television was accorded an equal 
position with radio. It was an indication that television in China was well 
recognised by the Party and cential government as a new way of governing 
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The rise of television and the decline of radio 
[1983-1992] 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter relates how from around 1980 the Party started to pay more attention to 
television than to radio and newspapers. The existence of television became a major 
factor in party decisions, and journalists took over the management of television 
stations from party officials. 
Reform of television news was central to media reform, encouraged by the Party after 
the fall of the Gang of Four. CCTV's negative neivs reports and investigative 
journalism were well received and attracted the best journalists. CCTV offered 
lunchtime and evening news, and ordinary people xvere heard voicing their opinions. 
The drive to improve journalistic standards included an emphasis on prompt, 
accurate and comprehensive neivs reporting. The CCP retained control, but 
television's powerful influence on the public became obvious when its programmes 
began to affect political decisions. 
Television journalists were more creative and go-ahead than their radio and print 
counterparts, ivith innovative programmes and celebrity role models, and all met zvith 
the CCP's approval. As radio audiences declined, television rose in popularity, and so 
the Party gave television a much higher priority for its announcements and party 
news than to other media. A major advance came when the CCTV broadcast round-
the-clock coverage of the National People's Congress, ivith televised interviews of 
member and top leadership, and phone-in sessions by the public. 
The rise of television was a httle surprising at the beginning for the entire 
"Thought Work" regime. I t was even opposed by the traditional newspaper 
and radio leaders wi th in the CDP and "Thought Work" system. "Thought 
Work" (TW) is a direct translation f rom the Chinese words, "Si Xiang Gong 
97 
Zuo". Narrowly, it means ideological control and operations, and was always 
regarded by the Party as a vital part of the governing mechanism. 
News reforms 
News programme reform was a greatly sensitive topic for any official in the 
TW system. Senior people f rom the newspapers felt uneasy wi th the rise of 
anti-corruption reports. Besides, some quarters argued that television would 
not make any difference, because radio was already doing everything; its 
journalists were able to report issues promptly and could efficiently collect 
public opinion on current affairs. 
Television had just entered centre stage. Journalists f rom CCTV at the time 
were entirely party selected, and they were loyal and kept to the Party's 
guidelines. The core of the XWLB's mission was to propagate the Party's 
theory, guidelines and policy and staff reporters had never considered 
negative coverage of anything about the Party and government. However, 
positive news faced serious challenges. The Gang of Four had created a 
special way of telling "the good news", but viewers did not generally believe 
what they heard. Television journalists inherited the "special way" of 
reporting great achievements, which the XWLB viewers just found boring. 
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In November 1976, the SAB organised a conference in Hefei to discuss the 
quality of television news around China. Participants agreed that news 
programmes should get r id of four problems: programmes being faked, slow, 
too long or insubstantial. The problems were clear, but few television 
directors could propose any effective methods of making changes unti l the 
Third Plenary Meeting of the CCP's 11* National Congress, on 18 December 
1978. 
Deng Xiaoping called on the Party to "Seek truth f rom facts" (Shi Shi Qiu Shi) 
and this seems to have motivated TV journalists. From 1979, CCTV started to 
criticise inappropriate behaviour of residents in Beijing, such as throwing 
rubbish on the streets and violation of traffic laws. Whenever these 
programmes were shown, viewers called in and demanded remedial action. 
By the second day things would usually improve dramatically. 
On 12 September 1979, CCTV broadcast a brave report about the wrongful 
use of government vehicles by senior officials and their relatives. Two young 
CCTV journalists, Zhang Changming and Wang Jiyan, bravely recorded the 
registration plates of all cars parked in front of the Wangfujing Department 
Store. The reporters suspected that the government cars were parking there 
for the officials' private purposes. The programme was edited for immediate 
showing on the evening of 1 May 1979, but i t failed because i t had to be edited 
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again and again by the CCTV Director and Deputy of News and later by the 
minister-level Director-General of the SAB, Zhang Xiangshan. Four months 
later, the story was finally on air, though not as "news" any more. This 
groundbreaking story received the highest praise f rom viewers. For the first 
time, over 1,000 people wrote to CCTV about just one news item. Both the 
SAB and CCTV were relieved when, as a result, the 5* Plenary Meeting 
passed a new document regulating senior Party officials' political and private 
lives. 
The programme was also lauded as having influenced the passing of other 
new Party documents. The two young journalists enjoyed the experiments as 
a great success. Zhang Changming was later promoted to various positions in 
CCTV, leading the news departments, and he is currently the Vice President 
and Deputy Party Secretary of CCTV for Personnel and Political and 
International Programming. Wang Jiyan was promoted to be Vice President 
of the Beijing Broadcasting Institute and then President of the Hong Kong 
based Phoenix Television [SAB, 1989 and Interviews 1999, 2000]. 
After this initial test, CCTV decided to establish a new programme to cover 
negative news on a regular basis. It took a long time for the SAB to pass it 
because most of its officials had been promoted f rom the National People's 
Radio which, since 1959, had never broadcast commentary or negative news. 
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The SAB officials had a deep fear of challenging the set boundaries. After 
careful consideration, CCTV was given the chance to experiment first, and for 
this purpose CCTV opened a new department, the CCTV Features 
Department. This department would later attract the best journalistic staff for 
the development of CCTV over the coming 20 years. CCTV took a pioneering 
role in opinion programmes. 
The Features Department contributed a series of high quality watchdog 
programmes. On 12 July 1980, the department's official weekly programme, 
Obsennng and thinking, broadcast a masterpiece on the shortage of vegetable 
supply to the capital. The reporter d id a stand-up report and interviewed 
people on the streets. Interviewees were not told what to say or recite f rom a 
prepared reply as before, and everybody was speaking the everyday 
language of ordinary people. The pictures, the sound and the topics were all 
real. This programme certainly became very popular [Sun, 2003 and Guo, 
1991]. 
After a few years Observing and thinking faded away, partly because of a lack 
of creativity and passion in the production team. Other similar programmes 
also ended, fol lowing the direct supervision introduced shortly after 
Observing and thinking was launched. A l l CCTV popular news programmes 
were required to be under the direct supervision of CDP of the CCPCC. Key 
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members of the programme were invited to the weekly internal briefings of 
the CDP and themes and topics had to be pre-approved by the CDP before 
reporters covered the news. These practices f rom the beginning unti l now 
have greatly limited the power and potential of the programmes. 
News, not entertainment: Television News as the government's core 
strategy 
After the approval of advertising, television became more diversified and the 
air time allotted to share news broadcasting decreased sharply. More TV 
drama, imported cartoons, variety shows and televised traditional operas 
were competing for airtime. Director-General Zhang Xiangshan of the SAB 
published several serious criticisms of the SAB's official newspaper. Television 
weekly {Dian Shi Zhou Boa), saying that he would prefer more news on 
television rather than programmes purely for entertainment [SAB, 1981:122]. 
Zhang pointed out that national television was the mouthpiece and 
propaganda organ of the Party and should never become a "mini-cinema", 
only for movies. He demanded a "healthy" balance of news, education and 
entertainment. 
Debates on Zhang's proposal were quite lively until he left the SAB, when i t 
was elevated to become the Ministry of Radio and Television. News 
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programmes were, however, expanded without further debate. Learning f rom 
the Guangdong Television experiences, CCTV introduced lunchtime news 
and evening news bulletins. Even for the traditional XWLB, producers 
conducted various experiments, which included a challenge to the preferred 
order of news stories. Previously, news items were not ranked according to 
the timeliness or importance. News stories were simply ranked according to 
the officials' seniority, and domestic news was always positioned before 
international news. News producers wanted to adapt the international 
media's way of ranking news according to news values. 
Journalists started to take over senior positions in CCTV and MRT f r o m the 
party cadres. Journalistic standards gradually became the new philosophy in 
the newsrooms. Journalists in television competed wi th each other for prompt 
and accurate coverage of news. They also competed w i t h radio reporters. 
This competition broadened the scope of potential news, including many of 
the forbidden topics and issues such as natural disasters and a badly 
managed response to accidents. 
In May 1987, CCTV covered the big fire in the Da Xing A n Ling Natural 
Forest for a month, and this formally marked the start of television defeating 
radio in the news. Scholars had even written and argued that television news 
would eventually replace conventional newspapers, magazines and radio, 
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and that TV sets would become available to every single household in China, 
while the number of radio receivers would decline sharply. 
The "Four-Level Television" system 
The new MRT set up the 1 1 * A l l China Radio and Television Working 
Conference in Beijing on 31 March 1983. It was also the first time that the 
word "television" was inserted into the Conference's official title. The CDP 
head addressed the conference and stressed that, "Propaganda is the core of 
all radio and television development". MRT Minister W u Lengxi proposed 
the "Four-Level Television" (FLT), and this attracted most people's attention 
[MRT, 1983:12]. 
For a long time the development of television in China was limited by 
financial constraints and political considerations. CCTV was better off as it 
was supported by the CCPCC and central government. However, local 
television stations were vulnerable, having to depend on local officials, who 
had insufficient understanding of television and its significance. The new 
FLT proposal permitted municipal and country level Party committees to 
supervise the establishment of television stations at their level of government. 
It had now been some time since the Cultural Revolution and local 
governments were no longer lacking in financial independence. A l l local 
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governments were required to promote their own policies for running the 
television stations. Soon municipal and country governments came up wi th 
budgets for establishing their own television stations. 
As local television stations were being established, cable television was 
beginning to develop in the coastal regions. 
The FLT proposal led to great success considering the fact that in 1982 China 
had no more than 20 television stations, and that by the end of 1987, there 
were 336 television stations throughout the nation. 
However, the CDP required that the MRT take proper control of the television 
stations. CDP wanted to have all television stations centralised by the MRT 
and CCTV. As the local stations were financially supported by the local 
governments, it was not thought practical to expect all the local stations to 
comply wi th all the CCTV and MRT guidelines. Politically, i t could work, but 
economically i t could be very difficult . 
When illness forced Minister W u to retire in 1985, the new MRT Minister, A i 
Zhisheng, slowed down the approval of new television stations. Among the 
existing stations, some were really successful, while others were at the edge of 
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bankruptcy. The CDP and MRT soon learned that television management 
would no longer be based on political correctness, but on financial stability. 
Formation of the loyal and mature audience 
Television journahsts were certainly more creative and competitive compared 
wi th the monopolistic traditional Party newspaper and national radio 
journalists. Television nearly considered using all creative audio-visual 
formats to replace the limited traditional media formats. In July 1985, CCTV 
invited middle school teacher and education expert Qu Xiao to give a 
televised lecture and i t was broadcast to a billion viewers. Qu had originally 
been discovered by National Radio and became famous for his powerful 
lectures, but now television brought the real person to its audience. The 
televised lecture was a powerful format, frequently used during the Cultural 
Revolution, and even before that. For example, the "Steel Man" Wang Jinxi 
became a national, popular and adored hero, promoted by television. 
Supervised by the CDP, CCTV in competition wi th the National Radio now 
decided to present teacher Qu Xiao and a disabled girl Zhang Haidi , followed 
by the Vietnamese War hero Xu Liang. Traditional coverage of heroes in 
newspapers and on the radio had lost its appeal, and the CDP was happy to 
see television realising the goals of the CCPCC in promoting such role 
models. 
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With the downward trend in radio audiences f rom the mid 1980s, the CDP 
naturally gave higher priority to CCTV than to NPR or even the People's Daily 
for covering the most important news, especially news about senior political 
leaders' international visits and the initial announcements of important 
policies. This was entirely the result of the decline in radio audiences and the 
rise of television audiences, and their awareness of the powerful potential of 
television [Zheng, 2004: 331]. 
Since mid-1980s, CCTV presented its coverage of the National People's 
Congress and CPPCC's annual gathering in every March in an interesting 
way. Unlike the traditional reports of such meetings, CCTV invited members 
to answer questions in front of the cameras. People watching the programmes 
were encouraged to call and raise further questions wi th members of the 
congress. From this point on, CCTV became an alternative central 
government "reception desk" for gathering public views, opinions, concerns 
and problems. [Lynch, 1998: 56]. As CCTV was not an independent media 
organisation, information provided by the viewers was never ignored or 
thrown into the dustbin. Public opinions were carefully collected and 
analysed for the CCPCC's decision-making process, and this practice 
continued throughout Deng Xiaoping's administration. 
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The Party's Congress Meetings were always a mystery to the Chinese people 
and the international community. CCTV helped to change this image during 
the 13* CCP National Congress, when it provided around-the-clock exclusive 
coverage of the gathering. Top leaders were persuaded to collaborate w i t h 
CCTV and, f rom this congress onwards, Chinese leaders became accustomed 
to the cameras. The five elected members of the Politburo Standing 
Committee would be seen standing in line to meet the press and answer 
questions by both Chinese and foreign journalists. Television journalists 
applied to cover almost every event and the Party would give its approval. As 
a senior CCTV journalist later commented, CCTV was growing alongside the 
Party and the nation's top leadership. I t was CCTV journalists who gave 
lessons to the most senior Chinese officials in media literacy, and thus 
television journalists gradually brought about transparency in Chinese 
politics. Television no longer merely served as the mouthpiece of the party 
but also as a bridge, or at least a dual carriageway of information. 
At the same time, television news was also preparing a more mobilised 
audience group. Audience loyalty was essential for CCTV, and maturity in 
political understanding among the audiences would be a bonus for CCTV's 
efforts and would contribute to the social, economic and political 
development of China. 
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Chapter 5 
The golden age of television: Commercialisation, 
journalistic corruption and political correctness 
[1993-2003] 
Chapter Summary 
The history of Chinese television and its interaction zvith the state continues here. 
Shanghai's cable television now had several million vieivers, and Shanghai Oriental 
Television (SOT) was launched, a commercial channel without state support, and 
with neivs central to its programming. CCTV also made news its core strategy in its 
aim to be an authoritative and influential global network, and like other networks 
experimented with creative new ways of presenting the news. Further developments 
included the success of provincial television, and the formation of two Chinese media 
conglomerates. 
Television reform, particularly of the news, was reflected throughout the Chinese 
media. The rise of television commercialisation and media conglomerates in China 
were the results of the severance of financial ties xvith the state, and this is currently 
justified as a necessary condition for meeting foreign challenges since China's 
accession to the World Trade Organisation. 
An examination of how commercially supported television was run in practice is 
made, followed by discussion of the benefits and disadvantages of commercial 
television. The dilemma between television's wish for greater freedom from state 
control and political correctness is set against the corruption arising from the 
commercialisation of the media. 
The year 1993 was a very special one for Chinese television: Shanghai 
Television established a commercial channel, Shanghai Oriental Television 
(SOT), soon after cable television became available to several mil l ion viewers 
in the Shanghai municipality. Being commercial meant that this charuiel was 
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no longer financially supported by the government and party authorities: the 
television station had to make profits f rom commercial advertising to pay the 
bills. Very bravely, Shanghai Oriental Television positioned news 
programmes as the core strategy of competence. While the official Shanghai 
Television channels still presented Party conferences in a boring way, SOT 
was exploring ways to present the news in a format closer to viewers' tastes 
[MRFT, 1993:145]. 
A year after Deng Xiaoping's famous speech in Guangdong, when he called 
for more openness in Chinese politics, CCTV was ready for further changes in 
its news programmes. 
News as the core strategy 
The official yearbooks of MRFT indicate that promoting CCTV as a 
worldwide influential television network was integral to national strategy. 
The yearbook recorded Minister Sun Jiazheng's directives that, "CCTV w i l l 
never be a powerful and influential medium in the wor ld i f the news 
programmes are not authoritative and professional by international 
standards." Since former Minister Zhang Xiangshan's commentaries were 
covered up, few people remembered how he too, ten years earlier, had 
eagerly promoted the importance of news provision for national television. 
n o 
News, undoubtedly, was agreed to be the core component of national 
television by CDP, MRFT and the senior management of CCTV. 
Table 5.1 
Leaders of SBA-MRT-MRFT-SARFT 
Period of Time Title of Administration Name of Director Report to... 










L i Qiang 
(Minister) 
State Council 
1952.1-1962.12 State Administration of 
Broadcasting 
Mei Y i (Minister) State Council 
and the CCP, 
CCPCC 
1962.1-1966.12 State Administration of 
Broadcasting 




and the CCP, 
CCPCC 






1968.1-1968.12 State Administration of 
Broadcasting 










1973.1-1973.12 State Administration of 
Broadcasting 
L iu Jiangong 
(Minister) 
CCPCC 





1977.1-1977.12 State Administration of 
Broadcasting 
Zhang Xiangshan State Council 
and the CDP, 
CCPCC 
1978.1-1978.12 State Administration of 
Broadcasting 





and the CDP, 
CCPCC 





and the CDP, 
CCPCC 
1982.5-1985.4 Ministry of Radio and W u Lengxi CDP and State 
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Television (Minister) Council 
1985.4-1985.12 Ministry of Radio and 
Television 
A i Zhisheng 
(Minister) 
CDP and State 
Council 
1986.1-1994.4 Ministry of Radio, Film 
and Television 
A i Zhisheng 
(Minister) 
CDP and State 
Council 




CDP and State 
Council 
1998.3-2000.6 State Administration of 




CDP and State 
Council 
2000.6-2005.12 State Administration of 




CDP and State 
Council 
2005.12- State Administration of 




CDP and State 
Council 
Source: Compiled by author according to SAB, MRT, MRFT and SARFT 
Yearbooks 
CCTV senior management first established breakfast time as a "special zone" 
for news reforms and other associated experiments [CCTV, 1993: 202]. A t the 
onset they could not think of an appropriate name for the new department, 
but later the entire breakfast news programme was officially named by CCTV 
and the MRFT as Oriental horizon. Its official name was Department ofneivs and 
commentary and this was the first time that commentary had been introduced 
to television news in China. Investigative journalist Sun Yusheng was 
appointed as Director of the new department, and wrote a book about his 
experimental experiences in rurming it. By the time it was published, he had 
already been promoted to become the youngest Vice President in CCTV's 
history and was also responsible for the 2008 Olympic operations. 
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The introduction of news departments and commentary was only one part of 
a series of new changes within C C T V news productions supported by the 
MRFT. There had only been four news bulletin slots: morning, lunchtime, 
prime time at 7.00 pm and the late night news. From 1 March 1993, C C T V 
Channel 1 broadcast news bulletins twelve times a day and most of the news 
programmes were broadcast live [Sun, 2003:181]. 
More than ever before, television producers could now no longer be satisfied 
with simply relating the Party's policy word by word to the public during the 
news. They started seeking the best ways of communicating and interacting 
with the public. The all-positive XWLB was also reformed and started to 
include negative news stories in its bulletins almost every day. 
In December 1992, XWLB broadcast investigative reports of serious crimes in 
certain cities and how the police were struggling to combat the problem. The 
reports presented crime scenes, not previously allowed on television, and the 
programme was not only welcomed by the general public, but also praised by 
President Jiang Zemin. As with Mao and Zhou in the early days. President 
Jiang Zemin watched XWLB every evening and effectively interacted with the 
news departments. He supported C C T V in becoming the alternative channel 
for assessing public opinion on the current policies of the Party and 
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government. President Jiang and Premier Zhu Rongji had both pubHcly 
stressed the importance of CCTV's watchdog function. Premier Zhu once 
even commented that, "If C C T V focus report stops investigating and reporting 
misconduct, I will stop watching C C T V immediately" \]ing, 1997: 98]. In 
December 1996, XWLB covered the story of an underground base for pork 
production and illegal butchers in the North East. President Jiang 
immediately called the Minister of Trade and Commerce for verification and 
urged action against the misconduct. 
The top leadership seemed highly satisfied with CCTV's reform of news 
programmes. In February 1995, the Standing Committee of Politburo officially 
invited Minister Sun Jiazheng to a special meeting on the development of 
radio and television in China. Minister Sun was encouraged by the Politburo 
to highlight all the dilemmas and problems he faced. This was unusual in 
Chinese politics. The Politburo sorted out all his concerns, and a great deal of 
special assistance was given to him by the Party and central government. 
Commercial changes in news productions 
Oriental horizon was not only a brand-new C C T V programme, but also an 
ambitious experiment for news production operations. As they placed such a 
crucial role in C C T V , news programmes and their financial arrangements 
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were always centrally managed by the editorial board. News programmes are 
allowed to operate their own commercial advertising. Oriental Horizon 
introduced new operating procedures, which amongst other things gave the 
executive producers full political and financial control over the programme. 
The executive producers were also required to be responsible for the 
programme's revenue from advertising. This policy motivated television 
journalists to produce more quality and critical programmes. Producers 
competed with each other by using innovative ways of presenting news to 
attract more viewers for both positive and negative news but, as with any 
society in the world, negative news always attracted the most public 
attention. The news department was continually expanding and Beijing Youth 
Daily in 2000 reported that there were over 6,000 staff reporters working for 
C C T V news departments. Journalists interviewed by the author expressed 
pride in being television journalists in China and only a few of them 
complained about press freedom issues. They covered everything from 
government corruption to crime in the dark corners of society. They kept an 
eye on government behaviour on behalf of the public and provided a 
platform for the voices of the poor and those at grassroots. A news 
documentary programme called Life space became popular. Reporters were 
sent to ordinary homes around China to cover ordinary people's everyday life 
for the news. 
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Cutting-edge programmes like News probe and Focus report were very 
successful. They set the agenda for the national newspapers and commentary 
of most domestic media. Hu Zhengrong argued in 2000 at the China 
Communication Forum that the public regarded programmes as the 
"alternative government reception desk", where they could take their 
complaints, rather than to the bureaucratic party and government system. 
Commercialisation vs. party journalism 
Television was not the only medium celebrating reform; the entire Chinese 
media had undergone significant changes in the period between 1993 and 
2003, as a result of media commercialisation supported by the Party and 
government. The print media had gone even further and had formed press 
organisations like those in the West. The birth of media conglomerates in 
China was initially a response to the state's severance of financial subsidies to 
the press but now, however, it is being justified as a necessary condition for 
meeting potential foreign challenges following China's accession to the WTO. 
However, commercialisation is a double-edged sword and inevitably it was 
the negative side that attracted the Party's attention. First, as Lee [2003: 3] 
argues, the Chinese party-state system is moving closer to a system 
resembling what Latin American scholars call a "bureaucratic authoritarian 
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(capitalist) regime," whereby the system capitalises on emerging 
opportunities in the global market. The global market was clearly dominated 
by a few Western media giants promoting Western values and democracy. 
The C C P has never forgotten this potential threat to its ideology. 
Second, China has tried to shelter the media sector from the rules and norms 
of international trade arrangements, as the media remain the party-state's 
means of profit and ideological impact. Essentially, the Chinese media are 
owned and controlled by the party-state. The party-state takes a corporatist 
approach, whereby significant elite clients are incorporated into the power 
orbit of the party-state, with the party-state offering political and economic 
benefits in exchange for the media elite's loyalty. However, the Ministry of 
Commerce and Trade had had no experience whatsoever in dealing with the 
media industry. Very few of its media managers were professionally trained, 
unlike those from commercial companies. Most media directors were 
ideological cadres and former practitioners of Party journalism. It would take 
a great deal of time to get the ideological mind and the economic world 
smoothly bridged. 
Third, press conglomerates in China evolved in the 1980s and 1990s in 
response to the dire financial and bureaucratic imperatives of the party-state. 
Media officials seemed to believe that "bigger" implied "better" and that in 
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order to compete with foreign media providers in China large media 
conglomerates were necessary. But media conglomerates were actually a 
weak response to global forces and they were merely a facade for domestic 
political control and economic growth. 
In 2001 a grouping of all broadcasting institutions was formed to make the 
China Corporation of Radio, Film and Television, but again the establishment 
of giant national-level bodies was not the answer. "The bigger the better" was 
never part of the strategy for the development of broadcasting in China. 
Petitions are currently being made to the government for passing a money bill 
that will enable the formation of another media giant, to be called China 
International Communications Group. It will comprise C C T V 4 and C C T V 9, 
CRI, China Daily and wrww.China.com. 
Meanwhile television stations were still successfully operating on their own at 
a business level. Hunan TV achieved the first economic miracle among 
provincial television stations. Reform at this television network went beyond 
mere innovation in news programmes. Chinese versions of American idol, 
Survivor, Big brother and Blind date were all popular on the network. Their 
success was also supported by aggressive advertisers in the industry. China's 
number one dairy company, Meng Niu, became Hunan TV's primary partner. 
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The corporate world poured money in its billions into television stations 
every year to sponsor programmes, and before long questions started being 
raised about objectivity and impartiality when television stations took money 
from the commercial world [SARFT, 2003, 2004]. 
CCTV-2 introduced the "Low Ranking Denying" exercise, through which 
programmes with low audience ratings would automatically be dropped (or 
"denied") after three months, including the personnel working on those 
programmes. Many local television chaimels followed. "Money speaks 
louder" became true of many Chinese television stations [Interviews, 2004], 
Surprisingly, the LRD was supported by the CDP and SARFT. The Party 
believed that it was impossible for a programme without mass popularity to 
propagate the Party's guidelines effectively. 
Corrupted journalism and political correctness 
Journalism is corruptible in many ways and government power is one of 
them. China's case is different because journalists are not corrupted through 
political power, but by the commercial interests of television stations. 
Journalists are supposed to be independent of commercial influences. 
However, in the current Chinese media organisations, especially the severely 
competitive television industry, the ultimate goal is to make profit rather than 
to uphold professional values. Scholars in many countries are worried about 
this trend. In the West, media power is already in the hands of a few people 
and giant corporations. In China commercial interests have seriously 
corrupted the national and local television networks [Zhao, 1998: 83]. At the 
same time, political correctness has become the new benchmark in news 
departments. There are certain bottom lines of political reporting in the news 
departments. In severe conunercial competitions, television programmes 
should never risk to go beyond the political correctness bottom lines. This is 
also to guarantee the government will not stop protecting CCTV's monopoly 
position in Chinese television industry. 
It is some years since television ceased to be subverted by government 
interference, which had turned the relationship between the two into a 
government-protected monopoly. This means that television stations under 
the name of the party and government can now make money from 
entertainment programmes and commercial advertising, as well as from news 
programmes. The Party and government care less about how television 
stations make money, as long as they are able to make enough to operate. It is 
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occasionally heard that even reporters charge companies for a positive 
portrayal in news stories. 
Corruption in journalism was developing and spreading fast. The Party and 
government had not realised that the corrupted media conglomerates would 
soon start demanding freedom and a guarantee of higher profits. 
Since the Party still have the right to appoint senior media personnel for 
media groups, L i Xiguang [2003:1] suggests that immediate action should be 
taken to establish new regulations and laws to curb the misconduct of the 
media and journalists. 
In the highly developed coastal regions, including Zhejiang and Jiangsu, 
private companies are allowed to invest in newspapers, magazines and 
television productions. Unfortunately, the investors are given the right to take 
part in deciding editorial policies and occasionally, though at a junior level, 
these media organisations attack government officials and party leaders. With 
private business developing in the national economy, it will not be long 
before private business investors enter other territories of the media industry. 
It remains to be seen whether the legitimacy of the party-state will be 
challenged by the media. 
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This chapter only intended to highlight the problems. Methods of solving 
these problems are discussed in later chapters. It is obvious that the C C P 
needed to adjust the current television policy following the painful 
experiences endured by local government. Different departments within the 
CCP have already taken steps to prevent further damage, as the ability to 
govern through the news has been officially included in the Hu and Wen 
requirement, the "governing capability of the Party". 
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Chapter 6 
CCTV and the international playground [2003-
2007] 
Chapter Summary 
Can China's media industry, especially television, compete with the media giants 
from the more advanced capitalist countries, given the ever-ividening gap between the 
tivo? The debate includes an overview of the global media industry, and a discussion 
of the Chinese television industry's current status. 
Key strategies for the media industry of advanced countries in a global market are 
then highlighted, followed by a discussion on whether Chinese television can ivork out 
appropriate ways to raise its standards adequately to compete internationally, with 
particular regard to news programmes. 
The factors holding back the development of China's media industry are discussed in 
turn: potverful competition from Western media giants, China's negative 
international image, poor brand management, state indifference to audience research, 
corruption of broadcasting integrity by commercialisation, and the global dominance 
of the English language and of Western culture. 
The media policy of the Chinese government is examined, luhereby it retains strong 
media control, alloioing only a very limited freedom. The advantages to journalists of 
this are shown, along with the obstacles it causes. The conclusion suggests that 
defending the domestic media market is not a priority for China, but the successful 
maximisation of profit from the domestic market is the xoay fonvard if the Chinese 
television industry is to compete successfully luith the Western media giants. 
C C T V has become the most profitable media organisation in China since the 
late 1990s. For a long time there has been no organisation in the Chinese 
media powerful enough to challenge this government-protected monopoly. 
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However, now that China is a member of WTO, can this monopoly be 
protected any longer? In the national interest and for cultural security, China 
is also requires a powerful media brand. Can C C T V step up to the challenge 
and be a representative of the Chinese media? Can China, as a developing 
country, compete with the Western media giants? 
This chapter debates whether the Chinese media industry, especially 
television, can compete with the media giants based in more advanced 
capitalist countries. The key hypothesis is that the gap between the media 
industry of developing countries and developed countries is becoming 
increasingly wider, more so than ever before. To support this point, an 
introduction to the global media industry will be given after a sociological 
description of the "globalised" world. An overview of how the Chinese 
television industry developed will also be provided. 
The discussion will then highlight key strategies for the media industry of 
advanced countries in a global market, followed by a discussion on whether 
Chinese television can work out appropriate ways to deal with raising its 
standards enough to enter the global media market. It will also examine the 
media industry in China from the aspects of domestic market, language 
preference. Research and Development, contemporary global cultural 
dominance and China's negative image internationally. 
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The author will further examine government media policy in China, which 
has set out the social and political conditions for further development, 
conditions which are useful, but also form obstacles. The thesis will finally 
suggest that defending the domestic media market is not a priority for China, 
but that the successful maximisation of profit from the domestic market is the 
way forward if the Chinese television industry is to compete with Western 
giants in the international playground. 
The competition: Giants of the globalised media industry 
As the Chinese television industry aspires to enter the international stage and 
become part of the global media industry, it will need to withstand huge 
competition. What is currently referred to as the global television industry is 
in reality just a monopoly of a few television giants whose grip on the 
industry is so strong that it will require a great deal from ambitious and up-
and-coming television networks like those in China even to begin to compete. 
Television organisations that dominate the world stage in competition with 
Chinese television include American and European corporations that have 
been developing in the industry at a very fast rate. To illustrate this 
dominance, we can examine those corporations who practically control more 
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than half the American television industry and a world television market of 
almost the same size. . 
Walt Disney owns several television networks that dominate both the 
American and world markets. It owns the American Broadcasting 
Corporation (ABC), one of the oldest American television channels, which by 
2008 was the most watched television network in the US. It is also available in 
several other countries, including Canada, Mexico, Israel, Iraq, Japan, Russia 
and the Caribbean. In addition, Walt Disney owns one of the world's leading 
sports channels, the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network 
(ESPN). Time Warner is another American corporation whose global share of 
the television industry is staggering. The company is a conglomerate that 
owns Cable News Network (CNN) and its reach is practically worldwide. 
Another giant worth noting is Viacom. This corporation owns such 
worldwide television networks as Music Television (MTV), Black 
Entertainment Television (BET) and Nickelodeon. 
As mentioned earlier, any discussion of the global television market and 
industry is essentially about these American corporations and others like 
them, such as News Corporation which owns Fox News. These are the 
players currently in the field with whom the Chinese media industry will 
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have to compete if it hopes to emerge as an internationally accepted and 
respected television brand. 
"New Propaganda" television news and its challenges 
The current status of Chinese television is that of a follower, because ever 
since the emergence of the Chinese television industry its programming has 
been more or less a copy and paste of Western television programmes. The 
programmes that have been most popular and have recorded the highest 
viewer ratings on C C T V have all been Chinese versions of American 
television programmes. A C C T V programme called Focus report, which takes 
a critical look at society and questions inappropriate behaviour on behalf of 
the public, is actually just a Chinese version of Sixty minutes on CBS, the 
American television network. Other Chinese television networks also have 
their own versions of Western programmes - for instance, the now suspended 
Super girl, which was a replica of American idol. 
One of the reasons for the lack of improvement in the content of Chinese 
television is a lack of research and development. Those responsible for 
content do not carry out audience research to find out what kind of 
programmes would interest viewers. Instead, they seem to act on their own 
ideas of what viewers want and this is why Chinese television programmes 
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are still entrenched in the old ways while the rest of the world has moved on. 
With the opening up of China, many Chinese people are becoming exposed to 
the fast-growing outside world and their lifestyles are changing accordingly. 
If the television stations were to carry out research to measure the popularity 
of their current programming, they would be amazed. Another challenge to 
the improvement of programmes is that the people responsible for them have 
hardly travelled anywhere outside China, and have no of the type of 
programme content used by leading television stations elsewhere, and the 
fact that foreign television broadcasting is barred in China does not help. 
Local television stations were previously required to produce their own 
programmes, but around 1993 C C T V changed the system to what was called 
"the separation of production and broadcasting", through which stations 
could buy content from private production firms. This was essentially a good 
idea because programme content would be improved with competition 
between the private firms to produce programmes that viewers would want 
to watch. Unfortunately the system failed to work, because C C T V never really 
consumed very much from private production firms and the local television 
stations found it expensive, and these factors both discouraged the private 
production of programmes. 
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Without being creative and initiating programmes about the Chinese Ufestyle, 
the Chinese television industry cannot hope to compete successfully wi th 
well-established corporations. I f programmes wi th a greater pul l of viewers 
are those copied f rom other television networks such as America, Chinese 
television w i l l remain a follower on the global stage. 
News programmes are items that lend credence to Chinese television 
networks, but there is currently a problem because networks such as CCTV 
from which a large proportion of the Chinese population get their news, 
depend heavily on foreign news agencies. About 30 per cent of the thirty-
minute News Bulletin at 7.00 p m on CCTV consists of international news, but 
of this 90 per cent is f rom Western sources including AP, Reuters and AFP. 
Some original material is now offered by the Xinhua News Agency, but that 
only began in 2001. Before then, Xinhua could not provide audio-visual 
material f rom its own bureaux around the world. 
News provision is not the only handicap to pose a challenge to the Chinese 
television industry's desire to break into the global arena. CCTV's reporting 
of major international events has left much to be desired. Chapter 1 
mentioned the failure to report on the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, but 
another example is CCTV's failure to give adequate cover to the bombing of 
Baghdad in 2003, when US military forces invaded Iraq. The CCTV crew in 
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the city when the bombing started were ordered to leave for a safer place, 
while its major competitor. Phoenix Television, kept its foreign correspondent 
Lu Qiu Luwei there. He covered the offensive and returned to Hong Kong 
and broadcast pictures that attracted a huge audience to the network, beating 
CCTV by a vast margin. If CCTV fails to compete wi th a fellow Chinese 
television network like Phoenix, how w i l l it compete wi th the global giants? 
The television networks mentioned above have become major wor ld players, 
because they export many of their programmes through the flexible 
regulations that govern the export of television content i n the West. The 
import of foreign television programmes into China is regulated by the 
SARFT and i t is currently very diff icult to meet the requirements set by the 
authority. Exporting content f rom China is met wi th the same strict 
requirements, and so i t has been possible to export only a handful of 
programmes, which w i l l be a barrier if Chinese television is to go global. 
Looking at the distribution of television programmes, it is clear that there are 
some local "tollbooths" wi th in the information super-highway. The fact is 
that television has remained a local business, and only cable and satellite can 
reach the national level, because relatively pervasive national ownership 
restrictions still exist. These restrictions are very likely to impede on most of 
the cross-ownership investment. Now that China is part of the WTO i t w i l l be 
even tougher for Chinese television to be a player on the international stage, 
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because if other countries f ind it hard to sell their programmes in China they 
wi l l in turn make i t d i f f icul t for China to sell its programmes to them. 
Digitalisation of television in China has not made any difference, because 
only a few cities provide digital boxes and only Chinese programmes are 
provided through the service. CCTV does not seem to pay any attention to 
being a vibrant online television service provider. Its current online service is 
basically the same as that found on television, without any added value in 
terms of features or contents. CCTV currently makes a lot of money f rom its 
mainstream television services, and so it sees no need to dominate the digital 
platform. This mentality appears to be encouraged by the strict conditions set 
out by SARFT for those wanting to venture into the digital market. 
Chinese television forms an indispensable part of the Communist Party 
because, f rom Chairman Mao to the current President, H u Jintao, all leaders 
have agreed that television is the mouthpiece of the Party and government, 
and therefore measures such as censorship are necessary. This is what has 
slowed down the development strategy of Chinese television for so long. Too 
much control has meant that television in China has been very slow to adapt 
to global changes, and this w i l l continue for as long as the status quo remains. 
As already argued, while barring foreign players f r o m the domestic television 
scene has protected Chinese television f rom competition, it has at the same 
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time not allowed Chinese television the opportunity to learn how to improve 
programme content and competitive station management. 
Staying in control: TV organisation in China 
Almost every media market has ownership laws that restrict foreign 
ownership to far less than a controlling interest (usually 20-25%). In most 
countries, other than the US and the UK, these laws have been extended to 
cable systems as well. The reasoning behind this is that the media market and 
its products are very different f rom other market products. Following the 
social, cultural and political attribute of either news or other even 
entertainment programmes, the audiences can be mobilized for uncertain 
activities. A t least in China, political leaders and the governing party had 
never ignored this potential risk. Sociologically and psychologically, social 
science scholars described that "seeing might be believing and even deceiving 
.. ." [Crisell, 1997: 212]. This is exactly how the politburo of CCPCC consider 
the imports of news programmes f rom the West. 
As a developing country, the West is quite disappointing to see the slow 
process of media reform towards a West dominated "globalised media 
perspective". However, even for the good of Chinese people, the current 
situation raises the question of whether the government has noticed that the 
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country is entering an information age and that the media w i l l play an 
important role in the future world. 
The adage, "He who pays the piper calls the tune" [Hopkins, 1983:281], which 
a Marxist-Leninist would interpret as, "He who owns the means of 
production decides the manufacture," accurately describes the economic 
arrangements of the mass media i n the former Soviet Union style systems, 
including China and many African and Indo-China countries. 
Communist Party bureaucracy controls the media content, because the Party 
operates the levers of economic machinery. The government is clearly aware 
of the media's enormous significance, but unfortunately w i t h an outdated 
view. Putting it another way, because the economic marketplace of a centrally 
planned economic society is highly regulated, its mass media primarily 
respond to other than the financial forces of advertising revenue, subscription 
rates, distribution costs, payrolls and capital expenditures, the litany that 
drives the wor ld of publishing and broadcasting in most Western societies. 
Today almost everything in China is state-owned, and the media sector is 
specifically controlled by the government. 
Commercialisation in China is under the careful supervision of the 
government. Market theory can only apply to the entertainment sectors, 
although the investment relies almost entirely on non-governmental business 
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organisations. The only time that the government considers investing is when 
there are adequate political interests and considerations involved. Another 
fact is that in China the totally state-owned industrial system has just been 
commercialised and big investors wi l l ing to risk investment into the media 
market have not yet emerged. 
However, the changes and development of the media are never entirely 
dependent on Party or government discretion. With technological advances 
and more outside influence, the media in China, no matter how strictly 
controlled, w i l l push for reform in order to join the globalised wor ld media 
system. The developments that have been taking place in the Chinese 
television industry are a good example of this. The industry has the potential 
to achieve this kind of reform, but currently there is much that first needs to 
be addressed. 
The Chinese case: From Socialist market economy to media reform 
Traditionally in China, the word "media" is a very political term and was 
never considered in an economic or commercial way unt i l the late 1980s 
[Zhao, 1998: 96]. The Chinese government seldom rated its achievements in 
the media as economic success, but only as part of the Party's political agenda, 
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even wi th the growth of television audiences through rapidly improved 
technology. As Kim Gordon said: 
Collectivism and egalitarianism have given way to tacit 
encouragement of individualism and consumerism: the Chinese are 
being encouraged- in a carefully controlled manner - to speak their 
minds. 
[Gordon, 1999: 36] 
The changes that occurred in the following years undoubtedly provided some 
necessary preparation for individualism and consumerism wi th in the Chinese 
television audience group. These were also the factors basic to a media-
market system. 
Having had television in their homes for many years now, the Chinese people 
have started to demand better quality programmes and information. Only a 
competitive media market can provide the best and the most satisfying 
programmes for such an audience. Since the term "Socialist market economy" 
was used to define the current reformed Chinese political and economic 
system, the Chinese media wor ld has also been thoroughly influenced by the 
"market" notion. However, the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central 
Committee, which is in charge of the media, has only permitted 
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commercialisation and liberal reforms to take place in the entertainment 
sector (films, TV entertainment shows, music and partly in publishing). 
Figures f rom a CCTV annual report suggest that in 1996 CCTV bought 377 
hours of entertainment programmes f rom commercial television production 
companies, compared w i t h only 78 hours in 1992 [CCTV, 1998:24]. 
A t the same time, there is a series of data which indicates that the CCTV 
owned International Cultural Communication Company sells programmes to 
more than 62 countries worldwide. The profit, however, is not as high as 
imagined (only US$2,200 mill ion a year) and most of the programmes 
produced were sold to markets w i th a sizeable population of expatriate 
Chinese. The data demonstrate that these regions include Hong Kong (32%), 
Taiwan (36%), South East Asia (12%), North America (9%), Europe (6%) and 
others (5%). Within the context of the annual report [CCTV, 1998:75], CCTV's 
future target was to become an influential international television station 
(company) wi th a strong ability to compete in the global media (the term 
"market" was not mentioned in this context). Huayong Zhao defined his 
"Zhaoism" as building one of the biggest and most influential television 
networks in the wor ld [CCTV Newsletter, issue 29,1999]. 
Looking at CCTV as an independent business company, both its size and 
financial state would undoubtedly make it a powerful competitor in the 
136 
world of television distribution and regional television production. CCTV is 
currently running a nine-channel network for more than a billion viewers, the 
biggest audience group in the world. Advertising provides CCTV's key 
source of income, and the government is unconditionally committed to 
financial support of CCTV's development. Can we therefore hope that CCTV 
is able to compete globally as it tries to concentrate on taking an international 
market share? 
Too expensive and costly to learn: The difficulties faced by China as 
latecomers in the global media market 
The reality of business history has been very different f rom the textbook. 
Instead of an occasional deviation f rom the textbook image, the normal path 
of capitalist development has been characterised by oligopoly, barriers to 
entry and imperfect competition. I t is unfortunate that the media industry in 
China is still part of the political governmental machinery and politicians 
have not considered developing i t into an aggressive profit-maker. However, 
even if the Chinese media, television in particular, were supported in joining 
the competition on the international playing field, they would as latecomers 
face severe difficulties in competing wi th large companies f rom advanced 
e c o n o m i e s . 
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There are several factors that w i l l make i t diff icul t for the Chinese television 
industry to succeed globally, and unless they are addressed, the Chinese 
television industry w i l l remain trapped in its own snare. 
First, the media giants in the West have formed a huge and effective business 
system wi th their brands recognised worldwide. Disney, News Corporation 
and Reuters have become global brands recognised, respected and accepted 
in almost every country. Over the years these media corporations have built 
up a reputation that helps them to break into new markets and strengthen old 
ones. 
At the same time, as part of the attempt to insulate their market and keep 
competition out, these brands have also managed to denigrate newly 
introduced brands enough to make the world market refuse to accommodate 
them. CCTV and Xinhua, though not as famous and popular as the others, are 
known brands, but CCTV has unfortunately been portrayed and 
misunderstood as a "police camera" elsewhere in the wor ld , while Xinhua is 
considered too official to be trusted. Internationally, people have somehow 
been conditioned to feel that consumption of services f rom the two Chinese 
media brands is "unacceptable". 
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It was believed that merging all Chinese broadcasting media into one major 
group would help to develop a Chinese media brand able to compete wi th the 
Western conglomerates, but as already argued in earlier chapters, this was a 
bad move because ultimately i t d id not change anything. 
The second factor that is stalling the progress of the Chinese television 
industry is poor brand management. Chinese television does not pay 
attention to marketing programmes in ways that would make them 
permanent brands, first for Chinese audiences and eventually global. 
Managers of television stations do not have the business expertise to manage 
brands. For example, programmes like Focus report and Xin Wen Lian Bo are 
continually changing their logos and presenters and the music (signature 
tunes) that introduces the programmes is not consistent. I t is sad that such 
aspects, which identify a television programme, are always changed when the 
programmes are at their peak. Any suggestions to make Chinese television 
brands better managed and competitive are always viewed as a threat to 
established norms and practices and are therefore often brushed aside as 
capitalist ideas. 
Language and culture comprise the third factor that the Chinese television 
industry must review in order to enter world competition. The English 
language has always dominated and governed mainstream wor ld culture 
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since the British built their wor ld empire, and this makes i t impossible for 
programmes broadcast in Chinese or Korean or even Japanese to succeed 
outside their national boundaries. Many Asian television networks such as 
those in Hong Kong, Singapore and China have been producing English 
programmes and sending them by satellite to world viewers. However, 
cultural differences have been a major barrier and have hindered the success 
of these networks. It has been diff icul t for viewers f rom other countries to 
learn about current affairs, for example, through Chinese television's English 
programmes, yet when they watch BBC, C N N or CBS they can understand 
the current international situation, no matter where they are in the world . 
BBC, C N N and CBS have been seen as the reliable news programme brands in 
the global media market. CCTV operates English, French and Spanish 
channels, but the problem has been that all these channels are merely direct 
translations of the Chinese domestic channels. Politics and culture are always 
the most diff icul t to translate without losing the original meaning, and this 
makes translated programmes boring and unreliable. The vast political, 
cultural and linguistic differences wi th in the media markets have been a 
significant barrier to global diversification by the global media giants. Only 
Star TV, the Asian satellite television system owned by News Corporation, 
successfully formed a pan-regional network wi th the support of local and 
national governments. 
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The fourth factor concerns the domestic obstacles, especially the Chinese 
television industry's failure to separate the commercial element of networks 
from the news departments. Provision of news, to be successful, must be 
separated f rom advertising, because once the money-making obligations of a 
television network are confused wi th its news services, the public interest 
obligation is contradicted. Chinese television treats advertising and news as 
one and paid news is an acceptable practice, but this practice has resulted in 
corruption which has undermined the reputation of Chinese television 
networks as dignified and trusted sources of news. To compete on a global 
scale, the Chinese television industry must learn to operate advertising and 
news as completely separate and different components. 
The rising cost of research and development forms the f i f t h factor to be 
considered if Chinese television is to realise its dream of succeeding globally. 
It is a commonly agreed principle that to establish a television network, 
serious audience research must be carried out, but so far China has failed to 
do this. In order to serve an international audience, Chinese television 
networks need to know the needs of viewers at a worldwide level and reach 
the technical standards required to provide the same quality of programmes 
as those provided by the already established networks. But such research and 
development are expensive, Chinese television is government funded, and it 
is not a government priority to fund non-domestic endeavours. Given the 
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ferocity of global competition, the cost w i l l keep increasing, and so the 
government would rather spend the money on other priorities, such as 
improving people's l iv ing conditions. 
Finally, the wor ld still clings on to negative images of China as portrayed 
during the Cold War, although the Cold War ended more than a decade ago. 
China's image in the wor ld has been demonised, so for networks like CCTV 
to venture out and compete they face a prejudiced audience w i t h 
preconceived conclusions that prevent i t being accepted as a television 
network wi th as much potential as the already established networks. I t is even 
difficult for Chinese television to compete regionally w i t h media f rom Hong 
Kong or Singapore because of this demonised image. 
Conclusion: Defend the boundaries or expand? 
Television companies f rom developed countries have had a head start of 
several years in the industry and the technological gap that exists between 
them and Chinese television makes i t almost impossible for China to compete 
and hope to claim any fertile ground for expansion. As discussed earlier, 
networks f r o m the West have been successful globally partly because they 
have not had to meet prohibitive conditions for plying their trade outside 
their countries of origin. The Chinese television industry is currently so 
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greatly over-defended, protected and controlled that it is a luxury to expect it 
to develop to international standards. 
There are strict restrictions against foreign television networks entering the 
Chinese market, and this prevents the Chinese industry having the chance to 
learn f rom global players about running a television business. So far, the only 
foreign television channels that have been allowed into China are restricted to 
five-star hotels and i f their content contradicts the official government and 
party-established policy and ideology, they are immediately cut off. This kind 
of protectionism hinders the development of Chinese television, because 
when China tries to trade its television networks in other countries it receives 
the same treatment. Because of this over-control, Chinese television has 
always been myopic in its programming, and its lack of global orientation 
does not allow it to begin to compete wi th other networks. 
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Chapter 7 
The Party and television news: Managing the 
News through "Thought Work" in modern China 
Chapter Summary 
Based on the author's personal observations as television news presenter on CCTV's 
24-hour news service, this chapter examines how the relationship between the CCP 
and the media has changed after tiuenty-five years of reform, and whether Chinese 
television is still seen as the Party's mouthpiece. 
The topic is introduced by an overvieiv of CCP structure, showing the hierarchy and 
lines of command, and television's place in it. "Thought Work", its definition, origin 
and current status are explored, followed by a discussion on how far the CCP still 
controls the media. The relationship between Party and television appears to be 
mutually beneficial. China is thus uniquely successful in its media reform, loosening 
government control and encouraging the media to be commercially run and semi-free. 
A series of case studies illustrates this, showing how the need to address a single 
national problem has brought Party and television together, ultimately benefiting 
both. Forced to give television more freedom, the Party has also benefited, luith 
television acting as its cost-effective watchdog and whistleblozuer, a means of 
assessing public opinion, and of educating and mobilising the public. Greater media 
freedom is thus based on the Party's ability to govern and achieve far more through 
television in league ivith active citizenship than by increasing bureaucracy. 
This chapter explores the changed relationship between the Chinese party-
state and the mass media, television in particular, after a quarter century of 
reform. The chapter tries to answer such questions as: To what extent is 
television still the mouthpiece of the party-state? What has happened to the 
Thought Work regime, and is it still useful for the Party in managing news on 
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television? Is the Party pulling back f rom total control of television? Some 
case studies have been presented in the chapter to illustrate the discussion. 
The contemporary Chinese political system and Thought Work 
As this chapter tries to examine the relationship between the Chinese 
Communist Party and television, and how the former controls the latter as its 
undeviating mouthpiece, i t is important to include a description of the CCP's 
structure. The structure w i l l help in understanding where the controlling 
power originates, which parts of the Party are more influential and which 
ones have power to elect. I t w i l l show which arm of the CCP controls the 
media. The chapter w i l l also provide the state structure, since it is influenced 
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A t the top of the CCP is the General Secretary of the Party, a position 
currently held by President H u Jintao. The position is an elected one by the 
Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP, which comes directly under the 
General Secretary. The Politburo Standing Committee comprises the nine 
most powerful people in the Party: the General Secretary, Chairperson of the 
National People's Congress, Premier of the State Council, Chairperson of the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Chief of Propaganda, 
Vice President, Vice Premier of the State Council, Secretary of the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection and Minister and Party Secretary of the 
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Ministry of Public Security. Directly under these nine positions are the 
Politburo Members of the CCP, who elect the Politburo Standing Committee. 
There are usually 10-15 Politburo Members, and they are elected by the fourth 
level of the structure, the Central Committee of the CCP. A t the bottom of the 
party structure is the National Congress of the CCP, which is held every five 
years for all members of the CCP to elect the Central Committee of the CCP. 
The state structure has the President at the top, followed by the Vice 
President and then the Premier and Vice Premier. The Cabinet, or Ministers, 
come directly under the first four positions and under the Cabinet is the 
Military Power. Following immediately is the Judiciary (Law Approval), 
followed by the National People's Congress, and at the bottom are the State 
Media. 
The state structure usually reflects the operations of the party structure 
because its appointments are directly influenced by the three top levels of the 
party structure, namely the current General Secretary of the CCP, the 
Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP and the Politburo Members of the 
CCP. 
The Chinese political system is intertwined wi th numerous party and state 
organs influencing and controlling each other, but most of these operate 
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under the influence of the top levels of the state structure. For example, the 
Discipline Commission is a party organ, which together w i th another group 
called Party Elders controls the Politburo Standing Committee and the 
Politburo Members of the CCP. These two in turn control the Mili tary 
Commission, which is another party organ, as well as the National People's 
Congress and State Council, which are both state organs. Together the three 
elect three other state organs, namely Mili tary Affairs, Courts and Prosecutors 
and Local Government. 
CCP control of the media starts f rom the very top in the Politburo Standing 
Committee, where the Chief of Propaganda resides. This committee exerts its 
authority through four channels including the State Council, Publicity 
Department of the CCP (propaganda department). People's Liberation Army 
and the People's Daily newspaper. The State Council controls the Xinhua 
News Agency, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television 
(SARFT) and the General Administration of Press and Publishing of the PRC. 
SARFT looks after China National Radio, China Radio International and 
China Central Television. The People's Liberation Army has its own 
publication, the PLA Daily. 
To give an adequate explanation of "Thought Work", this thesis borrows the 
excellent outline offered by Lynch [1999: 2]. Thought Work refers to a system 
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of controlling and manipulating information by the state, so that citizens only 
have access to information and can only communicate in ways that the state 
deems right and appropriate. The state thus constructs its citizens' symbolic 
environment, making them likely to accept the state's political order as 
legitimate. This k ind of communication control encourages citizens to identify 
affirmatively and enthusiastically wi th state goals. In other words, the state 
interprets reality for the citizen. 
China learnt the Thought Work system f rom the then Soviet Union and has 
since then been one of the countries which successfully implemented 
Thought Work, right up to the early 1980s, when under Deng Xiaoping the 
country adopted a policy of "reform and opening up" to the outside world. 
Since reforms have begun to take root and China has allowed access to 
outside information, administering Thought Work has become increasingly 
diff icult for the state. 
Over the past thirty years, w i t h the decline of Thought Work as China has 
gradually opened up, the state has made every effort not to lose its grip on 
the media, especially television, being the most influential. In recent year, 
however, the relationship between television and state has been taking an 
interesting turn as the two sides seem to have involuntarily changed 
positions. The relationship is no longer that of party and government officials 
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telling television what to report and what to keep out of their business; 
television is now able to expose issues, forcing authorities to make changes. 
The relationship is becoming symbiotic, where both sides make some gains, 
rather than the slave and master scenario justified by Thought Work. 
CCP and the media: A fragile yet beneficial relationship 
To date, China has proved to be unique in its ability to boast success in 
reforming a previously command-and-control style media and economy, to a 
highly efficient economy and a semi-free media. While similar liberalisations 
around the wor ld have led to revolutions, the most famous of which was the 
result of perestroika and the fall of the Soviet Union, China has been able to 
balance its liberalising reforms and the desires of the Communist Party. 
While this balancing act may still be a bit like walking a tightrope, a beneficial 
relationship has developed between television and the CCP. 
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Chart 7.2 
How the Party governs the television networks? 
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The chart illustrates how power and control is distributed f rom the Chinese 
Communist Party and National People's Congress through the Central Office 
of Propaganda and State Council to the State Administration for Radio, Film 
and Television (SARFT), which ultimately supervises CCTV and the two 
radio stations. A t least this is how it is in theory; in practice the order is 
slightly different, as some parts of this power distribution chart are relegated 
to being merely symbolic, not really playing the role as indicated. 
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In practice the right hand side of the chart is not as functional as indicated. 
SARFT and the other bodies on the same level are supposed to report to the 
State Council, which would then report to the National People's Congress. In 
reality SARFT answers to the Central Department of Propaganda and the 
CCPCC. It is the CDP that directly controls all policy and strategies of CCTV, 
without the involvement and consultancy of SARFT. The General Office, 
which belongs to CCPCC through CDP, lays out the Party's programme for 
CCTV each day. For example, the General Office tells CCTV the party leaders' 
agenda for the day, such as what meetings they w i l l have, whom they are 
visiting and if there is anything the Party wants to communicate to the public. 
CCTV takes all this as part of its news for the day. 
The Central Department of Organisation also belongs to CCPCC through 
CDP. It nominates or appoints people to head CCTV and China National 
Radio, not SARFT as charted out. The real control of CCTV and the radio 
stations flows through the left side of the chart w i t h SARFT in the middle, 
just like a door-keeper, not allowed to be concerned w i t h what is happening 
inside CCTV. 
Among the major topics discussed at the 10th plenary of the National People's 
Congress this year, were the "three rural issues" which dealt w i th corruption 
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in rural areas. Because party leaders are not elected, and are therefore not 
accountable to their citizens, there is little incentive for not indulging in 
corruption, as there is in the Western democratic sense (i.e. being impeached 
f rom office or not being re-elected). In addition, the Chinese rural areas are 
still in the process of transition f rom "rule by man" to "rule by law." The 
consequence of this is that local and national laws are often in contradiction 
and vague, and also usually ignored in favour of personal benefits, or simply 
for economic gain in the local economy. 
Case studies 
Using this as springboard, the chapter introduces a case study, which is one 
of many that have pulled television and the Party together and forced each of 
them to take action to benefit the other, while addressing a single national 
problem, in this case environmental degradation and corruption. 
China is home to 16 of the 20 most polluted cities in the world . I t has a desert 
expanding at 385,700 km2 a year [Economy, 2004: 233]. The country has 
destroyed many of its river systems, many of which do not even achieve a 
Level 5 water quality test (industrial uses) and has a serious water shortage 
problem in the North East. China, which has recently become the largest 
producer and exporter of pesticides in the world , consumes 14 per cent of all 
pesticide used in the wor ld [Liu and Diamond, 2005:1180]. Every year. 
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300,000 people die prematurely in China f rom environmental causes [Ma and 
Ortolano, 2002: 2]. The World Bank states that environmental degradation 
costs China between 54 billion and 110 bill ion US dollars a year. That is 
between 3.8 and 8 per cent of China's annual GDP [Ma and Ortolano, 2002: 2]. 
It is hard to believe that wi th a record this bad China's environmental 
protection apparatus is almost non-functional. 
The Chinese environmental protection machinery is i l l equipped to deal wi th 
the environmental problems and challenges the country faces. The State 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) implements policies through 
Environmental Protection Bureaux (EPBs) spread across the country in 
branches at local government level. The challenge that EPBs have is that they 
depend on the local government for budgetary as well as personnel issues, 
including promotions, salaries, office space and even transportation [Ma and 
Ortolano, 2002:154]. Local government officials are often more concerned 
wi th lining their pockets or growing the local economy, which puts the EPB at 
a disadvantage. Unless the EPB manages to gain the support of the mayor, it 
can never hope to enforce policies that would affect important sources of 
revenue for the area [Ma and Ortolano, 2002:154]. Any action against local 
government only further hampers the EPB's powers by leading to reductions 
in its budget. The EPBs are often ignored by business and local officials who 
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favour increased production over environmental degradation. This renders 
the EPBs ineffective. 
Television, the most revered among the broadcasting media in China, on the 
other hand is not subject to the same constraints as the EPBs. Realising its 
powerful watchdog and whistle blower role, which exposes careless and 
corrupt officials and businesspersons, Chinese television has taken up 
responsibility for environmental protection. 
News probe was among the most powerful programmes on CCTV to start 
covering environmental issues and to set the agenda for changes. This time 
CCTV took an approach that was uncharacteristic, but would prove to be 
effective in influencing government policies. It collaborated wi th non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). A CCTV producer, having researched 
battery recycling, broadcast a programme on how improperly discarded 
batteries were a danger to the environment. Viewers were shocked at how 
much their health and land was being endangered by battery acid leaking 
into the soil. This one show alone made China rise into action as battery 
recycling efforts sprouted up all over the nation. Previously SEPA did not 
even have any guidelines in place for such an exercise [Economy and Day, 
2005:115]. In Dalian, a physician independently persuaded department stores 
to act as collecting points for used batteries. CCTV broadcast the story and a 
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few months later SEPA put battery-recycling guidelines in place [Economy 
and Day, 2005:115]. Battery collection has had tremendous success at the 
Beijing EPB, where batteries were being collected; an official once joked that 
she gets so many phone calls on the subject that she suffered f rom "battery 
phobia." [Economy, 2004:165]. 
Another television programme. Focus report, has gained popularity because of 
its investigations into issues of corruption and environmental degradation, 
and its ability to influence reparations. Only fifteen minutes long. Focus report 
draws an audience of 200-250 mill ion and has spawned all sorts of 
investigative efforts into environmental degradation. The show has become 
so popular that people wait in long lines outside the studio to ask producers 
to investigate their local environmental situation. Its reputation earned it the 
expression by bureaucrats to "avoid fires, avoid theft, and avoid Focus report." 
Television programmes, along wi th support f rom NGOs and the general 
public, have proved to be a relationship strong enough to force authorities 
into action against environmental degradation. In their efforts to halt 
environmental degradation, television in China is also serving the purpose of 
civic education. As more airtime is devoted to environmental issues, more 
viewers are educated about environmental issues and become more active 
citizens. "The more educated the populace becomes, the more they are likely 
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to lodge a complaint" [Economy and Day, 2005:116], and greater television 
involvement caused the number of complaint letters received by 
environmental officials to quadruple over a two-year period, f rom 67,000 in 
1996 to 241,321 in 1998 [Economy and Day, 2005:116]. In turn, the more 
people write letters on environmental issues, the more the television 
authorities and NGOs are motivated to follow them up. The relationship is 
self-enforcing and simply by continuing the process the apparatus 
strengthens itself. 
In another case, a nature photographer along w i t h television journalists f rom 
Beijing, informed SEPA about the endangered snub-nosed monkey of 
Yunnan province. They suspected that deforestation was leading to an ever-
declining number of monkeys. The environmental NGO Friends of Nature 
and the Chinese media quickly picked up the story and, w i t h grassroots 
student movements, combined to bring the news to national CCP officials. 
Through an organised effort, a settlement between the State Council and the 
logging industry in 1995 spared the forests. Three years later, however, i t was 
again reported that illegal logging continued. Action was again taken and the 
Yunnan Forestry Department's vice president held a meeting at which the 
head of Deqin County, where the logging was being done, was made to 
"confess his mistakes." Others at fault were also fired [Economy, 2004:151]. 
157 
This relatively new phenomenon, whereby Chinese television is effective in 
playing a watchdog and whistle blower role in society and forcing local 
officials to comply w i t h laws such as national environmental legislation - but 
why would the CCP, always so careful about reining in control, allow 
television and NGOs this freedom? 
Its willingness to allow this level of freedom is due to the sheer severity of 
environmental degradahon in China, coupled wi th the World Bank's 
assessment that China has yet to complete its transition to the rule of law 
[Economy, 2004:164]. Estimates indicate that environmental degradation in 
China already accounts for between 7 and 20 per cent of China's annual GDP. 
Implementation of environmental policy is impossible because corruption at 
local level is a big problem. In such circumstances, the CCP has very little 
choice but to allow the media this freedom. It is too costly for the CCP not to 
do so. 
Television is an efficient and cheap way to protect the environment. Instead 
of having to monitor and shadow every movement and every deal that local 
officials make, checking that they are honest and law abiding, television in 
league wi th an active citizenship, is able to do a better job, w i th no need for 
an increased bureaucracy. Qu Geping said, "Using the media to expose 
violators and to praise enforcers of environmental regulations was the main 
tool the NPC could use to enforce local government compliance wi th national 
environmental protection regulations" [Ma and Ortolano, 2002:155] at almost 
no cost. 
Television is an excellent tool for educating the Chinese on environmental 
issues. In a 2001 poll, 79 per cent of the Chinese population indicated that 
they learned about environmental related issues f rom television and radio, 
compared wi th only 42 per cent who said that government publicity was their 
main source of information [Economy, 2004:163]. 
I t has been CCP's goal to make television more independent of government 
subsidies. By allowing television to pursue topics which interest viewers, 
such as environmental issues, viewership increases and the necessity for 
government involvement in terms of funding local television is reduced 
[Economy, 2004: 3]. Liberating television at a local level is like ki l l ing two 
birds wi th one stone; avoiding the costly bureaucracy of implementing 
environmental legislation, and increasing the independent profitability of 
television. 
Too liberal a television media and active citizenship is a potential threat to the 
CCP, but it is evident the Party has decided that the threat posed by a society 
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that is too closed, in which no one is permitted any degree of freedom of 
expression, is greater than one left open. Tony Saich argues this point: 
The experiences of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution has 
shown China's leaders the kind of problems that can arise i f the 
flow of ideas and information f rom society is cut off or unduly 
distorted. Thus, the post-Mao leadership has realised that a higher 
degree of participation by sanctioned groups is both desirable to 
promote modernisation and is inevitable, given the proposed rapid 
changes that they hope to bring about [Saich, 2001:167]. 
In other words the government could not create an expansion of the economy 
as fast as it has done without allowing some degree of freedom to the media. 
The absence of any legal form of participation would only result in the rise of 
illegal organisations, wi th aims in opposition to the government and groups 
which work outside the law, who believe that the laws of the state are 
inadequate or unjust, would obviously oppose that regime. 
For this reason and "to prevent a plurality in society", rather than allowing 
grassroots organisations to arise and then just recognising them, all of these 
organisations are "created" by the Party and state [Saich, 2001:167]. A l l media 
in China are considered to be a "mouthpiece of the Party" and all are partly 
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owned by the CCP [Lanthan, 2000: 637]. In addition, the media are all 
censored by the state censorship bureau, SARFT. While holding on to the 
reins, and reserving the right to clamp down, the CCP is able to allow a 
certain degree of media freedom and NGO activity without forfeiting control. 
By allowing freedom to the NGOs and the media, the CCP can create a 
certain "revolution f rom above" [Saich, 2001:167], rather than permit one to 
occur f rom below. 
NGOs are currently prohibited f rom having branches, but often one centre 
trains people who then go on to set up NGOs in different parts of the country, 
thus creating a strong network based on personal exchange [Elizabeth, 2004: 
155]. As this continues to develop, along wi th support for environmental 
clean-up and organised pressure f rom the NGOs, the CCP w i l l be forced to 
allow television more freedom of reporting on sensitive issues of public 
interest. CCTV is currently greatly hampered by SARFT and the CCP, but as 
it gains experience and support f r o m the NGOs and the general public, its 
members can only get better at exposing scandals and braver in exposing 
more senior and even central government officials. 
While the author is not as confident as Tang Xiyang about the inevitability of 
a democratic China wi th in twenty years, one thing is certain: the increased 
role of television as watchdog and whistle blower w i l l continue to serve and 
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benefit the environment and the pubhc, and in so doing help the CCP to root 
out corruption at a local level. 
Thought Work is designed to have control over communication f low and in 
so doing structure the symbolic environment, but this w i l l only work in a 
society shut off f rom any other influences, as China was before its policies of 
reform and opening-up. In modern China, i t is a misplacement of resources 
and energy to continue trying to control what society thinks and the f low of 
its conmiunications. The sooner the Party and the state realise that a more 
liberal television and media w i l l strengthen and enhance the policies of 
reform and opening-up the better. 
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Chapter 8 
Television journalists: Seeking strategies for 
survival and success 
Chapter Summary 
China's gradual development into a market economy has resulted in the reform of its 
media, but journalists have lost substantial personal benefits in exchange for greater 
media freedom. Using questionnaires, surveys and interviews conducted by the 
author since 1999, with particular emphasis on CCTV, the current position of 
journalists at CCTV zs examined. 
China's journalists were traditionally chosen for their loyalty to the party line, rather 
than for professional and ethical journalistic standards. The author describes the 
difficulties of being appointed by CCTV, as well as managing to survive in post and 
be successful. Case studies illustrate the discussion. 
The political nature of CCTV as a party mouthpiece and reception desk is 
demonstrated, and the author coins the term "triangle model" to describe the 
interdependent three-way communication between CCTV, public and state, which 
enables the Chinese political system to ivork. The work of a CCTV journalist also 
depends on "stakeholders" and these are described under separate sections. The author 
concludes that, despite all obstacles, journalists are still managing to improve their 
professional position and standards. 
The orientation toward a market economy in China has resulted in many 
changes to the Chinese media. In early 2004, the Chinese goverrmient shut 
down 677 government and party newspapers. In addition, 325 state-owned 
newspapers were transferred to commercial newspaper groups, while 310 
newspapers were separated f rom government departments and 94 official 
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journals were converted into "free" publications. These changes have 
increased the degree of freedom of the press in China [Li , 2003: 3-12]. 
However, Chinese journalists have had to deal w i th a trade-off between a 
freer press and state benefits. In the past, under a planned economy and a 
tightly controlled propaganda system, the primary concern of most 
journalists was to fol low the party and government line. Journalists 
complained about the lack of a free press, but as long as they followed the 
party line, they enjoyed free housing, free medical care, job promotion, and a 
satisfactory retirement package. With greater press freedom f r o m political 
constraints, an increasing number of new journalists have lost their rights to 
labour contracts and medical and social insurance. In fact, a recent survey 
shows that 43 per cent of journalists working in the media do not have labour 
contracts. 
This chapter is based on various questionnaires, surveys and interviews 
conducted since 1999 for this study. It discusses how, despite some level of 
liberalisation of the media, journalists choose to remain under party and state 
control by working for institutions that are still entirely party-state controlled. 
The discussion focuses on television journalists at CCTV, by looking at how 
they enter the institution, how they survive and how they work their way up 
the position ladder. The chapter concludes that CCTV is practically a branch 
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of the CCP and that CCTV journalists would not trade working at the party-
state controlled institution for employment in another institution that has 
more freedom. 
Every chapter has so far indicated the superiority of CCTV among the media 
in China and how much control the Party and the state exert on the 
institution to ensure that i t operates only as the two powers desire. This 
control differentiates CCTV journalists f rom journalists of other Chinese 
media and even of other countries. This discussion w i l l explain the difference 
and what success and survival mean at CCTV. 
The difference 
Traditional media in China, such as the Xinhua News Agency and the People's 
Daily, followed employment criteria which ruled that a journalist should be a 
good and critical writer and a logical thinker, and for this reason people 
employed were usually literature graduates. When television was introduced, 
as BTV was back then, there was a clear difference in the type of people they 
were interested in employing. Instead of logical thinkers w i th impeccable 
writ ing skills, television was only interested in their looks. People who were 
judged to be good-looking, confident or just generally appealing were offered 
television jobs. Their only task at the television station was to read text 
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already prepared by the Xinhua News Agency. Once the news agency had 
supplied the text, camera teams would go out and look for pictures to match, 
and so a typical television newsroom then was basically for presenters and 
camera teams, not for journalists. Currently, of course, criteria for 
employment at CCTV do admit graduates in journalism, but compared wi th 
those in the other media, they are younger, and i t is obvious that their looks 
have played a key role in getting them employed. 
Television journalists, and indeed those f rom all other Western media, are 
people who have gained their reputation as respectable professionals through 
impartiality and their adherence to the ethics of journalism. In China i t is a 
different story. CCTV journalists gain their respect f rom how far up they are 
in the party membership. How good they are professionally and how ethical 
is of secondary importance. 
Getting into C C T V 
The word "cadre" is defined by some dictionaries as a controlling or 
representative group at the centre of an organisation, but in China the word 
has a completely different meaning. "Cadre" in China is a word associated 
wi th political correctness and respect. If you are a cadre in China it means 
you are a member of the CCP and under permanent government welfare -
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the state looks after you for as long as you live. If one is directly employed by 
the government, the tide changes to civil servant, but an employee of a 
government-owned enterprise is officially known as a cadre. Everyone in 
China wants this status, because once one is a cadre, appointment and 
promotion wi th in the government system is automatic. 
After this explanation of what i t means to be a cadre in China, i t w i l l not 
come as a surprise to learn that being a cadre is the first qualification that 
allows employment by CCTV. One must be a member of the CCP to be 
employed by CCTV, because every job required w i l l have something to do 
with the Party in one way or another. Having passed the party membership 
criterion, other qualifications are considered, for example how skilled a 
person is in other ways, such as voice, camera, graphics and related skills. 
About 10,000 people each year apply for work at CCTV, but after scrutiny 
into their political background the institution is usually satisfied wi th only 
around 20 people, who are then employed. CCTV previously relied on other 
companies to identify and supply i t wi th people who would be employed on 
contract, but after 1993 CCTV started to employ permanent staff itself. Once 
employed by CCTV, the professional tasks are not a challenge; the real 
challenge is to survive in the establishment. 
167 
Surviving in C C T V 
Like every media institution, CCTV has its dos and don'ts, the only difference 
being that at CCTV almost all the rules are about preventing staff f rom 
interfering wi th the mandatory political behaviour. Once again, party 
considerations are the priority, and every employee must accept, respect and 
support the one-party system. It cannot be challenged and nothing should be 
done that can be deemed to challenge the one-party system. One should 
never betray the People's Republic of China and employees are prohibited 
from discussing sensitive issues such as Tibet. Everyone is required and 
expected to fol low the guidance of the CCP. 
The 7.00 pm News Bulletin on CCTV is a good illustration of what the 
establishment expects of its employees. Presenters of the programme are 
carefully selected; they must be employees who are politically correct in 
every sense of the word and their commitment to the CCP must be 
unquestionable. While CCTV is regarded as the ultimate mouthpiece of the 
Party, the 7.00 pm News Bulletin is considered to be the voice of the Party. 
Being presented live, the party leadership makes sure that presenters should 
be employees who can never be suspected of saying anything unacceptable. 
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Professional conduct and adherence to ethics are the last things to worry 
about in keeping a job at CCTV, for it is easy to get away wi th a breach of 
both. This is why employees are also expected to respect the structural 
arrangements of the institution. A t CCTV the newsroom and the 
advertisement department are not separated, as should be the case in a media 
institution. Having companies paying for coverage is normal and expected: in 
fact, this is the whole reason why CCTV has Channel 2, which is strictly for 
business and company news programmes, run by the establishment's 
advertising department. This channel has good business programmes, 
including news presented by attractive personalities, but companies that f ind 
themselves in the programmes are those who have paid. Those who do not 
pay occasionally appear, but their stories are usually negative. So far only one 
business programme. Dialogue, has publicly stated that i t does not receive 
money f rom any company, but the rest charge for coverage. Channel 2 is 
commercially successful since it is run by business people, but for journalists 
who work there, ethics and professionalism have long been discarded. CCTV 
1 is basically for political issues and i t appears that its journalists are spared 
f rom having to be "corrupt", but a closer look reveals that it is the same. In 
CCTV 2 journalists offer positive reporting in exchange for money, while at 
CCTV 1 they offer trust in return for political considerations such as future 
promotions. 
169 
Succeeding in C C T V 
Making it into CCTV is an achievement and surviving the establishment is an 
effort journalists working there are proud of, but gaining respect f rom peers 
in the media and the country is what CCTV journalists describe as success. 
Once this status is attained one is on the way to better things, such as 
promotion. Jing Yidan gives a good illustration of how to achieve success 
through respect in the media and the public. 
She was born when Mao's Great Leap Forward movement began in the late 
1950s. She became a Red Guard and worked as a newsreader in a rural farm 
broadcasting station. She then was sent to study Broadcasting Journalism at 
the Beijing Institute of Broadcasting (BIB) and joined Harbin TV station after 
her graduation at the beginning of the 1980s. She was promoted to 
Heilongjiang TV Station one year later. In the middle of the 1980s, she went 
back to the Beijing Institute of Broadcasting to study for a Master's degree 
and then became a lecturer in the Department of Television Journalism. Eight 
of her first students were recruited to CCTV news as presenters in 1988. Two 
years later, she was invited to be a presenter on a newly established economic 
news programme. Economics 30 minutes. In 1992, another new programme, 
called Oriental horizon was launched to provide the first investigative news 
series on CCTV, and she was asked to join the programme as anchorwoman 
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and reporter. The programme brought her a lot of fame. Five years later, 
another programme. Focus report, on which she worked as presenter and 
producer, obtained the top viewership award of all CCTV programmes. As 
an individual she has received the Golden Microphone Award for best 
presenter three times, earning her the permanent Golden Microphone 
Lifetime Award . She was appointed assistant director of the Central Bureau 
of Journalism of the CCP Central Department of Propaganda, and she now 
has an equivalent executive position as the vice-mayor of Beijing. 
If one carmot be impressive enough professionally to achieve success like 
Jing, there is another means of advancement in CCTV and that is being 
politically important. Someone who does things that the political leaders f ind 
exceptional, are regarded as successful, because every time the leaders want 
to consider someone for a political position they do not look further. The 
career of L i Dongsheng illustrates well this kind of success 
Dongsheng graduated f rom Fudan University in Shanghai and was employed 
at CCTV. After ten years he was appointed deputy editor-in-chief. In 1993 he 
introduced Oriental horizon, a one-hour news programme which was 
broadcast every morning. The programme changed people's habits; Chinese 
people started looking forward to Oriental horizon each morning. Previously 
Chinese people would listen to the radio news in the morning, and television 
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news in the evening. Dongshen then introduced an in-depth news report 
programme, which came every evening after the normal 7.00 pm News 
Bulletin. The programme, entitled Tell the truth became popular among 
viewers. Dongshen was appointed deputy minister of SARFT and then 
promoted to be deputy director of the CDP. 
Other examples include Bai Keming and Zhang Baoshun. Bai was Editor-in-
Chief of the People's Daily and was appointed Party Secretary and Governor 
of the Hubei and Hainan Provinces. Zhang was appointed Vice President of 
Xinhua News Agency and is now Party Chief of Shanxi Province. 
Another barometer for success at CCTV is being able to achieve celebrity 
status, because it sets one on the path to wealth. Presenters who frequently 
appear on television soon become household names in China, and companies 
start hiring them to promote different brands and advertise products. L i 
Yong, whose wealth is currently estimated in billions, was a news presenter 
in CCTV. Realising that news presenting was not as lucrative as he expected, 
he switched to presenting commercial programmes which were being 
produced by his wife Ha Wen. He also anchored the Chinese version of Who 
wants to be a millionaire? and The weakest link. 
172 
The Triangle Model 
From the political nature of CCTV, as demonstrated in this chapter and in 
previous chapters, i t is clear that this institution is not only the mouthpiece 
for the CCP and the government, but also some form of "reception desk" for 
the two authorities. Later the chapter w i l l explore this role further, but it is 
important to realise that these two roles give CCTV the status of an important 
arm in Chinese politics. CCTV, together wi th CCP, fo rm two parts of a 
triangle of which one is the Chinese political structure and the other is the 
public. The triangle formed by these three sides necessitates a f low of activity 
that enables the Chinese political system to work. 
There is interdependence between CCTV and the CCP, between CCTV and 
the audience and also between the CCP and the public. CCTV is almost like 
another branch of the Party, because nearly 70 per cent of the CCTV 
journalists are CCP members and the institution is now home to 26 branches 
of the Party. CCTV is thus a very strategic part of the triangle for 
disseminating party information. CCP sets the political agenda and CCTV 
w i l l turn everything into realities to "educate, inform, entertain and serve" 
the Chinese people. The public on the other hand plays the role of informing 
the Party about what is happening in the larger society. Once again CCTV 
becomes essential, when wearing its "reception desk" hat, because when the 
public has complaints or comments that need to be brought to the attention of 
173 
the Party they go to CCTV. Through its party structures and programmes, 
CCTV takes the message to the Party. This is probably part of the reason that 
CDP supported CCTV's creation and promotion of programmes such as 
Oriental horizon. Focus report and Nexvs probe, because through information 
culled f rom these programmes the Party is able to punish corrupt officials at a 
local level, which satisfies the public and encourages them to report more to 
CCTV. Through these prograirmies the CCP also formulates appropriate 
policies, and its feedback to the public is through CCTV's news, features and 
commentaries. 
Table 8.1 
The Triangle Model 
<? 
The Chinese Communist Party 
c? C C P 
C C T V Audiences 
(Media) o<=>o (Public) 
Source: Compiled by the author 
C C T V ' s reception desk function 
The Communist Party and government both have in place a feedback system, 
and have established offices where people can go if they have anything to 
communicate. Typical things to communicate would be complaints about 
mismanagement and corruption by local officials, alerting authorities to the 
need for some social development or making suggestions about how certain 
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things should be done. Picking out relevant information f rom these, the CCP 
and government then make appropriate decisions in response to the public's 
communications. 
Because of the bureaucracy involved, however, these information offices are 
not found effective by the public. Either the authorities take too long to 
respond or they do not respond at all. The difference is that when people 
communicate wi th CCTV they get a faster and more satisfactory response, 
and so people would rather by-pass the established information offices and 
go to CCTV. Seeing this, the two authorities decided to elevate CCTV to the 
same status, and so CCTV became recognised as another means through 
which the public could channel its communications to the Party and 
government, and the opposite is true too. 
It is obvious that the Party and government f ind this arrangement useful and 
important, because to some extent it facilitates and makes governing possible, 
but this should not be the sole reason for encouraging and supporting 
CCTV's reception desk function. Rather, this function should be encouraged 
because it reminds CCTV of one of its main roles, which is to represent the 
interests of the people. The political nature of CCTV does not encourage 
journalists to aggressively go out into the public to investigate issues that are 
affecting people's lives and publicise them in news and other programmes. 
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When people go to CCTV w i t h complaints and other issues, journalists are 
compelled to take up the issues without being paid as they would for other 
news sources. This reception desk function is helping CCTV to retain its value 
as a servant of ordinary people. 
C C T V stakeholders 
There are several stakeholders that CCTV journalists must always have in 
mind as they work. These are people and institutions which directly or 
indirectly influence the everyday production of news and programmes. These 
stakeholders are an important part of CCTV and their existence results in 
threats, challenges and opportunities for CCTV journalists. The chart below 
shows who the stakeholders are and the few fol lowing paragraphs w i l l 
describe each of them. 
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Due to the political nature of CCTV, its journalists' coverage of news is 
usually reactive. Often CCTV journalists watch public opinion on various 
issues to decide how they would cover them in their own bulletins. Public 
opinion is usually observed through other media, especially print, and once 
the newspapers bring up an issue and it is in public debate, CCTV reports on 
it or adds the issue as one topic in a programme. In this way the journalists 
are able to protect themselves, because they cannot be accused of instigation. 
CCTV editorial and bosses 
Elsewhere editorial meetings at the beginning of every working day are 
meant to discuss news production issues and assigning of duties, for instance 
who covers or follows up what event or story. But at CCTV editorial meetings 
are held to brief journalists on the guidelines and rules as stipulated by the 
CPD. The CPD normally organises the meetings for national media editors 
and bosses, when they are told what the Party expects and what are their 
responsibilities, and to pass on this information to journahsts. 
Party branches 
It is essential for CCTV journalists to belong to CCTV party branches, because 
decisions other than those made by the usual decision-making channels of 
CCTV are made by these party branches. Issues to do wi th staff promotions 
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and other personnel matters are usually decided by the branches, and so 
journalists at CCTV who do not belong to the Party stand at a disadvantage. 
journalistic colleagues 
Although CCTV journalists work together towards the same goal, they also 
compete to be the best at attaining those goals. They do not only compete as 
journalists over promotion or popularity wi th the viewers, but also to gain 
political favours and positions. 
Community 
CCTV's community includes several government ministries: the Ministry of 
Science and Technology, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Railways, 
and constitutional bodies such as SARFT. Journalists need to remember this, 
because, for instance, the Ministry of Railways has long provided office space 
for CCTV and they assist w i t h certain programmes. The Ministries of Defence 
and Science and Technology also provide programmes, so they have to be 
well treated. 
NGOs 
The NGO concept is new to China but CCTV journalists have realised that 
these organisations offer an alternative to political news and programming, 
and they have a vast knowledge of issues. The journalists also need to tread 
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carefully, however, because they have to establish a healthy balance between 
NGO coverage and the Party, and this can put them into a dilemma. 
Trade Unions 
CCTV journalists are members of the A l l China Association of Journalists, a 
trade union that looks after the interests of all the journalists in China. CCTV 
journalists need this union, though currently i t is not serving them as desired. 
CCTV is one media institution in China that is not looking after the welfare of 
its journalists well in terms of salaries. Some journalists are being paid less 
than they are worth and others are receiving more than they are worth. 
Though the trade union is failing to help in this situation, CCTV journalists 
are compelled to remain members because the leadership of the union is 
dictated by the CDP, which automatically turns membership into a 
requirement. 
Commentators and academic researchers 
CCTV must always f ind space to accommodate academic researchers and 
commentators, and journalists must tolerate them every time in order to 
maintain the relationship. There is a certain lack of trust between the two 
sides, however, because the political status of CCTV means that its journalists 
must always ensure that they do not get implicated wi th opinions held by the 
researchers and commentators. When these commentators are invited to offer 
179 
an opinion on television, they may say something which is not in the best 
interests of CCTV policy, but this would not worry them, because while they 
could lose the chance of being invited again, they still have employment 
elsewhere. The journalists, however, would be in trouble. 
Public Relations agencies 
Naturally public relations work in opposition to journalistic goals, because 
where journalists want to establish truth, public relations try to hide and 
present a different picture. A t CCTV journalists must particularly watch out 
for these agencies, since most of them work wi th advertisers of different 
programmes on CCTV's numerous channels, and wi th the existence of CCTV 
2 it is diff icul t for journalists to deal w i th public relations agencies. 
Related corporate firms 
CCTV owns about 50 top-rated public relations agencies, including Golden 
Bridge and Tomorrow, sometimes called Future Advertising, and all these are 
licensed to the CCTV's different channels. There are also companies that have 
had a lengthy relationship wi th CCTV, such as the dairy companies Meng 
Niu and Yi L i , and the alcohol making company Wulian Ye. It has long been 
rumoured that CCTV actually has a list of corporations that must be treated 
wi th k id gloves by journalists. 
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Victims and grassroots 
People in the lower classes of society depend on CCTV to voice their issues 
because the established system of communicating information f rom victims 
and grassroots is unreliable. CCTV journalists must understand how to 
handle these people and help them, which means that they have to be versed 
in the law and policies. 
Relatives 
It is an honour for people to have relatives working as journalists at CCTV, 
one of China's most prestigious television stations, but they often abuse this 
privilege. If these relatives have problems wi th certain service providers, they 
can threaten to tell their CCTV journalist brother, daughter, husband or uncle 
and expose them, and sometimes relatives try to use the journalists to f u l f i l 
favours they owe certain people. 
Competitors 
CCTV journalists must constantly be aware of what competing television 
stations are doing. One of the stations that gives CCTV journalists a good run 
for their money is Shanghai Dragon Television, which has 20 channels. 
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International Organisations 
CCTV journalists are eager to become members of international media 
organisations and participate in international media activities, but the 
limiting factor is the difference in ideologies. Interests pursued by these 
organisations are usually contrary to those of CCTV. The best that CCTV can 
do at present is to help wi th the production of documentaries and other such 
programmes. 
State Council ministries 
These include among others SARFT, the Ministry of Culture and the State 
Council Information Office. These institutions always have information that 
journalists always need, and they cannot be ignored. 
Going through the different stakeholders that CCTV journalists have to deal 
wi th everyday, one can appreciate how different i t is f rom the way that other 
journalists work, not only in China but around the world, and i t is 
challenging. Despite this, CCTV journalists are still striving to provide 
viewers wi th programmes that enable them to stay informed, to debate and to 
contribute ideas on how China is operating. Stability and consensus is one 
policy that both the Communist Party and the Chinese government work 
hard to achieve and maintain. Although they are faced w i t h fu l f i l l ing the 
182 
desires of all these stakeholders, CCTV journalists are still managing to 




The 24-hour news channel: 
Propaganda or telling the truth? 
Chapter Summary 
An account is given of the decade of events leading up to CCTVs launch ofCCTV-
Nexvs, China's first 24-hour nexvs channel, in 2003, with an analysis of the reasons 
behind this innovation. 
It was in direct response to CCTV's closest and more advanced competitor. Phoenix 
Television, as ivell as to the public's dissatisfaction with the quality of the neius. This 
motivated CCTV to improve the scope and standard of its reporting, and a change in 
Party leadership had given CCTV a greater control over its own future. Prompt and 
comprehensive reporting of breaking neivs was made possible by the creation of a 24-
hour neivs channel, exclusively for news, and CCTV xoas encouraged by the long 
success ofXWLB, a recognised leader of news-reporting in China, with a trusted 
brand image. Other factors included China's recent WTO membership and drive for 
economic groxuth, together xuith CCTV's own strategy to become a xvorld-class 
broadcaster. 
Early achievements of CCTV-Nexvs are described, including its immediate availability 
to all Chinese provinces and its prompt and balanced reporting of events. The threats 
to its success and survival are also discussed, including its inexperience, the lack of 
variety in its rolling nexvs bulletins, its lack of critical commentary, and its lack of 
balance party journalism and commercialisation, as xvell as competition from other 
networks and the groxvth of the Internet. 
The problems of state-oxvned television are explored and a discussion of the tension 
betxoeen public and civic journalism completes this chapter. 
After a ten-year consoUdation period wi thin the decision-making circles 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China's first 24-hour News 
Channel (CCTV-News) finally entered the media scene on 1 May 2003. 
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However, this new development was not necessarily accompanied by a 
better quality of news. The move was regarded as a direct reaction to the 
Hong Kong based Phoenix TV's progress, not just in news but in all other 
aspects of television programming. This chapter discusses the factors that 
led to the emergence of the new channel and assesses the problems 
associated wi th state-owned television networks in China. The discussion 
begins wi th a brief overview of the driving forces that underpinned the 
creation of the news channel, and among other factors the demand for 
satisfactory coverage of news events, change in the leadership of the 
CCP's "Thought Work" regime, economic changes and CCTV's long-term 
strategic goals. The discussion w i l l also look at the aggressive and 
massive success of reality shows pioneered by Hunan TV. 
A quick glance at the changes that took place at CCTV revealed 
weaknesses, including a lack of original international coverage of news 
and a failure to provide up-to-date news comparable to Western 
standards. Several challenges and limitations threaten CCTV's long-
standing monopoly. Competition wi th other media providers, such as 
Rupert Murdoch's joint venture wi th Phoenix Television, the growing 
number of imported Korean television dramas, and the increasing impact 
of the Internet, are some examples. The prevailing attitude wi th in Chinese 
media circles is that this intense competition w i l l probably lead to the re-
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mapping of the Chinese television industry and to a larger extent 
delineates a new topography of its media territories. 
The need for a 24-hour news channel in China 
CCTV-13, more commonly known as CCTV-News, aims to provide 
television coverage of events as they unfold. The channel provides hourly 
news updates, interspersed by in-depth coverage of news in four 
categories: Business and Financial, Cultural, Sport and International news. 
The slogan of the charmel promises, "To keep pace w i t h the world , to 
walk together w i t h the times". Impressively, almost every province in 
China was able to receive the channel after it had been on air for just one 
month. 
Given the obvious benefits and the necessity of 24-hour news provision in 
China, i t is surprising that CCTV-News has emerged so recently. 
Suggestions to create a 24-hour news channel were made i n the 1990s, but 
i t remained only an idea unti l 2003 because of the lengthy consideration 
period wi th in the Party's Central Propaganda Department. Satisfactory 
reporting of events, especially breaking news, had not been achieved by 
the previous news system and i t was recognised that a channel. 
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exclusively for news, was needed: CCTV-News fil led a gap wi th in 
China's television industry. 
Several factors contributed to the birth of the news channel, but perhaps 
the most important one was the increasing criticism that CCTV received 
regarding its failure to respond to important news events in a timely and 
comprehensive manner. In particular, when big news stories (such as the 
9/11 terrorist attacks) unfolded, CCTV did not report them quickly and 
updates as the events kept unfolding were inadequate. This lack of 
responsiveness caused widespread dissatisfaction throughout China, 
especially among the growing middle class, comprising white- collar 
professionals, leaders of government agencies and social institutions, and 
intellectuals who were believed to be the emergent opinion leaders in 
Chinese society. This growing middle class has been the new market, 
demanding up-to-date news. Prior to the launch of CCTV-News, the only 
satisfactory news programme available was the daily Xin Wen Lian Bo 
(Neivs Bulletin) on CCTVl at 7.00 pm, but many professionals were 
dissatisfied w i t h this limited service. In addition, an increasing number of 
young intellectuals, some w i t h overseas education, entered the civi l 
service including CCTV and influenced the culture of their workplaces. 
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Additional demand for a 24-hour news charmel also came fol lowing 
increased public dissatisfaction w i t h propaganda stories and concerns 
about a lack of transparency in the news. These issues centred on the 
tendency of the Chinese media to prioritise positive news, while turning a 
blind eye to criticism of the government or the Party, as well as the lack of 
public representation in news stories. With the current availability of 
foreign television channels in China, viewers are sometimes confused by 
the different versions of events broadcast by national and international 
channels, which makes people feel duped by state propaganda [Li , 2003: 
25]. 
A n outline of what influenced the establishment of CCTV-News would 
not be complete without mentioning the role played by the successes of 
another Chinese news programme, the 7.00 pm XWLB {Neivs Bulletin,) 
which celebrated its 25th anniversary in 2008. It has become a recognised 
leader of news-reporting i n China, developing its own brand image, and 
claims to have a viewership exceeding one billion. 
In order to maintain and further develop into a trusted news provider, 
CCTV w i l l need to be more brand motivated, and consider breaking away 
f rom propaganda reporting to exploit the fact that the public's trust in a 
news provider is based on brand reputation. The creation of CCTV-News 
was an opportunity to maintain, and enhance, the audience's brand 
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loyalty to CCTV by providing an opportunity to pursue more 
groundbreaking stories and styles. To emphasise this, CCTV-News took 
over a well-known controversial news programme called Focus interview 
(Jiaodian Fangtan). Following Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's earlier comment 
that, " I f F o c M S interview is not going to report on any negative news, I w i l l 
not watch i t " , the programme gained a reputation based on the reporting 
of critical news issues such as corruption. CCTV-News may, therefore, 
provide an avenue for CCTV to improve its general image. 
Chinese authorities controlling the media warmed to the idea of 
introducing a 24-hour news channel following a shift of decision-making 
powers f rom the CCP, which allowed CCTV to exert greater control over 
its own future. The departure of President Jiang Zemin and the 
appointment of the new Standing Committee members of the CCP 
Politburo also had a direct influence. The previous leadership, most of 
who were promoted directly f rom provincial to state level, came to power 
following a period of chaos in the late 1980s, and consequently their main 
priority was to stabilise the socio-political arena. I n contrast, the new 
leadership acquired power at a time when the country was more stable, 
and i t was therefore possible to tackle politically sensitive issues, such as 
reforming the state-owned media. President H u and his cabinet were 
generally more relaxed over supporting reforms. 
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Improvement in the economy also necessitated the decision to launch a 
24-hour news charmel. In contrast to the 1990s, the Chinese media were 
almost ready to face the challenges of opening up the market to 
international investment by the time that China joined the Wor ld Trade 
Organisation i n 2001 [Brahm, 2002: 49]. The opening up of the Chinese 
economy to foreign investors resulted i n competition. 
Competition f r o m other stations motivated CCTV to improve the scope of 
its news provision. The Chinese television market is large and lucrative. 
By 1999 China had about 320 mil l ion more television sets than the USA, 
and many media giants endeavour enter China's vast market [Thussu, 
2000:135]. CCTV faces competition, but the single most important 
competitor threatening the future success of CCTV is the Hong Kong 
based Phoenix Television. Ovmed by News Corporation and launched in 
China in 1996, Ma [2001:121] believes that Phoenix TV is currently the 
only channel that can challenge CCTV. For example. Phoenix provided 
impressive news coverage of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, while CCTV failed 
to report the incident wi th in the initial 48 hours. Phoenix has successfully 
balanced its provision of comprehensive news about China without 
criticising the central government. The company has also been successful 
in transforming the image of news presenters in China. Unt i l very 
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recently, Chinese news presenters were simply considered as news 
presenters, but Phoenix Television has managed to transform this status 
into celebrity. In order to compete wi th stations such as Phoenix 
Television, it was evident that CCTV needed a channel devoted 
exclusively to 24-hour news. 
The business environment in which CCTV now operates is completely 
different compared wi th a decade ago [Hong, 1998: 32]. The current 
environment has made the public demand better television programming. 
There is a proliferation of national, regional and local stations, including 
cable television, and an increase in leisure time - that means more viewing 
time - and a growing number of foreign television services. Many Chinese 
viewers are now able to receive foreign channels such as C N N , N H K , BBC 
and Star TV, using satellite dishes and the Internet. Residents in Fujian 
and Guangdong can receive broadcasts f rom Taiwan and Hong Kong 
without satellite dishes. Since the 1990s, as a result of the wide range of 
media by which news is communicated, Chinese television viewers have 
become more selective about the programmes they watch, making it 
harder for television channels to attract and retain viewers (Hong 1998). 
The creation of CCTV-News is part of CCTV's overall strategy to expand 
its media territory and to achieve its desired reputation as a world-class 
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broadcaster. A channel that provides 24-hour news provision can be used 
as an indicator of success. Conversely, if CCTV cannot provide 
professional news coverage, then i t could indicate that the organisation is 
not a key player in the media industry. CCTV aims to become the first 
choice brand for media, perhaps even a benchmark standard, against 
which competitors are compared. A l l of these facts were reflected in the 
creation of CCTV-News, but unfortunately the channel has not met its 
expectation of being lively and groundbreaking; its news provision, in 
terms of quality and scope, does not match the standards set by 
comparable news channels in the West. 
The milestones of the 24-hour news channel 
Although it took a long time for the CCP to approve the establishment of 
CCTV-News, there were already long-standing endeavours wi th in 
CCTV's management to create a blueprint of operations for launching the 
channel immediately, regardless of when the central government would 
make a decision. This blueprint, which reflected CCTV management's 
long-term aims, facilitated the quick and smooth development of the 
channel once its approval was announced. 
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The channel's first milestone was the timely reporting of the 2003 US 
invasion of Iraq and the impact that the reporting had on CCTV's 
capabilities. The commencement of the war was reported on CCTV-1 only 
five-minutes after it began and was announced on CCTV-4 a few minutes 
later. This was a notable event because prompt reporting was unusual for 
CCTV, and it contrasted sharply with its previous response to big stories. 
Efficient coverage of the Iraq War clearly demonstrated that C C T V was 
capable and ready to report news events immediately and accurately. 
When one of the decision-makers in C C T V was interviewed, he explained 
that C C T V wanted to show the government and the public that the station 
was ready to report news without delay. The interview also revealed that 
although C C T V had been previously criticised for delays in its reporting 
of important events, the situation was not representative of its 
capabilities. The interviewee said that most employees wanted to 
transform the way that C C T V reported news, but realised that the 
changes could not take place as quickly as wished. 
CCTV boasts a workforce that is highly talented and well-qualified, but 
the station is still the mouthpiece of the government and its reporting 
necessarily reflects this fact. Coverage of the Iraq War, however, helped to 
change the negative perceptions that were associated with CCTV's news 
coverage. Doubts within the central government and viewers about 
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CCTV's ability to handle breaking news stories were eroded, because 
during the war CCTV's reporting was comparable to that of the rolling 
news channels. There was competition between CCTV-1 and CCTV-4. 
Both channels were claiming a large proportion of news programmes, and 
there was soon a public debate about which channel would report events 
first and which channel would attract most viewers. For the first time, the 
idea of timely and accurate news was put into the public arena, and in a 
positive and non-threatening way. Li [2003: 213] describes positive 
feedback from the BBC and Japanese news agencies about CCTV's 
reporting of the Iraq War. The BBC reported that, "the Chinese media's 
reporting on the Iraq War is very balanced", while a Japanese newspaper 
commented, "CCTV had an incredible coverage. It was really interesting 
reporting. We believe the Chinese media is on its way to change". 
Obviously, such positive comments about the Chinese media from 
renowned overseas news organisations were well received by C C T V and 
the Chinese government, and demonstrated that C C T V could successfully 
report international news around -the clock. 
CCTV's other milestone was the change in the leadership's attitude 
towards the reporting of its activities. On 28 March 2003, the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo passed new regulations (entitled On further 
developing and improving of Party Conference Reporting and Top leadership 
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activity report) that allowed more reporting of the leadership's activities. 
After passing these regulations, the "actual voice" of the leadership was 
heard on C C T V for the first time, instead of voice-over interpretations of 
the leadership's activities. 
CCTV-News was established to achieve several goals, including being 
closer to the public, servicing the macro-envirorunent, producing news 
with Chinese characteristics and achieving the highest professional 
standards. The channel follows the three "closer" principles set out by the 
CCP leadership, aimed at transforming the status quo of news and the 
media. The principles stipulate that news and the media should be closer 
to the practical, closer to the public and closer to everyday life. In other 
words, the principles direct news and the media to be closer to the mass 
audience than to the leadership. Li Ting also laid down what he expected 
of CCTV-News. He insisted that news must be accurate and timely, the 
background to the news should be detailed and all-encompassing, news 
progranvming should be directed towards the official mainstream 
ideology, and its format should be audience-friendly (CCTV 2003-2004). 
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The partisan vs. the commercial: limitations and challenges 
CCTV-News has several challenges that threaten its success and even 
survival. The channel was partly established to counter the increasing 
success of other media organisations such as Phoenix Television, but the 
existence of C C T V News has only made competition tougher and harder 
for CCTV. 
Another threat is the Internet, as news is readily available online from 
both Chinese and foreign websites. It could be argued that the Internet 
threat is small because more Chinese people have access to a television 
than with the Internet. In fact China had 59.1 million Internet users in 
2002, but there were only about 27.6 computers per 11,000 people in the 
country (World Bank, 2004), whereas C C T V broadcasts to a much wider 
audience. In addition, Internet users tend to be concentrated in only three 
Chinese regions (cities) - Beijing, Guangdong and Shanghai - which are 
home to nearly 44 per cent of all Internet users in China (Brahm, 2001). 
Again, compared with CCTV-News, the TV channel has a much wider 
reach. 
Competition from the Internet should not be underestimated, however, as 
Internet usage is increasing exponentially every year through changing 
attitudes, reduction in telecom charges, increased spending power and 
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plans for a Chinese-language software industry [Lewis, 2001: 72; Yip, 
2001: 99]. Zhao Qizheng stated in 2001 that "In terms of the time period 
from the intioduction of one type of new electionic medium to the 
formation of 5,000 users, it takes 38 years for broadcasting, 13 years for 
wireless television and 10 years for cable. It takes only four years for the 
Internet" (quoted in C C T V , 2002). The Internet will undoubtedly 
revolutionise China, and its media, over the next few years. 
Another problem that CCTV-News needs to address is the quality of its 
news, especially when compared to Western 24-hour news channels. 
Before its launch, the media industiy had high expectations of C C T V -
News hoping that it would provide a livelier and more professional 
approach, currently lacking within the state-owned media. These 
expectations have unfortunately not been met. Although CCTV-News is a 
24-hour news charmel, this is only in theory because in reality the same 
half-hour news slot is repeated continuously during the day. People want 
re-stocked news programmes so that they can watch the channel for 
longer periods. 
Another quality problem is caused through the lack of integration 
between departments within CCTV. The C C T V organisation can be 
described as an "under-developed land with many people wanting to 
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cultivate." There is a lack of communication between the many decision-
makers in different departments, and consequently many programmes 
overlap and are repetitive. 
It is also important to consider that foreign organisations, such as the BBC 
and CNN, have different operational management philosophies. It is fair 
to say that issues such as investment strategy, financial management, 
human resource management, etc are more developed in Western 
organisations. For example, Kung-Shankleman [2000: 2-12] explained how 
the organisational culture (as well as the interrelationship between quality 
and performance) plays a major role in contributing to the success of the 
BBC and CNN. However, fine-tuning the relationship between 
organisational culture and performance is generally alien to Chinese 
organisations. In addition, unlike CCTV-News, the global media 
organisations are very experienced in a competitive market, thus giving 
them a competitive edge over CCTV. Phoenix Television very effectively 
competes with C C T V and its success is partly based on Rupert Murdoch's 
unmatched experience in media competition and his ability to overcome 
the potential barriers that any market in China presents. For example, the 
station localises Phoenix Television by ensuring that Chinese 
professionals facilitate top management and decision-making. Phoenix 
Television has been sensitive to issues in China and has actively worked 
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to smooth relations with the government; for example, the station 
removed the BBC from its service following criticism over human rights 
abuses, cancelled another potentially negative contract with 
HarperCollins, set up a joint venture with the People's Daily newspaper, 
and organised a concert following the 1999 NATO bombing of the 
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (Thussu 2000). 
Although Phoenix Television has successfully overcome the barriers of 
the Chinese media market, C C T V remains bogged down by a failure to 
balance party journalism and commercialisation. Ma [2001] compared the 
Chinese and international news broadcasting models. She described how 
the acceptance or rejection of news headlines is determined by political 
guidelines. Consequently, headlines commonly include state leaders 
receiving visitors or a hero/model worker being introduced to the nation. 
In contrast. Western stations report the top stories dominating the world 
news. According to Ma, the result of this major "Chinese characteristic" is 
that "a series of receptions and meetings are grandly pushed out into the 
news. Obviously this style of news broadcasting (of highlighting politics) 
is different from the international, generally accepted news-broadcasting 
model" (Ma, 2001). 
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Another characteristic of the Chinese media is "positive propaganda" that 
often results in the reporting of unnecessary news. For example, L i [2003: 
179] described how the reporting of floods in China was used to promote 
the image of the army; news pictures of the army working hard to save 
the Chinese people enhanced their public image. Other positive 
propaganda stories have included praising workers such as bus 
attendants and primary school teachers from remote areas. Although 
these activities have some benefits, it is difficult to judge whether viewers 
actually want to watch these events, compared with breaking news stories 
available on other channels. The international model of news reporting 
adopted by competitors, particularly Phoenix TV, means that C C T V -
News may be at a competitive disadvantage with regard to attracting 
audiences. Zhao [1998: 94] discussed the intertwined nature of the 
commercialisation of the media in China. Despite this commercialisation 
and some reforms, urgent change is needed; she believes that values from 
commercial media in the West and Hong Kong are more informative and 
less didactic. 
Another point to consider is that foreign news channels often provide 
critical commentary of a goverrunent, whereas in the Chinese media there 
is a lack of critical evaluation about government policies and behaviour; 
this is exemplified by Schnell's [1999: 4] interesting discussion of the lack 
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of political cartoons in Chinese newspapers; although political cartoons 
are common in the West they are rare in China, presumably because the 
government (which owns the press) does not want to be criticised or 
lampooned. The government has also expressed concern over the 
negative impact of foreign television programmes, including the effects of 
movies on teenagers. For example. Lynch described how the leadership 
has previously set limits to the proportion of broadcasting time 
apportioned to foreign programmes (in 1993 the government limited 20 
per cent of total air time to foreign broadcasting, and in 1996 foreign 
programmes were suspended from primetime television [Lynch, 1999: 
209]. 
A Chinese version of public/ civic journalism? 
The discursive negotiation between partisanship and professionalism 
entirely reflects the fundamental tension in the set-up between the C C P -
dominated press system and the ongoing media commercialisation in 
contemporary China. Remaining central to such tension is the 
"mouthpiece" theory, which C C P commissars have employed to 
legitimate their firm control of the press and media over the past five 
decades. Following in the same vein of Jiang Zemin's open-ended theory 
of "Three Represents", Chinese scholar Tong Bing has attempted to 
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redefine the role of the news media in the following three dimensions: (1) 
the right to know and the right to communicate are basic human rights 
which are constitutionally legitimate; (2) the news media can serve as the 
mouthpiece for both the Party and for the general public; (3) news media 
can be defined both as an Althusserian "State Ideological Apparatus" and 
as an integral part of the profit-oriented "service industry" [2003:18-20]. 
Its empirical contradictions and theoretical ambiguities aside, Tong's 
redefinition can be read as another typical manifestation of the "post-
politics" prevalent in the ideological domain of contemporary China. The 
term "post politics", coined by Chinese critic Chen Xiaoming, embodies a 
condition wherein "everything is political and nothing is political at one 
and the same time; politics is everywhere, and yet it subverts itself at any 
moment" [2000: 222-223]. Obviously, such post-pohtics reflects CCP's 
current agenda in cultural/ideological domains, that is, to shift decidedly 
away from Maoist revolutionary legacies and towards pragmatic 
objectives for maintaining order and stability, or the status quo [c.f. Liu, 
2004:19-28]. 
For Chinese journalists and media professionals, Tong's redefinition of 
the news media's role lends legitimacy to their experimentation in 
negotiating the partisan/professional. Post-politics is characterised by 
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their eclectic motto, "Helping but not making troubles" {Baman bu 
tianluan), that is, to help the public voice their concerns without making 
trouble for the top Communist Party leadership. This approach has been 
central to the development of public/ civic journalism. Since 1 April 1994, 
C C T V has aired Focused interviexv, a 15-minute in-depth news programme 
in the mould of CBS's 60-minute segments. At the core of the 
programming are interpretation of current affairs, investigative reporting 
and watchdog journalism. The programme has gained official 
endorsement from the topmost leadership, high ratings from the general 
public and considerable revenue from advertisers, which has led to a 
boom in public/civic journalism in the Chinese news media. 
We need, however, to rethink what "public/civic journalism" means in a 
different global/local context. The notion surfaced primarily at a group of 
American mid-sized daily newspapers in the late 1980s. Davis "Buzz" 
Merritt, one of the advocates in this campaign and editor/vice president 
of The Wichita Eagle, has defined key aspects of civic journalism as follows: 
It moves beyond the limited mission of "telling the new" to a 
broader mission of helping public life go well, and act out that 
imperative; 
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It moves from detachment to being a fair-minded participant 
in public life; 
It moves beyond only describing what is "going wrong" to 
also imagining what "going right" would be like; 
It moves from seeing people as consumers - as readers or non-
readers, as bystanders to be informed - to seeing them as a 
public, as potential actors in arriving at democratic solutions 
to public problems. 
[1995:113-114] 
Obviously, Merritt's idealistic model of civic journalism finds fault with 
the norm of objectivity, which remains central to professionalism and 
prevails in contemporary American journalism. Moreover, he also 
attempts to resuscitate the participatory nature and the overriding 
concern with political/public issues, as manifested in the bygone tradition 
of partisan journalism. Interestingly enough. Sun Yu-Sheng, the founder 
and then producer of Focused interviexv, shares a similar approach in 
defining the guidelines for his news programming, which can be read as a 
tentative definition of a Chinese version of public/civic journalism: 
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To maintain a correct standpoint in our observation, 
interview, analysis and programming; do not "give vent to 
outrage and be killed"; 
Social conflicts and problems remain the core to our news 
programming while a positive standpoint must be adhered to, 
that is, to constiuct but not to destroy 
The topical selection, interview skills, shooting, editing and 
programming must conform to the criteria of television 
newsworthiness. 
[2003: 5-6] 
To a non-Chinese observer. Sun's vision appears to be a far cry from 
Merritt's model of public/civic journalism. We should bear in mind, 
however, that Sun, as a senior editor with one of the topmost CCP's 
"mouthpieces" rather than a liberal intellectual, cannot but state his 
reformist ideas in line with official rhetoric. His euphemistic wording, 
such as "a correct or positive standpoint" and "criteria of television 
newsworthiness", points to a departure from the conventions of partisan 
journalism, and to the efforts of re-contextualising the global model of 
public/civic journalism in indigenous Chinese discursive practices. 
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According to the leading theorist of public/civic journalism. Jay Rosen, 
"The idea is to frame stories from the citizen's view, rather than inserting 
man-in-the-street quotes into a frame dominated by professionals" [Rosen 
and Merritt, 1995:15]. Both Merritt and Sun, despite their different ways of 
expressing it, converge in their ideas on news-framing from the 
public/civic perspective. In fact, CCTV's Focused interview contribution to 
the ongoing press/media reform lies precisely on its reliance on the 
public/civic sources as the basis of news-framing and production. It is 
estimated that the editorial department receives over 2,300 news sources 
every day from all around China via various channels of correspondence, 
including phone calls, e-mails, and mobile phone text messages [Chen, 
2004:1]. The programme has received a new lease of life under the current 
Communist Party leadership: Focused interview was granted a quota of no 
less than 50 per cent of "muckraking" reportage in its armual 
programming; the ratio by April 2004 had already exceeded 50 per cent, 
perhaps a positive sign for media reform [Chen, 2004:1]. 
The Chinese re-contextualisation of public/civic journalism has taken a 
notable new turn in recent years. A new concept of "plebeian journalism" 
{minsheng xinwen or "news about citizens' life") surfaced to encompass 
public participation in news production, which originated in Zero distance 
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from Nanjing {Nanjing lingju li, hereafter Zero), a primetime live news 
show in provincial Jiangsu Television's Urban Charmel. If CCTV's Focused 
interview attempts to negotiate partisanship with professionalism. Zero 
aims to replace official discourses with a more playful, intimate and 
interactive plebeian culture. 
As well as getting the audiences to call in direct with news sources. Zero 
enlists more than 1,000 amateur on-site correspondents and cameramen 
into its newsroom and constantly updates news polls and sampling 
during the course of the telecast. The majority of Zero's news items 
comprise live reportage of various incidents and disasters, public policy-
making, as well as urban residents' call-in complaints and investigative 
reportage, ranging from shortage of electricity supply to mistreatment by 
government officials. Obviously, Zero's discursive practice aims to 
construct "plebeian journalism", news about ordinary people's mode of 
living and psychological stances [Wang and Wu, 2003: 2]. 
The socio-political vicissitudes of Focused interviexv and Zero cannot but 
testify to the dialectics and contradictions in the course of China's media 
reform, which deserves a book-length project for a detailed account and 
in-depth analysis. What remains to be seen is how far such 
experimentation with public/civic journalism can go and to what extent 
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the goals of public/civic journalism can be achieved within the current 
framework of the paradoxical partisan-cum-marketing system. With the 
global media's further penetiation into the Chinese media arena, it is no 
surprise that the news media are torn between the opposing forces of 
partisan contiol and market economy. Emergent cheque book and yellow 
journalism, for instance, have already drawn attention from conscientious 
media scholars and professionals. Negotiation between the partisan and 
the professional still constitutes the core of the agenda of post-WTO 
Chinese media reform. The Chinese experience, as the attempts at 
recontextualising public/civic journaUsm have suggested, points to the 
directions in which we may engage the problems of globalisation (read 
Americanisation) and the search for its own cultural and social 
alternatives. 
The challenges and changes of television journalism in contemporary 
China discussed in this chapter point to the urgency and necessity of 
tiansferring the focus in the current studies of global communication and 
China, namely, from the cential theme of "What can media/cultural 
globalisation do to China?" to that of "What can China do to 
media/cultural globalisation?" The practices and experiments by C C T V -
News and Phoenix, as well as local television stations, are emblematic of 
the re-mapping of the Chinese media topography in response to 
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prevailing media/cultural globalisation. In the foreseeable future, 
negotiating between the partisan, the commercial and the professional 
remains the central tenet of this ongoing globalisation in the Chinese 
media sphere. Not surprisingly, the end of a propaganda state seems to be 
consequent upon its negation. What remains to be seen is whether the 
Chinese news media can successfully compete with the restricting 
dominance of their Western counterparts and bring forth a more 
constructive alternative to the prevailing commercial/professional model. 
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Chapter 10 
Televised democracy and mediated realities: 
Discussions beyond the television news 
Chapter Summary 
The concept of "mediated realities" is introduced, a theory that the images people have 
of the world, and their interpretation of them, are media-created. Neivspapers and 
radio had originally mediated realities to the public, but were eventually replaced by 
television-constructed realities. 
Against this background, CCTV began to offer the public "televised democracy", by 
broadcasting debates on everyday issues. The sense of democracy increased ivith 
interactive live broadcasts, when viewers could join in the debate by telephone, and 
influence political decisions. Allowing a free floiv of ideas benefited the government, 
ivhile public demand brought greater political transparency from the leadership. 
Reform of the Chinese media runs parallel to the reform of business ethics. Less 
censorship means that television news can reveal corruption in Chinese business and 
politics. Businesses are thus forced to act more ethically, and this attracts foreign 
investors. The thesis gives a useful background study of state censorship and the 
Chinese media. Case studies illustrate the points made. 
The Tiananmen protest brought a halt to media reform by the leadership zuho 
reiterated the former vieiv of television as Party "mouthpiece". Having seen the 
benefits of press freedom, the author concludes it is clearly essential if China is to 
become ethical, stable and economically sustainable, and to take its place among the 
major world powers. 
"Mediated realities" is a theory that argues that pictures or images of the 
world that people have in their minds are influenced by their contact with 
the mass media (Karen S/Johnson C-4/2004). People usually interpret 
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their surroundings according to what they absorb from the media. People 
normally look to the media for experiences they have never had, such as 
places they have never visited and people they have never met. For 
example, a lot of people in the world have never been to China, but they 
are able to talk about the country based on the "reality" of China as 
presented by the media. Their construction of what Chinese people are 
like is based on what they have read, seen on television or heard on the 
radio. 
Before television was introduced in China, reality was what people read 
in the government newspapers and heard on state radio. Once television 
was able to combine audio and visual, people's idea of reality changed, 
because what was now believable was what could be seen and heard. 
Television-constructed reality became accepted and trusted. As television 
became more entrenched in Chinese society and proved that it had more 
to offer than radio and newspapers, people's expectations started growing 
and television was challenged to be more ambitious. 
It is against this background that C C T V has for some time been giving 
Chinese people a taste of democracy, perhaps not in the same sense and 
magnitude as the West and elsewhere, but to some extent Chinese people 
have enjoyed more liberties through C C T V than they could ever have 
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hoped for otherwise. Increasingly, through C C T V programming, Chinese 
people were introduced to a diversity of ideas and they learned that in 
reality not everyone held the same opinions on issues that affect the wider 
public, as they had been made to believe before. C C T V started producing 
programmes which discussed issues that directly affected people's lives, 
such as policies and governance, especially at the local level where 
television news programmes revealed a lot of mismanagement and 
corruption. 
When C C T V started broadcasting live programmes democratic values 
increased, because it became possible to allow viewers to debate issues. 
Through calling in or being part of the audience in the studio, ordinary 
citizens began to discuss issues in a democratic way. C C T V provided an 
opportunity for Chinese people to start influencing party and government 
decisions; having heard people's comments on television, the authorities 
took remedial action, even going so far as to change laws and policies. 
Live programming also meant increased transparency and a willingness 
on the part of the state to allow the free flow of ideas on television. 
The programme. Tell the truth, is a good example of democracy on 
television. It tackles a single topical issue each week and during the 
programme panellists discuss the issue with a live studio audience who 
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are allowed to participate by asking questions, arguing or contributing in 
any constructive way to the issue. When the programme was first 
introduced in 1994 it was lauded as one of the most democratic 
programmes on CCTV. 
Through these open programmes, C C T V introduced a culture of 
transparency in Chinese society and soon people started expecting the 
same from other sectors, such as politics and business. This gave rise to 
press conferences, briefings and open inquiries by business and politics as 
they tried to be transparent. Also resulting from this was the concept of 
spokespersons, who were introduced into government offices and state-
owned enterprises. 
In the early days of television, the medium was predominantly for the 
upper class. Poor people from villages and rural areas never hoped to 
have any chance of advancing their interests through television. Through 
CCTV's efforts at democratisation, however, such people now enjoy the 
benefits of television as much as everyone else. C C T V is able to highlight 
their problems and disseminate their views and contributions on national 
issues. 
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Although China is not a democratic country, television enables citizens to 
participate in a democratic way over any issues they might have and to 
influence how they are governed. This is necessary to bring about both 
the full democratisation of television and China in general, because as 
citizens enjoy this transparency they will be motivated and empowered to 
demand more. It is obvious that the media in general and television in 
particular cannot wait until there is total democracy in China to provide 
people with programmes that are based on the democratic principles of 
free speech and transparency. Even through the little it is doing, C C T V is 
helping to oil the transition wheels as they move China towards eventual 
democratisation. 
The Free Press: A ticket to an ethical, sustainable and unified China 
Chinese media reform during the current economic boom goes hand in 
hand with the current drive for improved business ethics, encouraged by 
the decrease in press censorship. As a result, unethical and corrupt 
corporate and government practices are no longer readily accepted or 
tolerated. Mass media, particularly television news programmes, are 
finally revealing the corruption in China. Television news departments 
are making every effort to serve the people by truly acting as their eyes 
and ears in the corporate and government culture. Because of the media's 
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exposure of corrupt corporations, companies are beginning to act more 
ethically, and this is attracting foreign investors to the Chinese market. 
This not only helps to increase the trust of the people, but will also help to 
sustain and foster the growth of the economy. To properly understand 
this argument, the chapter is supported by an in-depth examination of 
the structure of the Chinese media, the recent reform movements, and a 
case study in business ethics. This is necessary as it will provide 
information about past situations and an understanding of the role of both 
current and future journalistic practices. 
Table 10.1 
Contrasting assumptions about Press mission 
Authoritarian regime assumptions I Democratic regime assumptions 
(e.g. China) \ (e.g UmiSA) 
Government knows and respects 
people's best interests 
Government are fallible and often 
corrupt 
Press should not attack the 
government and its major policies 
Press should attack the government 
when officials and policies seem 
flawed 
News should engender support for 
major policies 
News should stimulate critical 
thinking about major policies 
News and entertainment 
programmes should be selected for 
their social values 
News and entertainment 
programmes should be selected for 
audience appeal 
Source: 
Graber, D. A. (1993) Mass media and American politics. Congressional Quarterly 
Press. Page 20. 
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Chinese newspapers can be classified into two types: party organs or non-
party newspapers, such as mass appeal chapters and bureaucratic 
chapters (Lee, 161). Television stations, however, are all directly under the 
supervision of the CDP or the propaganda departments of C C P 
committees. The party organ is the formal voice of the Party, and has a 
political and ideological background to its editorial approach. The non-
party newspapers, on the other hand, while still owned and controlled by 
the party-state, serve the general interests of the public. Both types of 
newspaper carry with them an administrative status, which is defined by 
the administrative level of their sponsoring units. In China, each 
newspaper is required to have a sponsoring unit (Zhu Ban Dan Wei) and 
a regulating unit (Zhu Guan Dan Wei) [Lee, 2003:164]. These two units 
ensure that the newspapers are unit based and that no individuals can 
start up publications on their own. In addition, the sponsoring unit and 
the newspaper must agree on how they function in society and what are 
their geographical targets. The administrative status of the Chinese press 
is not merely a question of status; it carries with it important economic 
implications. These may affect its privileges, such as access to pulp and 
printing facilities, rates for distribution, frequency of technological 
updating, and tax rate [Lee, 2003:164]. Most importantly, a paper of a 
given administrative status is not allowed to enter another market of 
equal or higher administrative status. This basically means that a 
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provincial party chapter will not be allowed to enter another provincial or 
the national market. 
Certainly, these are strict boundaries but there is a reason for them. With 
the growing desire for profit and fame, prosperous newspapers often 
want to move into larger territories in order to profit, but this is seen as 
trespassing on to the Chinese administrative system. Currently, the 
provincial party organs are meant to serve the political aspirations of the 
provincial authorities and not to interfere with other province's business. 
Spreading to another province does necessarily guarantee better receiver's 
rate if the coverage are about the neighbour's crisis, scandals and 
disasters. Higher receiver's rate will normally guarantee better 
advertising revenue of the year and sharp economic growth. However it 
can almost certainly guarantee to disturb the neighbouring province's 
leaders as well. 
With the administrative boundaries in place, China's newspaper market is 
divided along provincial and municipal lines. The newspaper market 
force is strongest in the provincial capitals, where the city newspaper 
competes head-on with provincial daily chapters. The provincial borders 
are, however, effective in limiting the expansion of the media market in 
China and are also changing the administrative borders between cities in 
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a given province. In the whole of China, only a few local newspapers have 
circulations large enough to count as national dailies. A non-party chapter 
is in general less bound by its administrative status than a party organ. 
This corroborates the observation that there has been a decline in party 
organs in the overall press structure and a rise of municipal party organs, 
mass appeal evening chapters, and metro chapters [Lee, 2003:164]. 
Censorship represents one of the most burdensome infringements on 
freedom of expression. Censorship refers to "any system in which the 
government may deny a person the use of a forum for expression in 
advance of the actual expression". Chinese authorities employ different 
types of censorship to ensure that the Communist Party is able to silence 
critics and maintain direct editorial control over political information and 
news reporting. These types of censorship include: legislative censorship, 
political censorship, psychological censorship and technological 
censorship. Legislative censorship is upheld since people in China must 
ask the government's permission before they are allowed to publish. The 
state achieves political censorship in that the Communist Party has the 
right and the ability to screen works prior to publication, and stop 
publication of those works it finds objectionable. Psychological censorship 
is a result of Chinese authorities intimidating Chinese citizens into silence 
by using vague and over-broad laws to imprison people who publish 
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politically sensitive works without permission. Technological censorship 
occurs when Chinese authorities use computer software and hardware to 
prevent Chinese citizens from viewing and publishing opinions of which 
the government disapproves. This is the most recent form of censorship a; 
the Internet has begun to make its mark on Chinese society and culture. 
Chinese journalism has had its ups and downs ever since the 1980s. It 
started with gradual and uncertain liberalisation, leading to brief 
blossoming in the spring of 1989, and then the clampdown that followed 
was maintained until the early to mid 1990s. 
In 1977, when Deng Xiaoping picked Hu Jiwei to be editor-in-chief of the 
People's Daily, China was about to set out on a path of modernisation and 
opening up to the outside world after a decade of "Maoist insularity" 
(Jernow, 17). Hu Jiwei, a journalist and Communist Party member, was a 
good choice for this position to help fulfil the vision of a new China. The 
People's Daily is the one newspaper in China whose bureaucratic rank is 
equal to a ministry. Its editors enjoy the prestige and privileges of the 
Party. Hu Jiwei was not only a member of the Communist Party and 
editor-in-chief of the Party's most influential newspaper, he was also 




When Hu Jiwei became editor of the People's Daily, he was aware that the 
Party had made mistakes. His love for his country and loyalty to the Party 
were no longer one and the same, and he was forced to choose between 
the two. Hu Jiwei decided to take the newspaper in a bold direction, and 
bring it back to the people. The early 1980s were a time of sweeping 
economic and political change. Under Hu Jiwei's leadership, the People^s 
Daily published some of the best investigative stories in China, among 
them an article about the siriking of the Bohai oil rig which led to the 
Minister of Petroleum's resignation, and an article exposing the Minister 
of Commerce's habit of dining out on public money Qernow, 1993:18]. 
In 1982, at the pinnacle of his career, Hu Jiwei called on newspaper editors 
to publish the opinions and criticisms sent in by their readers. It was his 
belief that newspapers should speak for the people and should offer 
diverse thoughts and opinions. This call to action was seen as a 
conspiracy, and in 1983 during the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign, Hu 
Jiwei was forced to resign. 
The Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign died quickly because memories of 
the Cultural Revolution were still fresh in the minds of party leaders. 
They did not want to start the ideological hunting down of people, the 
purges and violence again. When the political "sloganeering" and public 
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denouncements began to threaten Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, the 
Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign lost its drive [Jernow, 1993: 23]. 
Journalistic reforms took a step backwards in October 1985 when Liu 
Brnyan, a journalist and party member, wrote an article in which he 
supported the right to "espouse political opinions that differed from the 
party of Mao" (Jemow, 1993: 23]. The article was refused by the People's 
Daily but published in a magazine called Kaituo. A few months later, Liu 
Binyan was criticised and eventually expelled from the Party. 
There was yet another upward swing in October 1987 when Zhao Ziyang 
told the 13th Party Congress that public opinion was needed in order to 
supervise public officials, and he specifically encouraged critical 
reporting. Zhao said that the public should know about more important 
events and debate important topics. Chinese journalists were united in an 
enthusiastic response. This unification was most significant, as it served 
as the backbone for the events that would take place in the spring and 
summer of 1989. 
The timing of Zhao Ziyang's speech was perfect, because when the protest 
movement began in the spring of 1989 Chinese journalists had come too 
close to attaining independence not to put up a fight. During the spring 
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and summer demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, journalists needed to 
be passionate about their career and to stick together. They were put to 
test for the first time during this period. 
In April, Chinese journalists marched under a People's Daily banner to 
oppose an editorial that appeared in the People's Daily for 26 April. The 
editorial, written by Deng Xiaoping, accused protesters of undermining 
stability and creating turmoil. It had been published despite staff 
objections. The People's Daily journalists had once again been forced to 
serve the Party, and they wanted people to know that they were not free 
to write as desired. 
On the evening of 4 May, demonstrators received encouragement from a 
speech by General-Secretary Zhao Ziyang. He distanced himself from the 
hard-line 26 April editorial in the People's Daily. Zhao Ziyang said the 
students were not causing turmoil and that reforms would continue. 
Taking advantage of a political struggle at the top of the party hierarchy, 
journalists began openly reporting on the protests in Tiananmen Square. 
This sentiment of open reporting continued up to the end of Tianar\men 
Incident. Many people recall reports published in the People's Daily of 4 
June. The brief articles said that there had been a "counter-revolutionary 
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rebellion" Qemow, 1993: 60]. It described the Army as having sudder\ly 
occupied Tiananmen Square, and suggested that they used force. The 
message was not lost either to the readers or to the leadership, and this 
article angered some top officials. 
The defiance of the press, while not outright, persisted after the massacre 
in Beijing, which had strengthened the journalists' antagonism towards 
the government. However, the hardliners who had gained dominance 
struggled to regain control of the rebellious propaganda machine. Top 
officials sympathetic to the press, Hu Qili and Zhao Ziyang, were expelled 
from the Standing Committee of the Politburo [Jernow, 1993: 61]. 
With the crushing of the Tiananmen protest, the media reform movement 
also suffered a major setback that was apparent both in journalistic 
practice and in theoretical discussion. The Party attributed the movement 
to the influence of "bourgeois liberalisation," a Western strategy of 
"peaceful evolution," and the partial takeover of the media and the 
ideological front by liberal and democratic reformers [Zhao, 1998: 45]. 
Two speeches, one by Jiang Zemin and Li Ruihuan, who replaced Zhao 
Ziyang and Hu Qili respectively, effectively reimposed the Party's 
principle and closed any theoretical debate on reform. 
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Jiang reiterated the mouthpiece theory. He claimed that serving the Party 
and serving the people were invariably one and the same, and criticised 
those who advocated the people principle and press freedom, charging 
them with maliciously trying to overthrow the party leadership. 
According to Li , the media were to fulfil all responsibilities by providing 
correct direction to the public and arousing people's confidence in and 
enthusiasm for the socialist system. Sadly, media reform, after a decade of 
intense debate and struggle, seemed to have returned to its starting point 
a decade before [Zhao, 1998: 46]. 
News reports in the major media in the mid 1990s have remained typical 
of party journalism; they are monolithic, positive and predictable. Many 
publications covered the same stories regarding policy directives from 
provincial and national leaders, visits of party and government leaders to 
various provinces, good agricultural harvests despite droughts, education 
in patriotism, and model party members [Zhao, 1998: 49]. Though these 
were clearly steps backwards, journalists were still united, and having 
once tasted freedom of expression, they were determined to get it back. 
China's acceptance into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 11 
November 2001 was exactly what the mass media industry needed to 
fully bring back the 1980s freedom of the press mentality. Reformers have 
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argued against the Party's concern that greater freedom would cause 
instabihty. Their argument is that press freedom is not only a right, but 
also conducive to political and economic stability. Wang Roushui, known 
for his theory of Marxist humanism and alienation under socialism, 
claimed that "economic instability is caused by bureaucracy, corruption 
and degeneration, which can be checked by a free press" [Zhao, 1998: 36]. 
This point is further supported by H u Jiwei. He said that "There w i l l be no 
genuine stability without press freedom" [Zhao, 1998: 37]. According to 
H u Jiwei, a free press can not only prevent and correct party and 
government wrongdoing and therefore eradicate destabilising factors, but 
also promote mutual understanding between the people and the 
government and among different segments of society. I t provides a safety 
valve for people to vent their dissatisfactions. In an essay published in the 
Worm Economic Herald, H u Jiwei said: 
Without freedom of the press, the people are helpless i n the 
face of policy mistakes and the phenomenon of increasing 
corruption. If what they say is moderate, it serves no purpose. 
If what they say is tough, i t is not published in the press. As 
time goes on, many people w i l l cherish an attitude of saying 
and thinking nothing, and even taking things as they come. 
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bending to fate. Such a phenomenon gives a false impression 
of stability and unity. But i t actually has people's numbness, 
indifference and their repression as a price. Hidden therein is 
an even greater risk. 
[Zhao, 1998: 37] 
Both of these men made their statements before China entered the WTO 
in 2001, and they now appear to be prophetic. There are two major themes 
running through their ideas: corruption and economic instability. The 
hope for economic reform lies in the continuation of freedom for Chinese 
journalists [Jemow, 1993: 93]. Without freedom of the press, corruption 
flourishes unchecked, which further impoverishes the country, rendering 
people helpless and undermining Chinese economic growth in the new 
century. 
China, once a planned economy, started to introduce the market mentality 
when it shifted f rom class struggle to econonuc development in the early 
1980s. Marketisation was given a strong boost after Deng Xiaoping 
elaborated on the importance of economic liberalisation in the socialist 
system during his widely publicised tour to southern China in 1992. By 
the logic of marketisation, one should expect capital to be crossing 
administrative boundaries, such as provincial and urban borders, in its 
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pursuit of a larger market. Indeed, in the non-media sector, the Chinese 
authorities have well recognised the need for abolishing all forms of local 
protectionism in order to foster a national market. The state 
administration released rules in Apr i l 2001 that forbid the use of any 
means to interfere w i t h the entry of goods and services to a local market. 
The intention is to establish and to perfect a unified national market that 
allows orderly and fair competition. [Lee, 2003:159] 
It is clear that these economic reforms have led up to China's 2001 entry 
into the WTO. As stated before f rom Jemow [1993: 93], the hope for 
economic reform lies i n the continuation of freedom for Chinese 
journalists. In order to defeat corruption and economic instability, a free 
Chinese press must exist. 
Some Chinese argue that i f the economy is to continue to develop and 
prosper, the need for rule by law w i l l likewise grow. A market economy 
can thrive only on the basis of viable contracts that can be fairly and 
impartially adjudicated, and i t requires unhindered access to information. 
People are not going to invest money in China's stock exchanges unless 
they know where i t is going and can be confident that their investments 
w i l l be safe. The press must be free to provide them w i t h this information. 
Western-educated intellectuals also place their faith in the creation of a 
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middle class, who demand greater political participation Qernow, 1993: 
133]. 
In the past, journalists in China have been assigned a dif f icul t balancing 
act as intermediaries between the nation's political authorities and the 
public. They are instructed to serve as the eyes, ears and mouthpiece not 
only of the Party and government, but also of the people and this has put 
them in a Catch-22 situation. As a result of working for two bosses (the 
Party and the people of China), journalists in China often f ind i t d i f f icul t 
to get a balance between the two. If they are biased towards the Party, 
people are upset, and if they disagree wi th the Party, the Party sees it as a 
conspiracy and punishes the newspaper and the author. As a result of 
this, the truth is often distorted or completely changed, and it is the 
people who are the victims. 
If China intends to continue its economic growth, journalists need a strict 
commitment to serve the people. So far, journalists have made some steps 
towards serving the people better. These steps have had a positive 
influence by decreasing corruption and increasing economic stability [Lee, 
2003: 33]. 
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With the development of the global economy, Chinese companies face the 
challenge of competing i n the wor ld market, and this demands market 
morality. As Chinese companies recognise the importance of morality i n 
the market, public demand for the same increases. The mass media, who 
are becoming increasingly articulate on abusive practices, w i l l play a 
major role i n developing an ethically responsible market. As a result there 
w i l l be a decrease i n corruption and an increase i n economic stability, 
both essential for the Chinese economy to prosper. 
One case illustrates wel l how the media helps to flush out corruption and 
corrupt business people. 
In the summer of 1998, a disastrous flood hi t China. Heavy rains beat 
down on the Yangtze River and caused floods in ten provinces. As a 
result of the storm, himdreds of millions of victims lost their homes. 
CCTV, in an effort to source immediate financial aid for the victims, 
organised a charity programme to raise relief fimds. During the broadcast 
companies and joint ventures donated money to the flood victims, while 
others pledged to donate later. The donations were to be sent off to the 
Red Cross wi th in one year. Urtfortunately, however, an enormous amount 
of the promised f imding never came. One day, Greeson Medicine 
Corporation, a Western company, received a list that showed that three of 
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its Chinese business partners who had pledged to donate money had 
broken their promises to provide relief. [Rothlin, 2004: C14] 
Greeson Medicine Corporation was forced to drop these three Chinese 
business partners. Chinese people were appalled to learn of the deeply 
rooted corruption of these companies when a Chinese newspaper exposed 
their unethical behaviour. The companies certainly saved some money in 
the short term by not donating to the f lood victims, but the long-term 
financial losses w i l l be irreplaceable. Since the newspaper exposed these 
three companies, the trust that Chinese citizens had in them has been 
erased and they have undoubtedly incurred large financial losses. 
As China becomes a bigger player in the global market, both Chinese 
people and Chinese corporations are no longer accepting corrupt practices 
and low quality products. These new sentiments are the result of the 
decreased censorship of newspapers. Wi th decreased censorship, 
newspapers are free to expose corrupt practices both in business and 
political environments, and are truly serving the best interests of everyone 
in China. Now that corporations and the government are aware that 
newspaper can, and w i l l , expose corrupt practices, they are making efforts 
to act ethically. As a result, citizens both i n China and abroad have a 
greater sense of trust i n the Chinese economy and market. This confirmed 
230 
sense of trust benefits everyone in China. Large corporations and the 
government w i l l develop an ethical culture, as they can no longer easily 
get away w i t h unethical and corrupt behaviour. This w i l l encourage 
Chinese citizens to trust corporations and the government. For the 
country overall, the general awareness that Chinese corporations and 
government offices are acting ethically and actually being held 
accountable for their crimes w i l l entice foreign investors to the potentially 
rewarding Chinese markets. 
The corruption and the false sense of stability and unity, so typical of the 
large corporations and the government, w i l l crumble under a free media. 
In their place w i l l be an ethical, economically sustainable and unified 
China that w i l l take its place among the major wor ld powers. 
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Chapter 11 
Governing China with the news in an Internet age 
Chapter Summary 
This final chapter examines the media policy of the Fourth Generation Chinese 
leadership, and its implications for economic and political reform. An analysis is made 
of the Chinese media, and the Internet in particular, in order to discover the role of the 
Internet in contemporary Chinese society and assess lohether television is able to 
survive. 
The CCP's media policies are discussed, showing how they contradict each other. 
While advocating more openness, the government's main priority is still to maintain 
strict control of the media and iron out dissent. The Internet, in particular, is seen by 
the Party as a dangerous and destabilising influence. 
The Chinese media, and especially television, have brought social, political and 
economic reform to China: increased democracy, more political openness and 
economic growth so great that China is noio the second largest economy in the world. 
The thesis concludes that this transformation is largely due to television-led reform, 
and that it is essential now for the Chinese leadership to release its media from state 
control. This will enable China to build on its economic grozvth and technological 
achievements and become recognised as a truly great world power. 
Media policy under President H u Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao is 
emblematic of one of the major contradictioris of the Fourth Generation 
leadership. On the one hand, the Hu-Wen team has committed its 
administration to the new ethos of transparency and responsibility, and the 
media has been touted as a prime vehicle to promote glasnost and popular 
supervision of the government. A t the same time, the Chinese Communist 
Party leadership's top priority is still to maintain socio-political stability and 
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snuff out dissent. A l l challenges to Beijing's stern one-party rule, including 
those emanating f r o m the press and the Internet, are seen as dangerous, 
destabilising agents [Dong, 2004:166]. 
Particularly during the first year after coming to power at the 16th CCP 
Congress of November 2002, Politburo stalwarts including Hu , Wen, and Li 
Changchun have issued tolerant and liberal instructions to the media, and 
since the SARS crisis, officials at all levels have been told not to hide the news, 
including potentially embarrassing facts and figures. The official media have 
been encouraged to bring corruption and allied administrative ills out into the 
daylight. 
This concluding chapter examines the media policy of the Fourth Generation 
leadership, as wel l as the implications for the future of economic reform, and 
political reform in particular. Emphasis is placed on how the Hu-Wen team 
addresses the challenge of the globalisation of the media and the challenge of 
the Internet, as wel l as the commercialisation of electronic and media units. 
This chapter also looks at the overseas public relations aspect of Beijing's 
media policy, including the way that the CCP leadership responds to, and 
tries to influence, any China-related reporting in the Western as wel l as the 
Hong Kong media. 
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Untangling the net: The Internet's effect on China's consensus and stability 
A n economy which had a large share of its output controlled by its country's 
government; a command economy wherein the state dictated the level of 
production goals, how prices were to be controlled, and how resources were 
to be allocated; a centrally planned economy which once pooled its 
households into large communities, and undertook large-scale investments 
both in human and physical resources, in order to support rapid 
industrialisation [Brahm, 2002:197]: this was the China of yesterday. These 
steps were taken to instil independence i n the Chinese economy, i n the sense 
that i t would only need to import goods that were beyond the range of its 
maximum production capacity. Government plcins, however, d id not work as 
well as they had expected [Chang, 2002: 35]. Policies implemented by the 
government kept the country's economy at stagnant and relatively inefficient 
levels, and competition was simply not present. Profit incentives were at their 
best meagre, whereas controls placed on production and prices caused 
distortions i n the economy. A centrally plaiuied economy, China had l iving 
standards that were substantially lower than those of most other countries. 
Rising f rom the bottom of the economic ladder, China has now become the 
second largest economy in the world, w i th predictions that i t w i l l surpass the 
United States by 2020 [SAS, 2005:92]. As of the year 2000, China's contribution 
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to global GDP growth, in terms of purchasing power parity, has been bigger 
than that of the U.S. and more than half as big as the combined contributions 
of India, Brazil and Russia, which are the three next largest economies. With 
the decade of economic development has come the emergence of the Internet 
as a social force in China. It is a sure fact that economic openness and 
prosperity in China's reform era has led to the expansion of social 
organisations and social groups that provide a variety of purposes and 
functions in China's ever-changiag society. Coinciding w i t h this is the 
commercialisation of the media industry, which has generated a brand-new 
audience and substantially enlarged the public sphere that is essential to the 
growth of society. 
In the advent of a vast array of speculation as well as criticism, this 
concluding chapter aims to further analyse the Chinese media, and the 
Internet in particular, i n order to discover the role of the Internet in modern 
Chinese society and how television can survive. W i l l the Internet be included 
in the tightly controlled official media system? To what extent have the 
Internet and the digitalised media challenged the traditional understanding of 
consensus and stability? 
In a society that has been under authoritarian rule and had limited 
information, the Internet has helped give social groups a voice and has helped 
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empower the individual Chinese person, giving the public not only the right 
to be heard but access to relevant information, and this has accelerated the 
change in Chinese society. 
The Internet in China 
The Internet is defined as a computer network consisting of a worldwide 
network of computer networks that use the TCP/IP network protocols to 
facilitate data transmission and exchange [Answers.com]. I t has 
revolutionised the world , taking communication to the next level. It started as 
a database support for the United States military, in order to break through 
conventional communication methods and regulatory frameworks and enable 
information to f low freely. Cyberspace on the other hand is defined as the 
electronic medium of computer networks in which online communication 
takes place [World Net Search]. Information that is uploaded in this network 
can easily be found in cyberspace by using complex and powerful search 
engines. This makes information literally at the finger tips of the user. I t 
comes as no surprise that more and more people are becoming fascinated by 
this technological breakthrough, even in China. 
One of the characteristics of this juggernaut is that it has transformed the 
traditional concept of space through combining and changing political and 
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geographic boundaries. I t does not matter where someone is or what 
nationality one is; given the proper cormectivity and sufficient technology, 
information has been more attainable than ever. Furthermore, i t has helped 
empower individuals to bypass conventional regulatory mechanisms [Tai, 
2006: 83]. What used to be a very expensive phone call or a very long wait for 
a letter has been totally revolutionised by the Internet. I t is a brand new realm 
through which people can communicate wi th ease at the touch of a button. 
Because of this improved technology, governments of every nation have 
needed to make a much greater effort to regulate information. 
Chinese official understanding of consensus and stability 
If a state can control society's communication processes, i t can 
structure the symbolic environment i n such a way that citizens w i l l 
be more likely to accept that state's political order as legitimate. 
There w i l l be fewer challenges to the state's rule and citizens might 
even be encouraged to identify affirmatively w i t h state rule, and 
citizens might even be encouraged to identify affirmatively and 
enthusiastically wi th state goals. 
[Lynch, 1999: 2] 
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This is the main justification China has used for centuries for t rying to 
regulate the flow of information. Chinese leaders have tried to control the 
communication process in Chinese society, because they believe that 
controlling the way that their citizens think greatly assists in stabilising the 
nation. This concept, that the state has the right and the responsibility to 
manage the way its citizens think, was f i rmly established in China when the 
Communist Party was established. This is evident f rom one of the theoretical 
journals published in November 1960: 
If the entire nation possesses a uniform ideology and if the nation is 
unified by the thought of Mao-Tse Tung, then i t w i l l enjoy unified 
actions. If a nation of 700 mill ion people does not possess a uniform 
ideology, then it w i l l be generally scattered sand. The ideologies of 
the entire populace can only be unified w i t h the power of the 
thought work of Mao-Tse Tung. 
[Lynch, 1999:18] 
Instilling a proper mindset in the minds of Chinese citizens has been achieved 
through the use of propaganda materials and by controlling the media. The 
media have to function under the Party's apparatus and are responsible for 
educating the masses and disseminating ideology [Tsui, 2001:17]. Under 
Communism, the role of the media was very different f rom that of other 
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countries. In China, the function of the media is to ensure the loyalty and 
unity of the organisation's members, to enforce not only correct thinking but 
also correct behaviour. 
Vertical communication in the age of television and newspapers 
The f low of messages during the early years of the People's Republic of China 
was distinctly top-down, meaning that the emphasis was placed on creating a 
mass media and telecommunications system that could relay orders 
hierarchically f rom the central governing station to the citizens [Lee, 2000: 
122]. I t indicated that information was highly centralised, as the public 
received the news already altered i n a way that supported the decisions of the 
government [Lee, 2003:165]. Information was edited and changed to match 
the "uniform ideology" of China [Lull , 1991: 98]. The hierarchy was arranged 
thus: State Council - Administrations - Provincial Governments - Bureaux -
Township Governments [Lieberthal, 1995: 42]. 
However, w i t h the rise of technological advances, such as the Internet, the 
control that Chinese leaders wish to retain is being undermined. "Thought 
Work", the struggle to control the communication flows [Lynch, 1999: 2], is 
still evident in China today. There is a struggle between the government and 
society as to who can impose order and content upon the circulation of 
information, and this struggle is causing the nation to change. The Party has 
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effectively established a powerful network for controlling the conventional 
media sectors, including national and local television and all printed 
publications. Neither Wang Dan, student leader on Tiananmen Square, nor L i 
Hongzhi, the Grand Master of the Falungong, could never own one of the 
media or even just appear on mainstream television. However, the Internet 
has changed this as i t can bypass this vertical communication and all the 
Party-assigned gatekeepers that the government regards as the necessary 
elements for a stable nation. 
China's stand on the Internet 
Methods of governing through newspapers and radio contributed greatly to 
the strategies for television news. Maoism is still part of the Party's 
philosophy which directs the People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency and CCTV. 
However, H u and Wen are alone in seeking the right strategy for the Internet. 
Despite all the dangers that the Internet brings, China under Jiang Zemin's 
period embraced this technological breakthrough for two main reasons. First, 
the authorities believed that the Internet could serve as the new engine of 
economic acceleration and productivity [Tai, 2006: 82]. Both President Jiang 
Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji were engineers in their early careers and, like 
many of their engineer colleagues in Chinese politics, they had used GDP 
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growth as the main yardstick for all their policies. As discussed earlier, China 
has been an economic juggernaut over the past decade and the Chinese 
authorities were confident that China could maintain its leading position 
among other nations in the pace of economic growth, right into the new 
millennium. They beheved that this could be achieved wi th the help of 
technology, and this explains why information and communication 
technologies have been granted a central place in China's national 
development strategy. The Party believed in the use of technology to enhance 
the access to and delivery of government services to benefit citizens, business 
partners and employees. 
Second, authorities believed that w i th proper filtering, the Internet could 
create a "cyber environment" that would contain all the public information 
thought suitable for the Chinese people to see. As mentioned earlier, the 
Chinese government believes in the power of propaganda. Though not ideal, 
the government wishes to be able to filter the Internet so that i t w i l l only 
contain the information that i t wants citizens to see, but the government w i l l 
soon f ind this to be too ambitious because amateur writers such as bloggers 
can be more productive than the officially approved party journalists. The 
Party is initially hoping that a well-developed and well-regulated Internet can 
work to its advantage in strengthening its grip on power and its capacity to 
win popular support. "The strategy is to produce our own content (Xinhua 
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News Agency, People's Daily and CCTV) and l imi t other news sources" [Tsui, 
2001:17]. As they d id earlier w i th radio and television, the Chinese leaders 
hope to make the Internet work for them by transforming it into a new form 
of medium, through which an average Chinese citizen can get his daily dose 
of government-approved information. 
It comes as no surprise that China has implemented numerous actions and 
several policies to regulate the use of the Internet. In order to achieve its two 
main goals, China has been trying to censor the information super-highway 
by means of regulation and filtering. "China's Internet-filtering regime is the 
most sophisticated effort of its kind in the world" [Internet Filtering in China 
in 2004-2005: A Country Study 2006]. It involves a large number of state 
agencies and thousands of personnel to censor content transmitted through 
different systems such as web pages, web-logs, on-line discussion forums, 
bulletin board systems and e-mail messages. On the macro level, China has 
started the "Great Firewall" movement, whereby all Internet communications 
coming in and going out of China are required to pass through a number of 
major Chinese networks, and this allows the government to l imit , control and 
observe the information being sent over the Internet [Interviews wi th SCIO 
Officials]. This allows the People's Republic of China (PRC) to be largely 
successful i n regulating Chinese computer networks into a controlled 
information environment, according to what they deem ideal. On the micro 
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level, there is a Chinese saying: "Ki l l the chicken to scare the monkey." The 
Government officials are notoriously selective in enforcing regulations 
spurned by the Chinese bureaucracy. The government does this by regulating 
individual users by requiring them to be registered wi th the Public Security 
Bureau, the republic police system, constantly reminding them that they are 
being watched and that violating these set laws would warrant them severe 
punishments. 
The rise of the Internet and the decline of television 
China's interest in the Information Revolution has been clearly supported by a 
number of government and party officials, starting i n the 1980s. I t gained 
strong support because both conservatives and reformers agreed that this 
"class neutral technology" was needed to close the gap between its Asian 
neighbours and the Western wor ld [Tsui, 2001:15]. The rise of the Internet in 
China is parallel w i t h that of the West, its growth is simultaneous w i t h the 
technological advances of Western nations. The history of the Internet in 
China has three basic levels [Tai, 2006: 82]. The first is the use of the e-mail 
between 1987 and 1994. This was only available to a few scientific research 
institutes, and so the public still had no access to it. The next phase was the 
development of research and education networks, where i t lasted for two 
years only, f rom 1994 to 1995. Here the Chinese Academy of Science and the 
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Chinese Committee of Education created the China Science and Technology 
Network (CSTNET) and the China Education and Research Network 
(CERNET) respectively. Both agencies aimed to provide communication 
services for their research institutes and universities. From this point, the 
Chinese Internet began its involvement wi th the international community. 
The final stage was commercial use, which began in 1995 and still continues. 
The government established its first public network, China Net, which 
allowed the public to access the Internet. After that, other networks were 
launched, all geared to give Chinese users access to websites and to provide 
faster and better services to the masses. 
As of today China has the second largest number of Internet users after the 
United States [SAS 2005 and Official Data, www.scio.gov.cn]. According to 
the China Internet Network Information Centre (CINIC)'s 18th Statistical 
Survey Report on Internet Development in China 2006, there were 123 mill ion 
Internet users as of June 2006. The nation currently has 54.5 mil l ion computer 
hosts and 788,400 worldwide websites. The average bandwidth is 214,175 
megabytes per second, which indicates that the government is trying to 
provide people w i t h improved and faster Internet services. The top four most 
frequently used services are news, search engines, e-mails and BBS, 
community forum. The use of blogs is currently rising, and is now at 23.7%. 
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as Figures in Table 11.1 can be easily understood in the way that the Internet, 
preferred provider of information, is expanding while television is declining. 
On more than several occasions the whole nation has had to access the 
Internet for news while television was stating that nothing had happened. 
Among the serious cases, 9/11 and SARS were the most significant. CCTV 
gave no coverage of the breaking news in New York on 11 September 2001 for 
nearly 48 hours. People were so scared and eager to f ind out how the attacks 
had happened and what the consequences would be in relation to China. The 
Sina.com and Sohu.com websites provided news services access around the 
clock and they were dubbed "Chinese C N N on the web". During the first 
month of SARS, people in the northern part of the country heard the first 
piece of news about SARS, not f rom CCTV or the People's Daily, but f rom the 
Internet and mobile phone text messages associated wi th some of the portal 
websites [Dong, 2003c: 75]. 
Table 11.1 
News consumpHon patterns in China 2001 and 2006, Beijing residents 
Medium Percentage(%) 2001 Percentage (%) 
2006 
Local newspapers {Beijing Evening 
Neivs) 
29 19 
National newspapers 9 3 
National television (CCTV) 34 22 
Alternative news networks (Phoenix 
TV) 
3 y 
Portal websites (news.sina.com.cn) 2 21 
News magazines (Chinese Neivsiueek) 6 7 
Radio 12 11 
Text-message service 0 2 
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Source: "~ 
2001 and 2006 Annual surveys of audiences, conducted by the Department of 
Propaganda, Beijing CCP Committee and Qianlong Nezus 
Effect of the new media: Will the same methods of control work? 
I t is not surprising that the Internet has broken down the norms and 
regulations of the traditional ways of thinking i n China, as wel l as the way of 
managing news in the Party. Despite the numerous regulations implemented 
by the government in censoring the Internet, it cannot completely prevent the 
viewing on the Internet of information that contradicts its ideology. 
Technology enables people to do what they like, which explains why 
thousands of Chinese users have found loopholes in the system to bypass the 
regulatory framework set by the PRC. Proxy servers, alternative hosts and 
peer-to-peer networking are among the methods used in China to cheat the 
system. I n doing so, the average Chinese citizen is able to get hold of 
information never accessible before. 
Politics 
A t one time in China, the only information to which the Chinese public were 
allowed access had first been modified by the government to suit the image i t 
wished to project for its own purposes. This has changed w i t h the coming of 
the Internet, which has made the circulation of information easier than ever 
before, and created the opportunity for Chinese users not only to obtain raw, 
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genuine information but, more importantly, help them express their opinions 
on important issues of interest. The Internet represents the vital charmels of 
communication in a civilised society, through which individuals and groups 
can become informed about issues, discuss and debate them autonomously, 
and ultimately have an impact on policy agenda. 
Through international websites and private pages, Chinese people can access 
an abundant supply of news. Unlike before, users are able to experience the 
liberty of f inding out what is really happening in the wor ld and in China. In 
turn, through bullet board services, blogs and chat rooms, users are able to 
comment and voice their opinions on these topics. These sites have in fact 
become a barometer for politicians and government officials, enabling them to 
gauge public opinion and make changes accordingly [Liu, 2004:145]. 
A n example of this change in Chinese politics can be seen in the story of Sun 
Zhigang. Sun was a 27 year old college student who was stopped by the local 
police on his way to an Internet cafe. When Sun could not show his 
temporary resident ID permit to the police, he was sent to a detention centre. 
While there, he became sick and was taken to a penitentiary hospital, where 
he was beaten to death by inmates and employees. The story was written up 
by a local newspaper reporter, though sadly not unti l a month later, but i t was 
published locally and then hi t the Internet globally. People who caught this 
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story voiced their anger through the Internet, and as more and more people 
caught the news and expressed their outrage, i t put pressure on the Chinese 
officials to catch the criminals behind this atrocity. The author was presenting 
morning news f rom 6.00 to 8.00 am at this time on (CCTV?). Presenters were 
ordered not to televise any news on the Sun case by more than one senior 
editor, but they changed their stance and directed that the story be in the 
morning news bulletin. The author went into history as the first television 
journalist to have covered this sensitive story. As an insider of the national 
television, I could feel the pressure on us f rom the Internet and the Hong 
Kong based 24 hour news channel Phoenix Television. The dozen culprits 
were captured and immediately sentenced to death. Moreover, China's State 
Council terminated its administrative measures that had been in place for 
years on the custody and detention of vagrants in Chinese cities. 
Though still insignificant, Chinese people now have a voice in society. If this 
story had hi t the news a few years back, the government would have tried to 
hush i t up, and the angry Chinese citizens would have had no medium 
through which to express their disapproval. The Chinese citizen now has the 
power to influence how government officials ought to behave and what 
policies they should implement or remove. Though i t is still l imited by 
various rules and regulations, the online public sphere has become an 
248 
important indicator of public opinion and sentiment. For an authoritarian 
regime that does not care about public opinion, the Internet has in many cases 
provided the only forum for checking the pulse of mass opinion. 
Culture 
Brand new information is taking shape on the Internet. Apart f rom politics, 
the Internet has been able to circulate all kinds of information into and out of 
China, and this includes the globalisation of the media. A n increasing number 
of media products f rom other cultures are penetrating the Chinese symbolic 
enviroiunent as the country becomes ever more tightly linked to the highly 
automated, worldwide commimications web. The process is much easier than 
it had previously been through television and publications; i t always takes a 
long time to get the SARFT or SAPP's final consent for importing a 
programme or a book. Western irtfluence has been slowly creeping into the 
Chinese community and the worldwide web is one of the reasons behind this. 
Chinese students in urban areas now know far more about American movies, 
television shows and even international athletes. Gone are the days when 
people would only wear traditional blue suits, and bicycles were the only 
form of transport i n the streets. These days, catching a young teenager 
wearing Jack Jones and seeing a Chinese businessman r iding a Mercedes Benz 
would no longer surprise anyone. As the cultures of many nations slowly 
enter China, the globalised belief system could inch its way into the minds of 
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Chinese citizens and possibly influence them to veer away f r o m the PRC's 
control and pursue a more liberated lifestyle for themselves and for the 
nation as a whole. 
The Internet has also changed the traditional role of the conventional media 
Chinese life. Marketization of the mass media in China has pushed the media 
ever closer to the edge of the market. Numerous portal sites i n the country 
have teamed up w i t h national and local media in sharing iriformation sources, 
making i t quicker and easier to spread the news. These stories are no longer 
limited by geographic location in reaching potential audience members. The 
reports that interest people, such as social events and human interest stories, 
are what more and more reporters publish now that readers have the power 
to choose what articles to read and which websites to browse. Careful 
tracking of the popular websites that Chinese users visit also indicates what 
sort of information interests them. From complete dependence on state 
subsidies to increasing dependence on commercial revenue f rom advertising, 
sponsorships and business operations in other areas [Zhao, 1998: 67], media 
institutions can now produce more stories that cater for the taste of their 
audiences and not what the government demands. 
Social 
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The Internet has changed the arena of social interaction in a number of ways. 
The changes could easily be understood in political and ideological terms by 
the Party. First, the Internet has created a new platform whereby the public 
can express their opinions on just about anything. I t is a gathering place 
where people share their respective views and debate. I n doing so, i t has 
paved the way for a number of Chinese Internet users to be exposed to the 
opinions of their fellow Internet users. This brings people together in a public 
agora, to voice their concerns and share their hopes. This is why the people's 
control of this public agora is perhaps the most fundamentcil political issue 
raised by the development of the Internet. 
Similarly, the Internet has also made it possible for the users to f ind people 
who share their interests. I t has been a new avenue where Chinese people can 
meet new friends and talk about issues of common interest. Technology has 
allowed users to share information in more ways than one. Sending pictures, 
songs and videos are some of the ways that the Chinese online users interact 
wi th one another. Wi th these technological advances, users are better able to 
express themselves, and this encourages an ever-growing number to use the 
information highway. From serious political views to simple hobbies, the 
Internet has made i t possible for the public to congregate and engage in 
discourse. 
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Mass public participation is another area revolutionised by the Internet. 
Unlike other types of media, the worldwide web has attracted active 
participation f rom an increasing number of people. Television and radio can 
also broadcast information widely, but Internet users can easily respond and 
at the same time use the same medium to express their own ideas. Its user-
friendliness and accessibility has encouraged the public to accept the Internet 
as a new channel through which they can contribute to society. 
Democratisation - Does the Internet promote more freedom than television? 
The Internet does indeed promote more freedom, because i t helps to release 
the information that the public ought to see without the regulatory 
gatekeepers of television news. It has been said that information is meant to 
be free [Tsui, 2001: 67]. The Internet was invented as a project to defy 
information control by the state, and distribute the power of control to all 
[Tai, 2006:180]. The vertical communication of the old Communism is being 
eroded in China today. Along w i t h other media, the Internet has provided a 
means of vertical communication, allowing greater discussion among citizens. 
The anti-control nature of the Internet brings the hope of democratising 
production and dissemination of information to the Chinese people as more 
and more information gets spread to a growing user base in ways that were 
not possible before. 
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However, the Internet alone cannot solve many of the persisting problems in 
establishing democracy. The Internet w i l l not democratise China, but rather 
the Internet is democratising communication in China. It is what the Chinese 
people do wi th the information they receive which w i l l determine whether a 
political democracy w i l l ever come about in China. While on this topic the 
question, "What do the Chinese people do w i t h the new information they 
receive?" should be asked. 
The eyes of the Chinese people are slowly being opened wi th the help of the 
Internet, rather than the conventional formats of television and newspaper. 
Mentioned earlier, the key characteristic of the Internet is its spacelessness, 
and it is thus able to bridge the former obstacles of geography and social 
structures. Each person is being empowered w i t h this raw, unedited 
information. Blogs are being created in which personal sentiments are 
expressed for others to see, and they contain all kinds of ideas, pro-China or 
not. Through the help of the Internet more and more people are able to f ind 
others who have the same interests as their own, and fo rm groups and 
societies that were impossible before. Bullet board services and community 
chat rooms are the more popular choices for this type of action. BBS allows 
users to offer opinions on various topics posed by someone. There, people can 
read different opinions, all based around a single topic and this highlights the 
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diversity of Chinese individuals. Chat rooms on the other hand are avenues 
of direct communication, person to person, and are based on real time, as one 
person waits for the other to respond. 
Furthermore, the Internet promotes continuing debate and analysis on these 
various topics. Chinese people are now able to give their opinion on the 
current issue at hand. The stimulation of critical thinking is made possible 
through the use of the Internet. Blogs, chat rooms and BBS are used as places 
where Chinese citizens are not only able to read and absorb information, but 
also as a venue where they can set out their own thoughts and views. Gone 
are the days when the public would just accept news reports as presented. In 
this day and age, the Chinese individual's voice can be heard. 
As discussed in this chapter, the Internet has changed Chinese society. It has 
been seen that the traditional understanding of Chinese stability and 
consensus has diminished as each Chinese citizen has been given the power 
to hear and be heard through the more diversified media. I t has severely 
challenged the traditional understanding of consensus and stability by forcing 
the government to make changes in its roles in order to accommodate this 
new found "power" that the average Chinese citizen now possesses. 
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The People's e-Republic of China: The future of press and politics in China 
It took the CCP nearly a century to cope wi th the rapid development of 
television. Strategies for directing television news are a combination of the 
Maoist Party rules and those of Deng and Jiang to control the media, while 
developing the media at the same time. It w i l l not give H u and Wen the 
chance to have a nice, long break by entering the new media age. Challenges 
are not merely provided by the Internet. Mobilised by the Internet, television, 
newspapers, radio and magazines are all empowered w i t h new looks and a 
fashionable presentation. Driven by the growing commercialisation, television 
w i l l rely less and less on the government's financial support. I f we think back 
to the government's four ways of controlling the media, we w i l l see why i t 
has been so hard to achieve. 
First, regarding laws and regulations, i t appears that the Party is still very 
nervous about introducing new laws and regulations into the media and 
communication sectors. Their primary concern is whether their unconditional 
control through the "Thought Work" regime w i l l be challenged. The problem 
now is that no specific person has challenged the Party, while the Party is 
actually challenged by the newly-emerged media technologies. 
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Second, standards and values, formerly used to control the media, are more 
relaxed than ever before. Even the majority of journalists serving in the 
traditional media, including television and newspapers, are uncertain of the 
political ideology and it w i l l be even harder to set publicly agreed standards 
and values for the providers of online information. 
Third, structural management can only be achieved in the national media 
organisations directly supervised by the CDP. Senior personnel are still 
appointed by the CCPCC, CDP and the SARFT. It is, however, a different case 
for the fu l ly - and semi-commercialised media sectors now. People on the 
board who invested greatly i n the media would defend their rights to satisfy 
their interests. Even the SARFT is not capable of recognising whether all the 
on-air productions are produced by a SARFT registered person who has been 
approved by the Party and government. 
Finally, economic tools are still useful, but have limited functions. These have 
changed more quickly than the CCP had expected and the majority of media 
institutions are now operated as businesses, and struggling to make better 
profits for their investors. Senior members of national and provincial 
television were sent to study at the prestigious business schools in Harvard 
and Oxford, as well as to the short executive courses for business and 
financial managers at the Peking and Tsinghua Universities. The market 
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economy has automatically driven the media firms to become more 
globalised, although it may not actually represent the majority of people's 
mterests. 
Hu and Wen's governing capability is evaluated: Is the change for better or 
for worse? 
Although i t is true that access to the Internet is not egalitarian, 
universal and unfettered, and rational debates have not become 
the norm on the Net, there is no denying that the Internet has 
already transformed the traditional communication landscape by 
making information already available to a variety of social groups 
that otherwise would be off limits without the Internet. 
[Tai, 2006:183] 
Indeed the traditional Chinese understanding of consensus and stability is 
slowly diminishing. Through numerous kinds of technological breakthrough 
each individual is being empowered wi th the chance to be heard and to speak 
out their own opinions. This change is good for China. Giving each citizen a 
voice is healthy for a developing country. It is also necessary for the Party to 
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be aware of people's concerns and to sort out the problems at an early stage. 
The longer i t is left, the harder i t is to get issues sorted out i n a huge country 
like China. The party controlled media should serve as a dual carriageway, 
facilitating two-way communication between the Party and the people. Party 
journalism could blind the Party i f they are only to speak and never to listen. 
Different views allow Chinese officials to see the nation f r o m numerous 
perspectives, equipping them w i t h the proper knowledge to do what is 
necessary. Moreover, critical thinking helps a nation, by stimulating each 
person to react to a given situation. In doing so, a better solution can be 
reached because i t is tested by countless debates and deliberations, instead of 
just one small group of people making decisions for the whole nation. Human 
beings are meant to be free, each one has their own free w i l l and the new 
media policies i n China offer an avenue through which human beings can 
present their own ideas to other people. Without achieving this mission, 
regardless of having the world's fastest GDP growth, China w i l l never be 
fu l ly developed for the wellbeing of the people. • 
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Conclusion 
Knowing what the situation was i n the People's Republic of China when 
television was introduced in 1958 for the first time, one can appreciate the 
long way that television has come. Television emerged during a time when 
political power in China was strongest and i t offered a new way of governing 
and ensuring that everybody spoke and thought in the same way. The 
Communist Party of China had found a new tool to achieve its political goals. 
Since i t was introduced as a new part of the media, television in China has 
been used as party mouthpiece, w i t h CCTV as the centre f rom where the 
directives and decrees of the Party and government are echoed. Wi th the 
heavy hand of political control and the burden of government regulations, 
CCTV has played its part in Chinese politics, playing its role as an 
indispensable part of the Communist Party. 
Before China's reform and opening-up policy, CCTV could never have hoped 
to be anything other than a political branch of the Party, but wi th China's 
opening up CCTV could no longer resist television's natural urge to change in 
an environment which is open to the free f low of ideas. Even though the Party 
engaged in new tactics to cope w i t h the strong winds of change, CCTV has 
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adopted a relatively relaxed position and has developed f r o m being purely a 
party megaphone to a medium that also tries, despite challenges, to represent 
the public. In its own limited way CCTV has tried to force the Chinese 
authorities to achieve a certain level of accountability to citizens, i t has tried to 
encourage the Chinese people to point out government wrongdoing, and has 
empowered ordinary Chinese people to contribute ideas on how they should 
be governed. Through CCTV's numerous channels, Chinese people at all 
levels have contributed in various ways to their country's economy and 
politics by offering opinions and voicing their aspirations. 
I t goes without saying that the Party is not ready to let go of CCTV and allow 
the forces of the market dictate whether i t is good for the Chinese people or 
not. Having said that, the changes taking place in Chinese society since the 
opening up cannot be ignored. Little by little, if CCTV continues to be a 
platform for politics, i t w i l l lose the appeal that i t currently enjoys, because 
the transformation of the market economy taking place in China w i l l soon 
catch up w i t h it. Viewers w i l l eventually have alternative networks f r o m 
where they w i l l be able to access all they currently can f rom CCTV, but 
without the heavy dose of politics. 
A l l over the wor ld people always demand something more f r o m television; 
they dare networks to break the boundaries of innovation and try exploring 
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uncharted waters to satisfy their hunger for entertainment and information. 
Chinese people are no different, and as China continues to reform and open 
up, the public's expectation of what CCTV should offer w i l l grow and so w i l l 
their demands. Failure to provide and satisfy these demands w i l l send 
Chinese people to alternative media, including those offered by foreign 
countries. 
The market economy that is increasingly taking root in China is transforming 
society into one that seeks quality in the goods and services being offered. In 
business, people want to see more honesty and healthy competition, and i n 
governance they want the authorities to be more transparent and tolerant. The 
implications are that i t w i l l be impossible for CCTV to keep looking the other 
way and not reflect the quality and standards that the public want in their 
society. Already CCTV has to some extent demonstrated that it can produce 
news and programmes about what people want to see, but w i t h the continued 
entrenchment of market economy values i t w i l l become increasingly diff icul t 
for the Party to control the television network without running the risk of 
making i t unpalatable to viewers. 
Many Chinese people are now accessing the news and other information 
online. Although the government is making every effort through censorship 
to '"clean" the web of information that does not support its ideals, the 
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Internet is still proving to be the way forward as far as access to satisfactory 
information is concerned. If television continues to remain under party 
control and limits the information that the Chinese people want, i t w i l l not be 
long before the public w i l l watch CCTV and other controlled networks more 
out of habit than to be informed and entertained. Currently, CCTV has only 
fractionally taken advantage of the Internet to reach a new audience, 
especially the young. The longer CCTV takes to invest into this market, the 
more its effectiveness w i l l dwindle and CDP's control of information on 
behalf of the Party w i l l only be theoretical since there w i l l be hardly anyone 
watching television. CCP's failure to control the Internet as completely as it 
has done wi th the other media w i l l prove to be its failure to control 
information in China in general, because the young generation for whom the 
control is obviously meant rely on the Internet for their information 
The Thought Work system on which China depended to control the free f low 
of information is currently under serious threat. It has already been shown 
that wi th reform and opening up, systems of information control such as 
Thought Work, w i l l have to be thrown out and only be remembered for what 
they managed to achieve when China was still too afraid to let new ideas in. 
By reforming and opening up, China has taken the first step towards 
becoming a country in which citizens live freely and enjoy the liberty of 
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choosing what they want to hear, see and say. When the Party and the 
government finally set television and the rest of the media free, China w i l l 
take another important step towards becoming a truly liberated citizen of the 
global village. A l l that China w i l l need to do then is concentrate on adding to 
her established achievements in world technology and economic growth. 
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APPENDIX-I 
List of people interviewed for this thesis, 2000-
2005 
No. i Name i Media Organization/Department 
1 i Zhao Qizheng i S C I O 
2 i Cai Mingzhao 1 S C I O 
3 i Wang Guoqing 1 SCIO 
4 i Guo Weimin i S C I O 
5 j Yang Yang i S C I O 
6 i Hua Qing i S C I O 
7 1 Li Liyan 1 S C I O 
8 i Wang Xingming 1 SCIO 
9 1 Liu Gengyin 1 S C I O 
10 : Ma Hong i SCIO 
11 i Liu Xuan i S C I O 
12 i Liu Zhengrong i SCIO 
13 i Wei Zhengxin i SCIO 
14 i Shen Lu I SCIO 
15 i Shou Xiaoli 1 S C I O 
16 j Liu Jiang SCIO 
17 Zhu Yinghuang China Daily 
18 Zhou Xisheng Xinhua News Agency 
19 Li Jie Xinhua News Agency 
20 Yan Wenbin Xinhua News Agency 
21 Ju Mengjun Xinhua News Agency 
22 An Zhiping Xinhua News Agency 
23 Tian Wenquan Xinhua News Agency 
24 Chen Zengbin Xinhua News Agency 
25 Xiong Lei Xinhua News Agency 
26 Huang Yan Xinhua News Agency 
27 Shen Bohan Xinhua News Agency 
28 Jing Yidan C C f V News 
29 Bai Yansong C C T V News 
30 Liang Jianzeng C C T V News 
31 Zhang Jie C C T V News 
32 Chai Jing C C T V News 
33 Wen Jing C C T V News 
34 Li Ruiying C C T V News 
35 Kang Hui C C T V News 
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36 i Li Zimeng i C C T V News 
37 i WangZhiming j C C T V News 
38 i Pan Linhua i C C T V News 
39 j Chen Mang i C C T V News 
40 j Hujincao i C C T V News 
41 : DongQian i C C T V News 
42 j Wang Zhi j C C T V News 
43 j Liu Shunf a i C C T V News 
44 i Yuan 
j Zhengming 
i c c f v Business Channel 
45 1 Jiang Shiming j C C T V Business Channel 
46 i Lijiaming i C C T V Business Channel 
47 i Wang Xiaoya i C C T V Business Channel 
48 i Rui Chenggang j C C T V Business Channel 
49 : Wang Lifen i C C T V Business Channel 
50 j Chen Weihong i C C T V Business Channel 
51 i Ru Chen i C C T V Business Channel 
52 i Leijianjun 1 C C T V Business Channel 
53 i Chen Dahui 1 C C T V Business Channel 
54 i Wang Xiaolei ! C C T V Business Channel 
55 i Zhang Shuang i C C T V Business Channel 
56 i Liu Meihong i C C T V Business Channel 
57 i Sun Lili i C C T V Business Channel 
58 i Ma Bin i C C T V Business Channel 
59 i Xiang deli i C C T V Business Channel 
60 i MengBo i C C T V Business Channel 
61 i Luo Ming 1 C C T V 
62 j Wang Gennian i C C T V 
63 i ShengYUai j C C T V International 
64 i Fan Yun ! C C T V International 
65 j Yang Rui i C C T V International 
66 i Yang Li i C C T V International 
67 i Liu Lianxi ; CCTV.com 
68 j Yang Xiaoping i CCTV.com 
69 i Zhang Xinyu i CCTV.com 
70 1 Anonymousl 1 C C T V Human Resources 
71 i Anonymous2 1 C C T V Human Resources 
72 i AnonymousS 1 C C T V Human Resources 
73 i Anonymous4 i C C T V Human Resources 
74 i AnonymousS i C C T V Human Resources 
75 i Anonymous6 j C C T V Human Resources 
76 1 Anonymous? i C C T V Human Resources 
77 i AnonymousS 1 C C T V Human Resources 
78 1 Anonymous9 1 C C T V Human Resources 
79 i Anonymousl 0 j C C T V Human Resources 
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80 j Anonymousll i C C T V Accounting Department 
81 : Anonymousl2 I C C T V Accounting Department 
82 i Anonymousl3 1 C C T V Accounting Department 
83 1 Anonymousl4 i S A R F T 
84 1 AnonymouslS i SARFT 
85 j Anonymousl6 i SARFT 
86 i Anonymousl7 1S A R F T 
87 i AnonymouslS i S A R F T 
88 i Anonymousl9 i SARFT International Department 
89 i Anonymous20 i S A R F T Research 
90 1 Anonymous21 i S A R F T Research 
91 i Zhang Liang i B T V 
92 j Ma Hong i BTV 
93 i Liu Qi \ B T V 
94 i Wang Hui i B T V 
95 i Xu Tao i B T V 
96 i Zhong 
i Bingsong 
1 B T V 
97 i Liu Xun i B T V 
98 i Lei Lei i B T V 
99 i Tian Xiangping i B T V 
100 i Pang Zi \ B T V 
101 i Shen Lei i BTV 
102 i Ma Lili i B T V 
103 i Wu Jiang i B T V 
104 i Wujin i BTV 
105 i Chen Da Hong i B T V 
106 i Zhong Shan i B T V 
107 : Sun Wenjun i B T V 
108 : Li Xiaoping i B T V 
109 j Sun Zhen i B T V 
110 Zhang Siwen 1 B T V 
111 ; Liu Dandan i B T V 
112 Ma Junqi i BTV 
113 i Yu Liangzong 1 B T V 
114 • Zhang Daqi \ B T V 
115 Yu Hua i Shanghai T V 
116 Yin Fan 1 Shanghai T V 
117 Zhang Qing i Shanghai T V 
118 Zhang Jing i Shanghai T V 
119 Wang 
Duanduan 
i C C T V International 
120 Wang Zhou j C C T V International 
121 Xu Li i C C T V International 
122 Ouyang Qun i C C T V Taiwan 
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123 : WangShilin i C C T v International 
: Zhao Shuqing j Yunnan T V 
12i> i Zhang Qi i Yunnan T V 
i WangMaohang i Shenzhen T V 
I Liaoning T V 
1 Zhu Xuantong 1 c l f v 
i Kang Ning i c l ' f v 
i Jing Muyao i c l f v 
131 j Chen Li i c i f v 
132 \ Huang Bailian i C E T V 
133 i Liu Shuhang i C E T V 
134 i Chang Hong 1 c l f v 
: Deng Bin i c i f v 
i Lian Baojun i c i f v 
I Phoenix Television 
138 : Chen Luyu j Phoenix Television 
i Phoenix Television 
: Phoenix Television 
: Shen Liang j Phoenix Television 
i Phoenix Television 
i Phoenix Television 
144 i Phoenix Television 
i Phoenix Television 
146 Ma Dingsheng 1 Phoenix Television 
147 Dong Jiayao ! Phoenix Television 
Chen Fangzhu Zhejiang f v 
Li Xiufen iZhejiang f v 
Wang Hong Fujian 1V 
Kang Bo Fujian 1 V 
Wang Zijian Fujian 1V 
Shu Zhan Fujian TV 
lb4 Anonymous22 
Ibb : Anonymous23 C P D 
Ibb i Anonymous24 
157 i Anonymous25 
158 i Anonymous26 CPD 
159 i Anonymous27 C P D 
16U I Anonymous28 C P D 
161 : Anonymous29 C P D 
162 i AnonymousSO C P D 
163 j AnonymousSl C P D 
164 I Anonymous32 C P D 
16b i Anonymous33 C P D 
166 i Anonymous34 CPD 
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167 i Anonymous35 1 C P D 
1 Anonymous36 i S A R F T 
169 : Anonymous37 i SAPP 
j Anonymous38 i S APP 
i Anonymous39 1 SAPP 
j Yin Yungong 
j MingAnxiang ^^gg JQJ^g 
i Shi Tongyu i C A S S - i o j C S 
j Zhang Dan 
j FangNing i CASS-institute of Political Sciences 
177 j Hu Zhengrong 1 c u e (formerly the BBlj 
: Gao Xiaohong i c u e (formerly the BBI) 
I c u e (formerly ithe BBlj 
: Zhang i c u e (formerly the BBI) 
i Shaogang 
j Zhang Zhe i c u e (formerly the BBlj 
; Liu Liqun i c u e (formerly the BBIj 
183 j Cao Guofen 1 c u e (formerly the BBI) 
Zhu Yujim i c u e (formerly the BBlj 
Cai Wenmei i c u e (formerly the BBI) 
Deng Xinxin j c u e (formerly the BBI) 
Zhang Yuqiang i c u e (formerly the BBI) 
Xu Qinyuan 1 c u e (formerly the BBI) 
Liu Xiaoying i c u e (formerly the BBij 
190 Qin Fang i c u e (formerly the BBlj 
Zhu Yongchuan _ ^ (formerly the BBlj 
192 Liu He j c u e (formerly the BBlj 
Liu Jinan j c u e (formerly the BBlj 
Hu Suliu i c u e (formerly the BBlj 
19b i Ding Junjie 1 c u e (formerly the BBlj 
196 j Huang Shenmin c u e (formerly the BBI) 
197 : Hu Zhifeng ^ „ (formerly the BBij 
198 i Guo Zhenzhi Tsinghua University 
199 i Yin Hong Tsinghua University 
200 I Zhang Xiaoqin Tsinghua University/CCfv 
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APPENDIX-II 
Parallel Chronology : The evolution of television 
news and political development in China 
compiled according to this thesis 
P O L I T I C S 
"1921 
CCP's founding congress. 
T E L E V I S I O N 
1939 onwards 
From 1939, television attracts 
..?!^ ?D.M9?}..!?.1M.^ .9...^ ..?^ P leadership. 
1921 
CCP establishes policy of total media 
control at its founding congress. 
1955 
CCP's five-year development agenda 
for ideology & education is 
established. 
1955 
CCP's five-year development agenda 
includes proposal to set up Beijing 
Television (BTV). 
1958 
China joins USSR to compete wi th US 
over television development. 
1958 
Birth of Chinese television: 
1 May: Beijing Television (BTV) 
1 October: Shanghai Television 
20 December: Heilongjiang TV 
1958-61: Great Leap Forward era 
Politicians begin to realise the power 
of television as a means of control. 
Premier Zhou Enlai provides further 
financial support to BTV and takes 
detailed interest in its operations. 
Zhou Enlai introduces "pool 
reporting" and thus gives priority to 
television reporting, especially to 
BTV. 
Many provincial television stations 
are established in line w i t h the Great 
Leap Forward mood of the time. 
1958 onwards: 
Re BTV's bir th and development: 
Reaches radius of 25 k m max 
Revolutionary music & 
calligraphy 
Live broadcast debate 
Documentary 
Entertainment 
"News documentary era" begins: 
BTV's own news programmes, 
documentaries and live broadcasts 
First TV news presenter 
Provincial television stations required 
to submit news programmes to BTV 




Government approval given for 
educational programmes. 
March 1960: 
"Moving the blackboard": BTV 
introduces televised classes and 
Beijing Television University is 
founded, successfully followed by 
others. 
September 1960: 
Zhou Enlai invites BBC journalist 
Felix Green to conduct televised 
interview for external broadcast for 
the first time. 
November 1960: 
BBC broadcasts Zhou Enlai interview, 
the first time that Western audiences 
have formally heard and seen a 
Chinese leader; it hits wor ld 
headlines. 
1961 onwards: 
Zhou Enlai further realises the 
influence of television, and 
maximises its use for government 
purposes. 
Early government statement is made 
on global television policy: "Rooted 
in Beijing, facing the wor ld" (1963). 
1961: 
BTV reporters accompany Zhou Enlai 
on diplomatic tours abroad. 
BTV reporters go to Laos, Vietnam 
and North Korea to make 
documentaries. 
BTV's first overseas bureau 
established in Hanoi. 
1962: 
Unremitting natural disasters and 
Widespread poverty force CCP to: 
Cut television investments 
Stop import of television sets 
Power of television is realised by CCP 
with success of televised Ping Pong. 
CCP continues to support BTV. 
1962: 
Effects of cuts in CCP funding: 
Closed 40% of television stations 
Remaining ones on limited airtime 
BTV focus on weekend 
programmes 
BTV broadcasts live the 26* World 
Ping Pong Championships (1962) in 
Beijing. 
Its success results in BTV initiating 
sports and entertainment 
programmes. 
1966-1976: Cultural Revolution 
Mao and political elite use television 
in policy drive for Cultural 
Revolution. 
Gang of Four, seeing television's 
power and wi th clear political aims, 
decide to import colour television 
facilities. 
1966-1976: Cultural Revolution 
effects: 
BTV forced to "ban bad programmes" 
and support of CR w i t h updates on 
CR news, criticism of anti-
revolutionaries, and features 
promoting CR to children. 
July 1966: 
Government approval for BTV 
July 1966: 
BTV removes names of authors, 
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removal of names (and therefore any 
celebrity status) of television staff. 
editors, reporters, producers, etc f rom 
screen. 
August 1966: 
Mao receives Red Guards at 
Tiananmen Square, a ceremony 
which BTV is required to broadcast. 
August 1966 
BTV fails to re-broadcast Red Guards 
ceremony quickly. The public outcry 
forces i t to close on 31 December 
1966. 
December 1966: 
CCP sends PLA to seize control of 
State Administration of Broadcasting, 
and the Gang of Four take tight 
control. 
Early 1967: 
BTV re-opens: Ordinary programmes 
replaced w i t h government 
propaganda. 
Most airtime given to "model 
operas". 
1968 onwards: 
The Gang of Four urges Shanghai 
Television to play active role in fight 
against class enemies. 
But Gang of Four worried by public's 
heavy criticism of a brutal Class 
Struggle conference televised in 
March. 
1968: 
Shanghai Television introduces live 
televised Class Struggle cor\ferences. 
Audience disapproval at injustice and 
brutality forces a conference to close. 
Conferences are no longer broadcast 
live and need prior official approval. 
CCP influenced by West through 
Mao's renewal of diplomatic talks to 
further China's international 
relations. 
1971: 
BTV introduces foreign ballet and 
opera in line wi th Class Struggle 
ideology, unti l they offend the Gang 
of Four. 
US President Nixon's state visit to 
China, wi th Dr Henry Kissinger. 
1972: 
Chinese journalists covering Nixon's 
visit notice huge gap between their 
technology and that of US journalists. 
The Chinese leadership are now able 
to finance the project to convert 
television to colour throughout 
China. 
October 1973: 
BTV starts broadcasting in colour. 
January 1976: 
Death of Zhou Enlai: Gang of Four 
use minimum television coverage to 
belittle his influence. A public outcry 
ensues. 
January 1976: 
Gang of Four order BTV to broadcast 
ordinary programmes and model 
operas, nothing to honour Zhou 
Enlai. 
Arrest, trial and imprisonment of 
Gang of Four, w i th huge public 
approval. 
1976: 
CCP orders BTV to broadcast trial of 
Gang of Four. BTV can show 
forbidden programmes on Zhou 




Under Chairman Hua Guafeng, the 
government takes a new direction, 
triggering many developments in 
Chinese television. 
1976 onwards: 
BTV tests mood for political change 
wi th many innovations: brings back 
foreign programmes and films, 
traditional Chinese opera, 
programmes about love and romance; 
produces documentaries w i th true 
stories and real people, educational 
programmes and eight drama series; 
initiates the Spring Festival Variety 
Show. 
State Administration of Broadcasting 
(SAB) builds on 1971 discussions 
under Mao to transfer television 
signals around China. 
SAB also discusses the quality of 
television news around China 
July 1976: 
Birth of XWLB {Xin Wen Lian Bo) or 
The United Primetime Nezvs. Using 
signal transfers, this programme 
gathered up all breaking news 
around China, then broadcast on 
XWLB throughout China. Presented 
by an attractive young woman. After 
this, BTV organised all regional and 
local news programmes. 
May 1978: 
Central government renames BTV as 
China Central Television (CCTV), 
having noted its national importance. 
May 1978: 
With its renaming, CCTV now comes 
under direct control of CCPCC as 
well as SAB, meaning less freedom. 
Deng Xiaoping US visit is broadcast 
to Chinese public. He accepts the US 
offer to provide China wi th the latest 
satellite television technology. 
Television f rom now on shows its 
huge influence in social, economic 
and political reform and 
development. 
1979: 
Simultaneously, CCTV broadcasts US 
science and technology 
documentaries. Chinese audiences 
see the 1969 Apollo moon landing for 
the first time. Deng Xiaoping's US 
visit broadcasts have huge influence 
on Chinese, introducing them to 
modern Western life, resulting in 
their demand for lifestyle choices. 
Commercial advertising on television 
approved by CDP. 
January 1979: 
Shanghai Television and Guangdong 
Television showed the first 
commercial advertisements, followed 
by CCTV. 
This financed innovation in 
programme making, and more staff 
were recruited. 
State Administration of Broadcasting 
replaced by State Administration of 
1981-83: 
Guangdong Television (GTV) sets up 
Pacific Audio Visual Company to 
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Radio and Television, television 
sharing an equal place wi th radio and 
seen as a new way of popular 
governing. 
produce programmes for export. 
GTV's other major innovations were: 
A localised, entertainment channel 
Interactive, lunchtime news 
A wide-reaching Cantonese 
charmel 
1983-1992: 
CCTV journalists still all CCP-
selected and follow party line. Deng 
Xiaoping told the Party to "seek truth 
f rom facts" 
CCP appreciates the power and 
facility they indirectly have to govern 
by supporting CCTV's innovations 
and reforms. 
1983-92: 
Television is now centre stage. 
From 1979 onwards, CCTV initiated 
new types of programme, w i t h which 
audience could interact: 
Tackling social problems 
Negative news 
Watchdog programmes 
Thus changed government policies. 
Also introduced televised lectures 
1983: 
State Ministry of Radio and 
Television sets up Four Level 
Television as a means of governing. 
Local and municipal governments 
given budgets to run their own 
television stations. 
1983-1987: 
Four Level Television resulted in 
growth f rom 20 to 336 television 
stations throughout China. 
Television overtakes radio in 
importance and audience size. 
1985: 
National People's Congress given 
round-the-clock coverage by CCTV. 
CCP gives approval to CCTV for live, 
interactive television interviews, as 
maturity in political understanding 
w i l l bring about the social, economic 
and political development of China. 
1985: 
CCTV televises live interviews wi th 
political leaders at National People's 
Congress. Offers hotline for audience 
to ring in w i t h questions, forming a 
bridge between leaders and people. 
CCTV & CCP learn together, and 
CCTV assists leadership in media 
literacy. 
1992: 
Ministry of Radio and Broadcasting 
Yearbooks 1949-2005 show that a 
worldwide television network was 
seen as integral to national strategy. 
In line wi th Deng Xiaoping's call for 
more openness in politics, this places 
greater emphasis on news broadcasts. 
1993: 
Shanghai Television (SOT) establishes 
a commercial channel, without any 
state funding. News remains core 
strategy, but in new formats. 
1993: 
CCP approves CCTV reforms. In 1995 
the Standing Committee of Politburo 
shows its approval by invit ing media 
minister to discuss development of 
1993: 
CCTV seeks reform of its own news 
programmes, including introduction 
of Oriental Horizon, a breakfast news 
programme, for the first time 
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radio and television, offering 
assistance and solving set-backs. 
including news commentary. 
Executive producers have f u l l 
political and financial control over the 
programme. 
Since 2000: 
Party praises CCTV's Focus Report, 
describing i t as the "alternative 
government reception desk". 
March 1993: 
CCTV starts 12 news bulletins a day. 
Introduces cutting-edge programmes 
Nexus Probe and Focus Report. 
1993-2003: 
Party approval of commercialisation 
of the media results in widespread 
media reform and gradual change in 
social, economic and political 
attitudes. 
1993-2003: 
Widespread changes throughout the 
Chinese media, as a result of media 
commercialisation. 
2001: 
China Corporation of Radio, Film and 
Television is formed by 
amalgamating all broadcasting 
institutions to compete on the 
international market. 
2001: 
CCTV and CCP have by now both 
realised that in order to compete wi th 
Western media giants its national 
television needs to offer good quality 




Great Leap Forward 
The term Great Leap Forward was given to an economic plan initiated by 
Mao Zedong between 1958 and 1963. This project aimed to take advantage of 
China's large population to rapidly transform the country f rom a 
predominantly agrarian economy into a modern agriculturalised and 
industrialised society. His vision was to modernise China's economy so that it 
would rival that of the US by 1988. 
The Great Leap Forward failed and i t caused widespread famine in China, 
which resulted in the deaths of millions of people. Failure of the plan also 
forced Mao to resign as head of state in 1959 and later i n 1960 the plan was 
abandoned. 
Cultural Revolution 
In 1966, about seven years after resigning because of the failed Great Leap 
Forward, Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural 
Revolution was Mao's idea of getting r id of people in the Chinese Communist 
Party and in Chinese society who were deemed to be emerging as a privileged 
class in China. 
Mao's strategy in bringing about the Cultural Revolution was to mobilise 
students and young workers as his Red Guards to attack members of the 
Communist Party who were alleged to be liberal bourgeoisie elements. 
The Cultural Revolution plunged China into social and political chaos, 
leading to economic problems that lingered until 1976, when the Cultural 
Revolution finally ended. 
Gang of Four 
The term Gang of Four refers to a faction that was formed during the Cultural 
Revolution led by Jiang Qing, Mao's third and last wife. Other members of 
the Gang of Four included Zhang Chunqioa, Yao Wenyuan and Wang 
Hong wen. 
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The four had their own political ambitions and they used Mao's name to 
implement their plans by victimising other party members who disagreed 
wi th them or were viewed as a threat during the Cultural Revolution. 
The Gang of Four committed many atrocities in the 10 years that the Cultural 
Revolution was in effect. After Mao's death in October 1976, the group was 
arrested and put on trial, leading to life and death sentences for them. 
Model Operas 
Mao Zedong had on several occasions, after the founding of the People's 
Republic of China, expressed disapproval of the operas that were being 
staged. He complained that though there had been reforms most operas were 
still dominated by Western ideologies and lifestyles. Mao wanted opera that 
would depict proletariat heroes f rom workers, peasants or soldiers. 
During the Cultural Revolution, Jiang Qing found an opportunity to revise 
the content of several Beijing Operas into Model Operas, whose format and 
style would be followed as standard. She made sure that the model operas 
were broadcast all the time on television and radio, made into movies and 
advertised wi th everywhere wi th posters. Performances were given all over 
China and each performance had to be identical and adhere to the model. 
Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign 
This was a campaign championed by Deng Xiaoping and other leaders of the 
Chinese Communist Party between October 1983 and February 1984. Its aim 
was to keep China free of Western liberal ideas that followed the "open door 
policy". 
Symbolic Environment 
Symbolic environment relates to China's long-term policy to bring about a 
harmonious society where everyone works towards the realisation of peace 
and stability. The current Chinese leadership believes that economic growth 
alone would not improve China better, but thatinclusivity is needed to enable 
people to live in harmony and prosper together. 
Class Struggle 
Class Struggle refers to Mao's continued efforts throughout his leadership to 
r id China of the development of ideas that might lead to people 
differentiating between each other and produce a class system in society. This 
was one of the causes of the Cultural Revolution. 
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Falungong 
It is an illegal cult in China. I t was founded by L i Hongzhi, who was an 
unemployed worker in Jilin province in 1990s. A t the begirmrng, he was 
training older people in parks and squares for Taiji and Martial Arts while 
studying traditional Buddhism theories. He then started to introduce his own 
theory and promote himself as the Master appointed by fate to lead. However, 
besides being involved in financial scandals, he had also mobilised a large 
demonstration in Beijing against the Government in the 1990s, and this was 
judged to be against the law of China. Since Li's escape f rom China, he has 
been supported by a number of US, Canadian and Japanese organisations in 
his activities around the world. 
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